Abuyasmine

عالم شيعي يحذر من انتقال النزاع الطائفي في العراق إلي السعودية

2006-05-07T03:32:00.000-07:00

Alquds Newspaper القدس العربي: "عالم شيعي يحذر من انتقال النزاع الطائفي في العراق إلي السعودي"

2006/05/05
لندن ـ يو بي آي: حذر رجل الدين الشيعي السعودي الشيخ حسن الصفار من أن النزاع الطائفي في العراق سينتقل إلي السعودية إذا ما شُجّع السنة في المملكة علي دعم السنة هناك والشيعة علي مساندة شيعة العراق.
ونسبت صحيفة فايننشال تايمز الصادرة امس إلي الشيخ الصفّار الذي وصفته بأنه أبرز رجال الدين الشيعة في السعودية قوله لم يحدث أي شيء سلبي حتي الآن لكننا نسمع بعض الأصوات العاطفية من كلا الجانبين رداً علي الأحداث بالعراق . واشار إلي أن الحكومة السعودية ورجال الدين الحكماء من الطرفين واعون تماماً لهذا الخطر الذي يهدد استقرار البلاد بسبب النزاع الطائفي في العراق، وتحركت وزارة الشؤون الدينية بسرعة لتطويق الخطابات الحماسية ضد الشيعة في المساجد .
وقالت فايننشال تايمز : ان غزو الولايات المتحدة للعراق دفع بالشيعة الذين واجهوا القمع فترة طويلة إلي الهيمنة علي المقاليد السياسية في البلاد وشجّع الأقلية الشيعية في السعودية علي المطالبة بالمساواة .
لكنها أشارت إلي ان شيعة السعودية يراقبون بهلع الآن تحول النزاع إلي طائفي في العراق ويخشون من أن ينتقل إلي بلدهم ويهدد المزايا الهشة التي بدأوا في اكتسابها مؤخراً . وقدرت الصحيفة عدد الشيعة في السعودية بنحو 1.5 مليون شخص من أصل عدد السكان البالغ 23 مليون نسمة يعيش معظمهم في المنطقة الشرقية حيث تتركز ثروة المملكة النفطية.

How to Lose Your Job at a Saudi Newspaper

2006-04-15T04:37:00.000-07:00

How to Lose Your Job at a Saudi Newspaper: "How to Lose Your Job at a Saudi Newspaper

By Fawaz Turki
Saturday, April 15, 2006; A15

I was unceremoniously fired this month by my Saudi newspaper, a leading English-language daily called Arab News.

It didn't matter that I had been the senior columnist on the op-ed page for nine years or that my work was quoted widely in the European and American media, including this paper. What mattered was that I had committed one of the three cardinal sins an Arab journalist must avoid when working for the Arab press: I criticized the government.

The other two? Bringing up Islam as an issue and criticizing, by name, political leaders in the Arab or Islamic world for their brazen excesses, dismal failures and blatant abuses.

Never mind that a newspaper cheapens and debases the idea of the journalistic enterprise when it enjoins its commentators against being critical of the government that it is supposed to be a watchdog over. Never mind the absurdity of preventing your contributors from touching on the issue of Islam, a social ideology whose embrace by jihadists is the top news story in the world today. And never mind that Arab society -- a society that remains broken in body and spirit more than a half-century after independence -- needs very much to engage in serious self-assessment and to promote an open debate in the media among intellectuals, academics, political analysts and others about why Arabs have failed all these years to meet the challenges of modernity.

But those are the stringent, not to mention pathetic, rules that determine how the Arab press conducts its business. You play by these rules or you're cut off. The problem is that if stringing words together is the only way you know how to make a living, you end up eating humble pie and playing the game by whatever rules they set for you.

Sometimes all it takes is a phone call to someone high up in your paper from a semi-literate government official who couldn't run a lunch counter, or a fundamentalist imam who hasn't read a half-dozen decent books in his life, or perhaps a disgruntled diplomat at a Muslim or Arab embassy in Riyadh who didn't like what you had to say in your column about his country. The result is the same: Your career is ruined.

Sometimes, if you're lucky, you will have an editorial page editor who likes your work, and he'll cut you a bit of slack and lobby on your behalf behind the scenes, often at the risk of losing his own job. But even in this case, three strikes and you're out.

My first provocation was -- horror of horrors -- to criticize Egyptian leader Hosni Mubarak after he cracked down on human rights activists several years ago. My second occurred soon after the failure of the Camp David accords when I called for the resignation of Yasser Arafat as head of the Palestinian Authority.

My last was to write about the atrocities Indonesia had committed during its occupation of East Timor from 1975 to 1999. For that transgression, my Saudi paper showed no mercy. I was out the door. No questions asked, no explanations given. You don't write about atrocities committed by an Islamic government -- even when they're already documented in the history books -- and hope to get away with it.

But this is not just the story of an Arab journalist losing his job. It is a story with implications for the current American administration's efforts to "introduce" the Arab countries to democracy, of which independent, free media are a major building block.

What Arabs, including those masquerading as their newspaper editors, have yet to learn is that a free press, a truly free press, is a moral imperative in society. Subvert it, and you subvert the public's sacrosanct right to know and a newspaper's traditional role to expose. If the Western democracies work better than many others, it is because to them the concept of accountability, expected from the head of state on down, is a crucial function of their national ideology.

What Arabs have yet to learn, in addition to that, is that newspapers are not published to advance the political preferences of proprietors, or the commentary of subservient analysts who turn a blind eye to the abuse of power by political leaders running their failed states.

Democracy may be a political system, but it is also a social ethos. How responsive can a country be to such an ethos when its people have, for generations, existed with an ethic of fear -- fear of originality, fear of innovation, fear of spontaneity, fear of life itself -- and have had instilled in them the need to accept orthodoxy, dependence and submission?

The Arab world today, sadly, remains a collection of disparate entities ruled for the most part by authoritarian regimes that rely on coercion, violence and terror to rule, and that demand from their citizens submission, obedience and conformity. And that includes those citizens who call themselves "journalists," to whom, by now, responsibility to truth and logic has become irrelevant.

In this atmosphere, it is regarded as an example of reportorial acumen to write on the op-ed pages of prominent Arab journals about how the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks were the work of Israeli agents, how the death of Princess Diana was the result of some diabolical plot by British intelligence to end her life rather than see her married to an Arab Muslim, how Monica Lewinsky was an agent-in-place, put in the White House by the "Jewish lobby" -- and so on with other infantile whimsies.

For Arabs, there is still a great divide between word and world. You can embrace conspiracy theories with impressive ease, and be accorded by your editors the right to pontificate about any foolish thing you want, but don't dare write about the malfeasance of political leaders in Egypt and Palestine, or the atrocities of a fellow-Muslim government in East Timor. The price you must pay for such offenses if you work for the Arab press is heavy indeed.

Fawaz Turki is a journalist living in Washington and the author of several books, including "The Disinherited: Journal of a Palestinian Exile." His e-mail address isdisinherited@yahoo.com.

How predictions for Iraq came true

2006-04-13T04:38:00.000-07:00

How predictions for Iraq came true

By John Simpson
BBC World Affairs Editor

The invasion has created a series of problems

It was a few weeks before the invasion of Iraq, three years ago. I was interviewing the Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, in the ballroom of a big hotel in Cairo.

Shrewd, amusing, bulky in his superb white robes, he described to me all the disasters he was certain would follow the invasion.

The US and British troops would be bogged down in Iraq for years. There would be civil war between Sunnis and Shias. The real beneficiary would be the government in Iran.

"And what do the Americans say when you tell them this," I asked? "They don't even listen," he said.

Over the last three years, from a ringside seat here in Baghdad, I have watched his predictions come true, stage by stage.

Falluja fallout

The first stage was the looting.

Iraqis have voted, but still have no government

As Saddam Hussein fled Baghdad, people started attacking every symbol of the old system, no matter how self-destructive that might be.

I saw crowds of people sacking a hospital, running out with bits of equipment which were useless to them, but essential to the running of the hospital.

At the information ministry, I watched them stripping the claddings from the walls and the underlay from the floors. The American soldiers outside did nothing to stop them. Sometimes they would fire in the air, but the looters scarcely even looked round.

Until then, most Iraqis had thought the US was all-powerful, and was there to help them. The perception started to change then and there.

For the next year, if you were careful, you could wander round Baghdad, and even drive to other parts of the country.

When we arrived for a tour of duty we travelled by road to Baghdad from Jordan, through places like Falluja, or else from Kuwait, past Nasiriya and Hilla. It was sometimes nerve-racking, but we always got through. Now there is no alternative to flying in.

The BBC, like most other news organisations, is based in the city centre, not inside the Green Zone. It still is, but now our bureau is protected like a fortress.

Everything in Iraq changed in April 2004, with the American onslaught on Falluja. The town is small, but it took a long time to subdue - and it never has been subdued entirely. The ferocity of the American attack angered a broad swathe of Iraqi opinion.

At the same time, against the advice of many Iraqi politicians, the Americans also took on the Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr.

After that, the towns and cities of central Iraq became markedly more dangerous. We started hearing more of the American acronym IED, or improvised explosive device (it simply means a bomb).

Post-traumatic stress

The Coalition Provisional Authority under the leadership of Paul Bremer handed over to an interim Iraqi administration in July 2004.

There is an all-out effort to provoke a civil war. The bombings of Shia shrines are always followed by the murder of individual Sunnis

It made little difference: the corruption had already started, and people now realised that neither the coalition nor the Iraqi administration could do anything about the failing water, power and fuel supplies.

The next key moment was the election of January 2005. The violence dropped noticeably, as the insurgents saw the size of the turnout and felt the general enthusiasm, and waited to see if they could do a deal with the new government.

But there was no new government for a full three months. The politicians squabbled among themselves, and the moment passed. The violence soon returned to its former level.

By July of last year there was already talk of civil war. A referendum and another election followed, and an effective administration was as far away as ever. Four months after the December election, Iraq still has no government.

'Easier targets'

The insurgency is fading a little now. Fewer American, British and Iraqi troops are dying, and there are less frequent attacks on the Iraqi police.

Instead, easier targets present themselves. There is an all-out effort to provoke a civil war. The bombings of Shia shrines are always followed by the murder of individual Sunnis: sometimes dozens at a time.

There is a quiet movement of population, as people leave mixed areas and head for places where others like them live. Marriages between Sunnis and Shias used to be frequent; now they've dropped away to almost nothing.

A psychiatrist at one of the main hospitals in Baghdad told me that serious mental illness in Iraq in the past had affected fewer than 3% of the population. Now, he said, the figure was 17%.

Another psychiatrist told me that in the days of Saddam Hussein, his patients had shown the effects of living under a ferocious dictatorship: stress levels were very high.

Now, he said, most of his patients suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder. It's no longer the fear of violence and injury which troubles them, it's the daily reality of it.

While we were filming, someone fired a gun close by. I won't easily forget the terrified way some of the patients flinched.

Doing and undoing

Just over three years ago, when I interviewed the Saudi foreign minister, I asked him why he thought the US was determined to invade Iraq.

He said he had put the same question to Vice-President Dick Cheney. Mr Cheney had replied: "Because it's do-able."

It was. The trouble is, undoing the kind of damage the Saudi foreign minister foresaw is proving very hard indeed.

Saudi Arabia must try to keep US in Iraq, says report

2006-04-11T03:32:00.000-07:00

Business Day - News Worth Knowing: "Saudi Arabia must try to keep US in Iraq, says report
Souhail Karam

Reuters

RIYADH — Saudi Arabia should try to avert Iraq’s fragmentation by lobbying against any premature withdrawal of US forces and pressing Iran to stop meddling, a report by a security adviser to the Saudi government says."

A civil war may be inevitable. Such a development would have the gravest implications for the entire region, especially Saudi Arabia, which shares its longest international borders with Iraq,” Nawaf Obaid said in his report on how Saudi Arabia should respond to the situation in Iraq.

The report, released by the US-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies, was based on dozens of interviews with military and intelligence officials in the region, and numerous conversations with Iranian officials, Obaid said.

Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal said on Sunday that the violence in Iraq could only be described as a civil war.

Obaid said it was crucial for Saudi Arabia to try to foster a stable, unified Iraq. “Saudi Arabia has a vested interest in preserving the integrity of Iraq and safeguarding the rights of Sunnis in a country dominated by Shiites.”

He said a premature US withdrawal would “precipitate a civil war and an immediate disintegration of the state”.

Saudi Arabia should try to use its influence in Washington to prevent this, he said, and should open talks with Iran.

“Tehran now sees an opportunity to fulfil one of the most cherished aims of the Iranian revolutionary experiment, ‘to export the revolution’. More simply stated, it wants to expand the reach of Shiite Islam,” the report said. “The time has arrived … to open a dialogue with Tehran and to make it clear the kingdom is conscious of their covert activities in Iraq.”

He said only talks with Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khomeini and Revolutionary Guard chiefs could get results.

Iran denies interfering in Iraq and has agreed to hold talks with US diplomats on stabilising its neighbour.

Obaid said Riyadh could send a strong regional message by inviting Grand Ayotollah Ali Sistani, the spiritual leader of Iraqi Shiites who is also revered by Saudi Shiites, to visit shrines in Saudi Arabia.

Obaid said Saudi Arabia, Iraq’s largest creditor, should also start talks to scrap an estimated $32bn debt.

“It will send a strong message that the Kingdom is not acting out of sectarian interests, but in the interests of Iraq and the region at large,” he said.

‖In Baghdad, pressure from Kurdish and Sunni leaders looked increasingly likely yesterday to force Iraq’s Shiite alliance to drop Ibrahim al-Jaafari as its choice for prime minister.

The stalemate since the December elections has seen fighting in Iraq spike. The Iraqi Accordance Front, the biggest Sunni bloc, said it had told the Shiite-dominated United Iraqi Alliance it still rejected al-Jaafari.

The alliance needs Sunni and Kurdish votes to secure a majority. The decision was postponed late yesterday.

The Israel Lobby

2006-03-30T03:40:00.000-08:00

LRB | John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt : The Israel Lobby: The Israel Lobby
John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt

For the past several decades, and especially since the Six-Day War in 1967, the centrepiece of US Middle Eastern policy has been its relationship with Israel. The combination of unwavering support for Israel and the related effort to spread ‘democracy’ throughout the region has inflamed Arab and Islamic opinion and jeopardised not only US security but that of much of the rest of the world. This situation has no equal in American political history. Why has the US been willing to set aside its own security and that of many of its allies in order to advance the interests of another state? One might assume that the bond between the two countries was based on shared strategic interests or compelling moral imperatives, but neither explanation can account for the remarkable level of material and diplomatic support that the US provides.

Instead, the thrust of US policy in the region derives almost entirely from domestic politics, and especially the activities of the ‘Israel Lobby’. Other special-interest groups have managed to skew foreign policy, but no lobby has managed to divert it as far from what the national interest would suggest, while simultaneously convincing Americans that US interests and those of the other country – in this case, Israel – are essentially identical.

Since the October War in 1973, Washington has provided Israel with a level of support dwarfing that given to any other state. It has been the largest annual recipient of direct economic and military assistance since 1976, and is the largest recipient in total since World War Two, to the tune of well over $140 billion (in 2004 dollars). Israel receives about $3 billion in direct assistance each year, roughly one-fifth of the foreign aid budget, and worth about $500 a year for every Israeli. This largesse is especially striking since Israel is now a wealthy industrial state with a per capita income roughly equal to that of South Korea or Spain.

Other recipients get their money in quarterly installments, but Israel receives its entire appropriation at the beginning of each fiscal year and can thus earn interest on it. Most recipients of aid given for military purposes are required to spend all of it in the US, but Israel is allowed to use roughly 25 per cent of its allocation to subsidise its own defence industry. It is the only recipient that does not have to account for how the aid is spent, which makes it virtually impossible to prevent the money from being used for purposes the US opposes, such as building settlements on the West Bank. Moreover, the US has provided Israel with nearly $3 billion to develop weapons systems, and given it access to such top-drawer weaponry as Blackhawk helicopters and F-16 jets. Finally, the US gives Israel access to intelligence it denies to its Nato allies and has turned a blind eye to Israel’s acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Washington also provides Israel with consistent diplomatic support. Since 1982, the US has vetoed 32 Security Council resolutions critical of Israel, more than the total number of vetoes cast by all the other Security Council members. It blocks the efforts of Arab states to put Israel’s nuclear arsenal on the IAEA’s agenda. The US comes to the rescue in wartime and takes Israel’s side when negotiating peace. The Nixon administration protected it from the threat of Soviet intervention and resupplied it during the October War. Washington was deeply involved in the negotiations that ended that war, as well as in the lengthy ‘step-by-step’ process that followed, just as it played a key role in the negotiations that preceded and followed the 1993 Oslo Accords. In each case there was occasional friction between US and Israeli officials, but the US consistently supported the Israeli position. One American participant at Camp David in 2000 later said: ‘Far too often, we functioned . . . as Israel’s lawyer.’ Finally, the Bush administration’s ambition to transform the Middle East is at least partly aimed at improving Israel’s strategic situation.

This extraordinary generosity might be understandable if Israel were a vital strategic asset or if there were a compelling moral case for US backing. But neither explanation is convincing. One might argue that Israel was an asset during the Cold War. By serving as America’s proxy after 1967, it helped contain Soviet expansion in the region and inflicted humiliating defeats on Soviet clients like Egypt and Syria. It occasionally helped protect other US allies (like King Hussein of Jordan) and its military prowess forced Moscow to spend more on backing its own client states. It also provided useful intelligence about Soviet capabilities.

Backing Israel was not cheap, however, and it complicated America’s relations with the Arab world. For example, the decision to give $2.2 billion in emergency military aid during the October War triggered an Opec oil embargo that inflicted considerable damage on Western economies. For all that, Israel’s armed forces were not in a position to protect US interests in the region. The US could not, for example, rely on Israel when the Iranian Revolution in 1979 raised concerns about the security of oil supplies, and had to create its own Rapid Deployment Force instead.

The first Gulf War revealed the extent to which Israel was becoming a strategic burden. The US could not use Israeli bases without rupturing the anti-Iraq coalition, and had to divert resources (e.g. Patriot missile batteries) to prevent Tel Aviv doing anything that might harm the alliance against Saddam Hussein. History repeated itself in 2003: although Israel was eager for the US to attack Iraq, Bush could not ask it to help without triggering Arab opposition. So Israel stayed on the sidelines once again.

Beginning in the 1990s, and even more after 9/11, US support has been justified by the claim that both states are threatened by terrorist groups originating in the Arab and Muslim world, and by ‘rogue states’ that back these groups and seek weapons of mass destruction. This is taken to mean not only that Washington should give Israel a free hand in dealing with the Palestinians and not press it to make concessions until all Palestinian terrorists are imprisoned or dead, but that the US should go after countries like Iran and Syria. Israel is thus seen as a crucial ally in the war on terror, because its enemies are America’s enemies. In fact, Israel is a liability in the war on terror and the broader effort to deal with rogue states.

‘Terrorism’ is not a single adversary, but a tactic employed by a wide array of political groups. The terrorist organisations that threaten Israel do not threaten the United States, except when it intervenes against them (as in Lebanon in 1982). Moreover, Palestinian terrorism is not random violence directed against Israel or ‘the West’; it is largely a response to Israel’s prolonged campaign to colonise the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

More important, saying that Israel and the US are united by a shared terrorist threat has the causal relationship backwards: the US has a terrorism problem in good part because it is so closely allied with Israel, not the other way around. Support for Israel is not the only source of anti-American terrorism, but it is an important one, and it makes winning the war on terror more difficult. There is no question that many al-Qaida leaders, including Osama bin Laden, are motivated by Israel’s presence in Jerusalem and the plight of the Palestinians. Unconditional support for Israel makes it easier for extremists to rally popular support and to attract recruits.

As for so-called rogue states in the Middle East, they are not a dire threat to vital US interests, except inasmuch as they are a threat to Israel. Even if these states acquire nuclear weapons – which is obviously undesirable – neither America nor Israel could be blackmailed, because the blackmailer could not carry out the threat without suffering overwhelming retaliation. The danger of a nuclear handover to terrorists is equally remote, because a rogue state could not be sure the transfer would go undetected or that it would not be blamed and punished afterwards. The relationship with Israel actually makes it harder for the US to deal with these states. Israel’s nuclear arsenal is one reason some of its neighbours want nuclear weapons, and threatening them with regime change merely increases that desire.

A final reason to question Israel’s strategic value is that it does not behave like a loyal ally. Israeli officials frequently ignore US requests and renege on promises (including pledges to stop building settlements and to refrain from ‘targeted assassinations’ of Palestinian leaders). Israel has provided sensitive military technology to potential rivals like China, in what the State Department inspector-general called ‘a systematic and growing pattern of unauthorised transfers’. According to the General Accounting Office, Israel also ‘conducts the most aggressive espionage operations against the US of any ally’. In addition to the case of Jonathan Pollard, who gave Israel large quantities of classified material in the early 1980s (which it reportedly passed on to the Soviet Union in return for more exit visas for Soviet Jews), a new controversy erupted in 2004 when it was revealed that a key Pentagon official called Larry Franklin had passed classified information to an Israeli diplomat. Israel is hardly the only country that spies on the US, but its willingness to spy on its principal patron casts further doubt on its strategic value.

Israel’s strategic value isn’t the only issue. Its backers also argue that it deserves unqualified support because it is weak and surrounded by enemies; it is a democracy; the Jewish people have suffered from past crimes and therefore deserve special treatment; and Israel’s conduct has been morally superior to that of its adversaries. On close inspection, none of these arguments is persuasive. There is a strong moral case for supporting Israel’s existence, but that is not in jeopardy. Viewed objectively, its past and present conduct offers no moral basis for privileging it over the Palestinians.

Israel is often portrayed as David confronted by Goliath, but the converse is closer to the truth. Contrary to popular belief, the Zionists had larger, better equipped and better led forces during the 1947-49 War of Independence, and the Israel Defence Forces won quick and easy victories against Egypt in 1956 and against Egypt, Jordan and Syria in 1967 – all of this before large-scale US aid began flowing. Today, Israel is the strongest military power in the Middle East. Its conventional forces are far superior to those of its neighbours and it is the only state in the region with nuclear weapons. Egypt and Jordan have signed peace treaties with it, and Saudi Arabia has offered to do so. Syria has lost its Soviet patron, Iraq has been devastated by three disastrous wars and Iran is hundreds of miles away. The Palestinians barely have an effective police force, let alone an army that could pose a threat to Israel. According to a 2005 assessment by Tel Aviv University’s Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies, ‘the strategic balance decidedly favours Israel, which has continued to widen the qualitative gap between its own military capability and deterrence powers and those of its neighbours.’ If backing the underdog were a compelling motive, the United States would be supporting Israel’s opponents.

That Israel is a fellow democracy surrounded by hostile dictatorships cannot account for the current level of aid: there are many democracies around the world, but none receives the same lavish support. The US has overthrown democratic governments in the past and supported dictators when this was thought to advance its interests – it has good relations with a number of dictatorships today.

Some aspects of Israeli democracy are at odds with core American values. Unlike the US, where people are supposed to enjoy equal rights irrespective of race, religion or ethnicity, Israel was explicitly founded as a Jewish state and citizenship is based on the principle of blood kinship. Given this, it is not surprising that its 1.3 million Arabs are treated as second-class citizens, or that a recent Israeli government commission found that Israel behaves in a ‘neglectful and discriminatory’ manner towards them. Its democratic status is also undermined by its refusal to grant the Palestinians a viable state of their own or full political rights.

A third justification is the history of Jewish suffering in the Christian West, especially during the Holocaust. Because Jews were persecuted for centuries and could feel safe only in a Jewish homeland, many people now believe that Israel deserves special treatment from the United States. The country’s creation was undoubtedly an appropriate response to the long record of crimes against Jews, but it also brought about fresh crimes against a largely innocent third party: the Palestinians.

This was well understood by Israel’s early leaders. David Ben-Gurion told Nahum Goldmann, the president of the World Jewish Congress:

If I were an Arab leader I would never make terms with Israel. That is natural: we have taken their country . . . We come from Israel, but two thousand years ago, and what is that to them? There has been anti-semitism, the Nazis, Hitler, Auschwitz, but was that their fault? They only see one thing: we have come here and stolen their country. Why should they accept that?

Since then, Israeli leaders have repeatedly sought to deny the Palestinians’ national ambitions. When she was prime minister, Golda Meir famously remarked that ‘there is no such thing as a Palestinian.’ Pressure from extremist violence and Palestinian population growth has forced subsequent Israeli leaders to disengage from the Gaza Strip and consider other territorial compromises, but not even Yitzhak Rabin was willing to offer the Palestinians a viable state. Ehud Barak’s purportedly generous offer at Camp David would have given them only a disarmed set of Bantustans under de facto Israeli control. The tragic history of the Jewish people does not obligate the US to help Israel today no matter what it does.

Israel’s backers also portray it as a country that has sought peace at every turn and shown great restraint even when provoked. The Arabs, by contrast, are said to have acted with great wickedness. Yet on the ground, Israel’s record is not distinguishable from that of its opponents. Ben-Gurion acknowledged that the early Zionists were far from benevolent towards the Palestinian Arabs, who resisted their encroachments – which is hardly surprising, given that the Zionists were trying to create their own state on Arab land. In the same way, the creation of Israel in 1947-48 involved acts of ethnic cleansing, including executions, massacres and rapes by Jews, and Israel’s subsequent conduct has often been brutal, belying any claim to moral superiority. Between 1949 and 1956, for example, Israeli security forces killed between 2700 and 5000 Arab infiltrators, the overwhelming majority of them unarmed. The IDF murdered hundreds of Egyptian prisoners of war in both the 1956 and 1967 wars, while in 1967, it expelled between 100,000 and 260,000 Palestinians from the newly conquered West Bank, and drove 80,000 Syrians from the Golan Heights.

During the first intifada, the IDF distributed truncheons to its troops and encouraged them to break the bones of Palestinian protesters. The Swedish branch of Save the Children estimated that ‘23,600 to 29,900 children required medical treatment for their beating injuries in the first two years of the intifada.’ Nearly a third of them were aged ten or under. The response to the second intifada has been even more violent, leading Ha’aretz to declare that ‘the IDF . . . is turning into a killing machine whose efficiency is awe-inspiring, yet shocking.’ The IDF fired one million bullets in the first days of the uprising. Since then, for every Israeli lost, Israel has killed 3.4 Palestinians, the majority of whom have been innocent bystanders; the ratio of Palestinian to Israeli children killed is even higher (5.7:1). It is also worth bearing in mind that the Zionists relied on terrorist bombs to drive the British from Palestine, and that Yitzhak Shamir, once a terrorist and later prime minister, declared that ‘neither Jewish ethics nor Jewish tradition can disqualify terrorism as a means of combat.’

The Palestinian resort to terrorism is wrong but it isn’t surprising. The Palestinians believe they have no other way to force Israeli concessions. As Ehud Barak once admitted, had he been born a Palestinian, he ‘would have joined a terrorist organisation’.

So if neither strategic nor moral arguments can account for America’s support for Israel, how are we to explain it?

The explanation is the unmatched power of the Israel Lobby. We use ‘the Lobby’ as shorthand for the loose coalition of individuals and organisations who actively work to steer US foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction. This is not meant to suggest that ‘the Lobby’ is a unified movement with a central leadership, or that individuals within it do not disagree on certain issues. Not all Jewish Americans are part of the Lobby, because Israel is not a salient issue for many of them. In a 2004 survey, for example, roughly 36 per cent of American Jews said they were either ‘not very’ or ‘not at all’ emotionally attached to Israel.

Jewish Americans also differ on specific Israeli policies. Many of the key organisations in the Lobby, such as the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organisations, are run by hardliners who generally support the Likud Party’s expansionist policies, including its hostility to the Oslo peace process. The bulk of US Jewry, meanwhile, is more inclined to make concessions to the Palestinians, and a few groups – such as Jewish Voice for Peace – strongly advocate such steps. Despite these differences, moderates and hardliners both favour giving steadfast support to Israel.

Not surprisingly, American Jewish leaders often consult Israeli officials, to make sure that their actions advance Israeli goals. As one activist from a major Jewish organisation wrote, ‘it is routine for us to say: “This is our policy on a certain issue, but we must check what the Israelis think.” We as a community do it all the time.’ There is a strong prejudice against criticising Israeli policy, and putting pressure on Israel is considered out of order. Edgar Bronfman Sr, the president of the World Jewish Congress, was accused of ‘perfidy’ when he wrote a letter to President Bush in mid-2003 urging him to persuade Israel to curb construction of its controversial ‘security fence’. His critics said that ‘it would be obscene at any time for the president of the World Jewish Congress to lobby the president of the United States to resist policies being promoted by the government of Israel.’

Similarly, when the president of the Israel Policy Forum, Seymour Reich, advised Condoleezza Rice in November 2005 to ask Israel to reopen a critical border crossing in the Gaza Strip, his action was denounced as ‘irresponsible’: ‘There is,’ his critics said, ‘absolutely no room in the Jewish mainstream for actively canvassing against the security-related policies . . . of Israel.’ Recoiling from these attacks, Reich announced that ‘the word “pressure” is not in my vocabulary when it comes to Israel.’

Jewish Americans have set up an impressive array of organisations to influence American foreign policy, of which AIPAC is the most powerful and best known. In 1997, Fortune magazine asked members of Congress and their staffs to list the most powerful lobbies in Washington. AIPAC was ranked second behind the American Association of Retired People, but ahead of the AFL-CIO and the National Rifle Association. A National Journal study in March 2005 reached a similar conclusion, placing AIPAC in second place (tied with AARP) in the Washington ‘muscle rankings’.

The Lobby also includes prominent Christian evangelicals like Gary Bauer, Jerry Falwell, Ralph Reed and Pat Robertson, as well as Dick Armey and Tom DeLay, former majority leaders in the House of Representatives, all of whom believe Israel’s rebirth is the fulfilment of biblical prophecy and support its expansionist agenda; to do otherwise, they believe, would be contrary to God’s will. Neo-conservative gentiles such as John Bolton; Robert Bartley, the former Wall Street Journal editor; William Bennett, the former secretary of education; Jeane Kirkpatrick, the former UN ambassador; and the influential columnist George Will are also steadfast supporters.

The US form of government offers activists many ways of influencing the policy process. Interest groups can lobby elected representatives and members of the executive branch, make campaign contributions, vote in elections, try to mould public opinion etc. They enjoy a disproportionate amount of influence when they are committed to an issue to which the bulk of the population is indifferent. Policymakers will tend to accommodate those who care about the issue, even if their numbers are small, confident that the rest of the population will not penalise them for doing so.

In its basic operations, the Israel Lobby is no different from the farm lobby, steel or textile workers’ unions, or other ethnic lobbies. There is nothing improper about American Jews and their Christian allies attempting to sway US policy: the Lobby’s activities are not a conspiracy of the sort depicted in tracts like the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. For the most part, the individuals and groups that comprise it are only doing what other special interest groups do, but doing it very much better. By contrast, pro-Arab interest groups, in so far as they exist at all, are weak, which makes the Israel Lobby’s task even easier.

The Lobby pursues two broad strategies. First, it wields its significant influence in Washington, pressuring both Congress and the executive branch. Whatever an individual lawmaker or policymaker’s own views may be, the Lobby tries to make supporting Israel the ‘smart’ choice. Second, it strives to ensure that public discourse portrays Israel in a positive light, by repeating myths about its founding and by promoting its point of view in policy debates. The goal is to prevent critical comments from getting a fair hearing in the political arena. Controlling the debate is essential to guaranteeing US support, because a candid discussion of US-Israeli relations might lead Americans to favour a different policy.

A key pillar of the Lobby’s effectiveness is its influence in Congress, where Israel is virtually immune from criticism. This in itself is remarkable, because Congress rarely shies away from contentious issues. Where Israel is concerned, however, potential critics fall silent. One reason is that some key members are Christian Zionists like Dick Armey, who said in September 2002: ‘My No. 1 priority in foreign policy is to protect Israel.’ One might think that the No. 1 priority for any congressman would be to protect America. There are also Jewish senators and congressmen who work to ensure that US foreign policy supports Israel’s interests.

Another source of the Lobby’s power is its use of pro-Israel congressional staffers. As Morris Amitay, a former head of AIPAC, once admitted, ‘there are a lot of guys at the working level up here’ – on Capitol Hill – ‘who happen to be Jewish, who are willing . . . to look at certain issues in terms of their Jewishness . . . These are all guys who are in a position to make the decision in these areas for those senators . . . You can get an awful lot done just at the staff level.’

AIPAC itself, however, forms the core of the Lobby’s influence in Congress. Its success is due to its ability to reward legislators and congressional candidates who support its agenda, and to punish those who challenge it. Money is critical to US elections (as the scandal over the lobbyist Jack Abramoff’s shady dealings reminds us), and AIPAC makes sure that its friends get strong financial support from the many pro-Israel political action committees. Anyone who is seen as hostile to Israel can be sure that AIPAC will direct campaign contributions to his or her political opponents. AIPAC also organises letter-writing campaigns and encourages newspaper editors to endorse pro-Israel candidates.

There is no doubt about the efficacy of these tactics. Here is one example: in the 1984 elections, AIPAC helped defeat Senator Charles Percy from Illinois, who, according to a prominent Lobby figure, had ‘displayed insensitivity and even hostility to our concerns’. Thomas Dine, the head of AIPAC at the time, explained what happened: ‘All the Jews in America, from coast to coast, gathered to oust Percy. And the American politicians – those who hold public positions now, and those who aspire – got the message.’

AIPAC’s influence on Capitol Hill goes even further. According to Douglas Bloomfield, a former AIPAC staff member, ‘it is common for members of Congress and their staffs to turn to AIPAC first when they need information, before calling the Library of Congress, the Congressional Research Service, committee staff or administration experts.’ More important, he notes that AIPAC is ‘often called on to draft speeches, work on legislation, advise on tactics, perform research, collect co-sponsors and marshal votes’.

The bottom line is that AIPAC, a de facto agent for a foreign government, has a stranglehold on Congress, with the result that US policy towards Israel is not debated there, even though that policy has important consequences for the entire world. In other words, one of the three main branches of the government is firmly committed to supporting Israel. As one former Democratic senator, Ernest Hollings, noted on leaving office, ‘you can’t have an Israeli policy other than what AIPAC gives you around here.’ Or as Ariel Sharon once told an American audience, ‘when people ask me how they can help Israel, I tell them: “Help AIPAC.”’

Thanks in part to the influence Jewish voters have on presidential elections, the Lobby also has significant leverage over the executive branch. Although they make up fewer than 3 per cent of the population, they make large campaign donations to candidates from both parties. The Washington Post once estimated that Democratic presidential candidates ‘depend on Jewish supporters to supply as much as 60 per cent of the money’. And because Jewish voters have high turn-out rates and are concentrated in key states like California, Florida, Illinois, New York and Pennsylvania, presidential candidates go to great lengths not to antagonise them.

Key organisations in the Lobby make it their business to ensure that critics of Israel do not get important foreign policy jobs. Jimmy Carter wanted to make George Ball his first secretary of state, but knew that Ball was seen as critical of Israel and that the Lobby would oppose the appointment. In this way any aspiring policymaker is encouraged to become an overt supporter of Israel, which is why public critics of Israeli policy have become an endangered species in the foreign policy establishment.

When Howard Dean called for the United States to take a more ‘even-handed role’ in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Senator Joseph Lieberman accused him of selling Israel down the river and said his statement was ‘irresponsible’. Virtually all the top Democrats in the House signed a letter criticising Dean’s remarks, and the Chicago Jewish Star reported that ‘anonymous attackers . . . are clogging the email inboxes of Jewish leaders around the country, warning – without much evidence – that Dean would somehow be bad for Israel.’

This worry was absurd; Dean is in fact quite hawkish on Israel: his campaign co-chair was a former AIPAC president, and Dean said his own views on the Middle East more closely reflected those of AIPAC than those of the more moderate Americans for Peace Now. He had merely suggested that to ‘bring the sides together’, Washington should act as an honest broker. This is hardly a radical idea, but the Lobby doesn’t tolerate even-handedness.

During the Clinton administration, Middle Eastern policy was largely shaped by officials with close ties to Israel or to prominent pro-Israel organisations; among them, Martin Indyk, the former deputy director of research at AIPAC and co-founder of the pro-Israel Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP); Dennis Ross, who joined WINEP after leaving government in 2001; and Aaron Miller, who has lived in Israel and often visits the country. These men were among Clinton’s closest advisers at the Camp David summit in July 2000. Although all three supported the Oslo peace process and favoured the creation of a Palestinian state, they did so only within the limits of what would be acceptable to Israel. The American delegation took its cues from Ehud Barak, co-ordinated its negotiating positions with Israel in advance, and did not offer independent proposals. Not surprisingly, Palestinian negotiators complained that they were ‘negotiating with two Israeli teams – one displaying an Israeli flag, and one an American flag’.

The situation is even more pronounced in the Bush administration, whose ranks have included such fervent advocates of the Israeli cause as Elliot Abrams, John Bolton, Douglas Feith, I. Lewis (‘Scooter’) Libby, Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz and David Wurmser. As we shall see, these officials have consistently pushed for policies favoured by Israel and backed by organisations in the Lobby.

The Lobby doesn’t want an open debate, of course, because that might lead Americans to question the level of support they provide. Accordingly, pro-Israel organisations work hard to influence the institutions that do most to shape popular opinion.

The Lobby’s perspective prevails in the mainstream media: the debate among Middle East pundits, the journalist Eric Alterman writes, is ‘dominated by people who cannot imagine criticising Israel’. He lists 61 ‘columnists and commentators who can be counted on to support Israel reflexively and without qualification’. Conversely, he found just five pundits who consistently criticise Israeli actions or endorse Arab positions. Newspapers occasionally publish guest op-eds challenging Israeli policy, but the balance of opinion clearly favours the other side. It is hard to imagine any mainstream media outlet in the United States publishing a piece like this one.

‘Shamir, Sharon, Bibi – whatever those guys want is pretty much fine by me,’ Robert Bartley once remarked. Not surprisingly, his newspaper, the Wall Street Journal, along with other prominent papers like the Chicago Sun-Times and the Washington Times, regularly runs editorials that strongly support Israel. Magazines like Commentary, the New Republic and the Weekly Standard defend Israel at every turn.

Editorial bias is also found in papers like the New York Times, which occasionally criticises Israeli policies and sometimes concedes that the Palestinians have legitimate grievances, but is not even-handed. In his memoirs the paper’s former executive editor Max Frankel acknowledges the impact his own attitude had on his editorial decisions: ‘I was much more deeply devoted to Israel than I dared to assert . . . Fortified by my knowledge of Israel and my friendships there, I myself wrote most of our Middle East commentaries. As more Arab than Jewish readers recognised, I wrote them from a pro-Israel perspective.’

News reports are more even-handed, in part because reporters strive to be objective, but also because it is difficult to cover events in the Occupied Territories without acknowledging Israel’s actions on the ground. To discourage unfavourable reporting, the Lobby organises letter-writing campaigns, demonstrations and boycotts of news outlets whose content it considers anti-Israel. One CNN executive has said that he sometimes gets 6000 email messages in a single day complaining about a story. In May 2003, the pro-Israel Committee for Accurate Middle East Reporting in America (CAMERA) organised demonstrations outside National Public Radio stations in 33 cities; it also tried to persuade contributors to withhold support from NPR until its Middle East coverage becomes more sympathetic to Israel. Boston’s NPR station, WBUR, reportedly lost more than $1 million in contributions as a result of these efforts. Further pressure on NPR has come from Israel’s friends in Congress, who have asked for an internal audit of its Middle East coverage as well as more oversight.

The Israeli side also dominates the think tanks which play an important role in shaping public debate as well as actual policy. The Lobby created its own think tank in 1985, when Martin Indyk helped to found WINEP. Although WINEP plays down its links to Israel, claiming instead to provide a ‘balanced and realistic’ perspective on Middle East issues, it is funded and run by individuals deeply committed to advancing Israel’s agenda.

The Lobby’s influence extends well beyond WINEP, however. Over the past 25 years, pro-Israel forces have established a commanding presence at the American Enterprise Institute, the Brookings Institution, the Center for Security Policy, the Foreign Policy Research Institute, the Heritage Foundation, the Hudson Institute, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis and the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA). These think tanks employ few, if any, critics of US support for Israel.

Take the Brookings Institution. For many years, its senior expert on the Middle East was William Quandt, a former NSC official with a well-deserved reputation for even-handedness. Today, Brookings’s coverage is conducted through the Saban Center for Middle East Studies, which is financed by Haim Saban, an Israeli-American businessman and ardent Zionist. The centre’s director is the ubiquitous Martin Indyk. What was once a non-partisan policy institute is now part of the pro-Israel chorus.

Where the Lobby has had the most difficulty is in stifling debate on university campuses. In the 1990s, when the Oslo peace process was underway, there was only mild criticism of Israel, but it grew stronger with Oslo’s collapse and Sharon’s access to power, becoming quite vociferous when the IDF reoccupied the West Bank in spring 2002 and employed massive force to subdue the second intifada.

The Lobby moved immediately to ‘take back the campuses’. New groups sprang up, like the Caravan for Democracy, which brought Israeli speakers to US colleges. Established groups like the Jewish Council for Public Affairs and Hillel joined in, and a new group, the Israel on Campus Coalition, was formed to co-ordinate the many bodies that now sought to put Israel’s case. Finally, AIPAC more than tripled its spending on programmes to monitor university activities and to train young advocates, in order to ‘vastly expand the number of students involved on campus . . . in the national pro-Israel effort’.

The Lobby also monitors what professors write and teach. In September 2002, Martin Kramer and Daniel Pipes, two passionately pro-Israel neo-conservatives, established a website (Campus Watch) that posted dossiers on suspect academics and encouraged students to report remarks or behaviour that might be considered hostile to Israel. This transparent attempt to blacklist and intimidate scholars provoked a harsh reaction and Pipes and Kramer later removed the dossiers, but the website still invites students to report ‘anti-Israel’ activity.

Groups within the Lobby put pressure on particular academics and universities. Columbia has been a frequent target, no doubt because of the presence of the late Edward Said on its faculty. ‘One can be sure that any public statement in support of the Palestinian people by the pre-eminent literary critic Edward Said will elicit hundreds of emails, letters and journalistic accounts that call on us to denounce Said and to either sanction or fire him,’ Jonathan Cole, its former provost, reported. When Columbia recruited the historian Rashid Khalidi from Chicago, the same thing happened. It was a problem Princeton also faced a few years later when it considered wooing Khalidi away from Columbia.

A classic illustration of the effort to police academia occurred towards the end of 2004, when the David Project produced a film alleging that faculty members of Columbia’s Middle East Studies programme were anti-semitic and were intimidating Jewish students who stood up for Israel. Columbia was hauled over the coals, but a faculty committee which was assigned to investigate the charges found no evidence of anti-semitism and the only incident possibly worth noting was that one professor had ‘responded heatedly’ to a student’s question. The committee also discovered that the academics in question had themselves been the target of an overt campaign of intimidation.

Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of all this is the efforts Jewish groups have made to push Congress into establishing mechanisms to monitor what professors say. If they manage to get this passed, universities judged to have an anti-Israel bias would be denied federal funding. Their efforts have not yet succeeded, but they are an indication of the importance placed on controlling debate.

A number of Jewish philanthropists have recently established Israel Studies programmes (in addition to the roughly 130 Jewish Studies programmes already in existence) so as to increase the number of Israel-friendly scholars on campus. In May 2003, NYU announced the establishment of the Taub Center for Israel Studies; similar programmes have been set up at Berkeley, Brandeis and Emory. Academic administrators emphasise their pedagogical value, but the truth is that they are intended in large part to promote Israel’s image. Fred Laffer, the head of the Taub Foundation, makes it clear that his foundation funded the NYU centre to help counter the ‘Arabic [sic] point of view’ that he thinks is prevalent in NYU’s Middle East programmes.

No discussion of the Lobby would be complete without an examination of one of its most powerful weapons: the charge of anti-semitism. Anyone who criticises Israel’s actions or argues that pro-Israel groups have significant influence over US Middle Eastern policy – an influence AIPAC celebrates – stands a good chance of being labelled an anti-semite. Indeed, anyone who merely claims that there is an Israel Lobby runs the risk of being charged with anti-semitism, even though the Israeli media refer to America’s ‘Jewish Lobby’. In other words, the Lobby first boasts of its influence and then attacks anyone who calls attention to it. It’s a very effective tactic: anti-semitism is something no one wants to be accused of.

Europeans have been more willing than Americans to criticise Israeli policy, which some people attribute to a resurgence of anti-semitism in Europe. We are ‘getting to a point’, the US ambassador to the EU said in early 2004, ‘where it is as bad as it was in the 1930s’. Measuring anti-semitism is a complicated matter, but the weight of evidence points in the opposite direction. In the spring of 2004, when accusations of European anti-semitism filled the air in America, separate surveys of European public opinion conducted by the US-based Anti-Defamation League and the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press found that it was in fact declining. In the 1930s, by contrast, anti-semitism was not only widespread among Europeans of all classes but considered quite acceptable.

The Lobby and its friends often portray France as the most anti-semitic country in Europe. But in 2003, the head of the French Jewish community said that ‘France is not more anti-semitic than America.’ According to a recent article in Ha’aretz, the French police have reported that anti-semitic incidents declined by almost 50 per cent in 2005; and this even though France has the largest Muslim population of any European country. Finally, when a French Jew was murdered in Paris last month by a Muslim gang, tens of thousands of demonstrators poured into the streets to condemn anti-semitism. Jacques Chirac and Dominique de Villepin both attended the victim’s memorial service to show their solidarity.

No one would deny that there is anti-semitism among European Muslims, some of it provoked by Israel’s conduct towards the Palestinians and some of it straightforwardly racist. But this is a separate matter with little bearing on whether or not Europe today is like Europe in the 1930s. Nor would anyone deny that there are still some virulent autochthonous anti-semites in Europe (as there are in the United States) but their numbers are small and their views are rejected by the vast majority of Europeans.

Israel’s advocates, when pressed to go beyond mere assertion, claim that there is a ‘new anti-semitism’, which they equate with criticism of Israel. In other words, criticise Israeli policy and you are by definition an anti-semite. When the synod of the Church of England recently voted to divest from Caterpillar Inc on the grounds that it manufactures the bulldozers used by the Israelis to demolish Palestinian homes, the Chief Rabbi complained that this would ‘have the most adverse repercussions on . . . Jewish-Christian relations in Britain’, while Rabbi Tony Bayfield, the head of the Reform movement, said: ‘There is a clear problem of anti-Zionist – verging on anti-semitic – attitudes emerging in the grass-roots, and even in the middle ranks of the Church.’ But the Church was guilty merely of protesting against Israeli government policy.

Critics are also accused of holding Israel to an unfair standard or questioning its right to exist. But these are bogus charges too. Western critics of Israel hardly ever question its right to exist: they question its behaviour towards the Palestinians, as do Israelis themselves. Nor is Israel being judged unfairly. Israeli treatment of the Palestinians elicits criticism because it is contrary to widely accepted notions of human rights, to international law and to the principle of national self-determination. And it is hardly the only state that has faced sharp criticism on these grounds.

In the autumn of 2001, and especially in the spring of 2002, the Bush administration tried to reduce anti-American sentiment in the Arab world and undermine support for terrorist groups like al-Qaida by halting Israel’s expansionist policies in the Occupied Territories and advocating the creation of a Palestinian state. Bush had very significant means of persuasion at his disposal. He could have threatened to reduce economic and diplomatic support for Israel, and the American people would almost certainly have supported him. A May 2003 poll reported that more than 60 per cent of Americans were willing to withhold aid if Israel resisted US pressure to settle the conflict, and that number rose to 70 per cent among the ‘politically active’. Indeed, 73 per cent said that the United States should not favour either side.

Yet the administration failed to change Israeli policy, and Washington ended up backing it. Over time, the administration also adopted Israel’s own justifications of its position, so that US rhetoric began to mimic Israeli rhetoric. By February 2003, a Washington Post headline summarised the situation: ‘Bush and Sharon Nearly Identical on Mideast Policy.’ The main reason for this switch was the Lobby.

The story begins in late September 2001, when Bush began urging Sharon to show restraint in the Occupied Territories. He also pressed him to allow Israel’s foreign minister, Shimon Peres, to meet with Yasser Arafat, even though he (Bush) was highly critical of Arafat’s leadership. Bush even said publicly that he supported the creation of a Palestinian state. Alarmed, Sharon accused him of trying ‘to appease the Arabs at our expense’, warning that Israel ‘will not be Czechoslovakia’.

Bush was reportedly furious at being compared to Chamberlain, and the White House press secretary called Sharon’s remarks ‘unacceptable’. Sharon offered a pro forma apology, but quickly joined forces with the Lobby to persuade the administration and the American people that the United States and Israel faced a common threat from terrorism. Israeli officials and Lobby representatives insisted that there was no real difference between Arafat and Osama bin Laden: the United States and Israel, they said, should isolate the Palestinians’ elected leader and have nothing to do with him.

The Lobby also went to work in Congress. On 16 November, 89 senators sent Bush a letter praising him for refusing to meet with Arafat, but also demanding that the US not restrain Israel from retaliating against the Palestinians; the administration, they wrote, must state publicly that it stood behind Israel. According to the New York Times, the letter ‘stemmed’ from a meeting two weeks before between ‘leaders of the American Jewish community and key senators’, adding that AIPAC was ‘particularly active in providing advice on the letter’.

By late November, relations between Tel Aviv and Washington had improved considerably. This was thanks in part to the Lobby’s efforts, but also to America’s initial victory in Afghanistan, which reduced the perceived need for Arab support in dealing with al-Qaida. Sharon visited the White House in early December and had a friendly meeting with Bush.

In April 2002 trouble erupted again, after the IDF launched Operation Defensive Shield and resumed control of virtually all the major Palestinian areas on the West Bank. Bush knew that Israel’s actions would damage America’s image in the Islamic world and undermine the war on terrorism, so he demanded that Sharon ‘halt the incursions and begin withdrawal’. He underscored this message two days later, saying he wanted Israel to ‘withdraw without delay’. On 7 April, Condoleezza Rice, then Bush’s national security adviser, told reporters: ‘“Without delay” means without delay. It means now.’ That same day Colin Powell set out for the Middle East to persuade all sides to stop fighting and start negotiating.

Israel and the Lobby swung into action. Pro-Israel officials in the vice-president’s office and the Pentagon, as well as neo-conservative pundits like Robert Kagan and William Kristol, put the heat on Powell. They even accused him of having ‘virtually obliterated the distinction between terrorists and those fighting terrorists’. Bush himself was being pressed by Jewish leaders and Christian evangelicals. Tom DeLay and Dick Armey were especially outspoken about the need to support Israel, and DeLay and the Senate minority leader, Trent Lott, visited the White House and warned Bush to back off.

The first sign that Bush was caving in came on 11 April – a week after he told Sharon to withdraw his forces – when the White House press secretary said that the president believed Sharon was ‘a man of peace’. Bush repeated this statement publicly on Powell’s return from his abortive mission, and told reporters that Sharon had responded satisfactorily to his call for a full and immediate withdrawal. Sharon had done no such thing, but Bush was no longer willing to make an issue of it.

Meanwhile, Congress was also moving to back Sharon. On 2 May, it overrode the administration’s objections and passed two resolutions reaffirming support for Israel. (The Senate vote was 94 to 2; the House of Representatives version passed 352 to 21.) Both resolutions held that the United States ‘stands in solidarity with Israel’ and that the two countries were, to quote the House resolution, ‘now engaged in a common struggle against terrorism’. The House version also condemned ‘the ongoing support and co-ordination of terror by Yasser Arafat’, who was portrayed as a central part of the terrorism problem. Both resolutions were drawn up with the help of the Lobby. A few days later, a bipartisan congressional delegation on a fact-finding mission to Israel stated that Sharon should resist US pressure to negotiate with Arafat. On 9 May, a House appropriations subcommittee met to consider giving Israel an extra $200 million to fight terrorism. Powell opposed the package, but the Lobby backed it and Powell lost.

In short, Sharon and the Lobby took on the president of the United States and triumphed. Hemi Shalev, a journalist on the Israeli newspaper Ma’ariv, reported that Sharon’s aides ‘could not hide their satisfaction in view of Powell’s failure. Sharon saw the whites of President Bush’s eyes, they bragged, and the president blinked first.’ But it was Israel’s champions in the United States, not Sharon or Israel, that played the key role in defeating Bush.

The situation has changed little since then. The Bush administration refused ever again to have dealings with Arafat. After his death, it embraced the new Palestinian leader, Mahmoud Abbas, but has done little to help him. Sharon continued to develop his plan to impose a unilateral settlement on the Palestinians, based on ‘disengagement’ from Gaza coupled with continued expansion on the West Bank. By refusing to negotiate with Abbas and making it impossible for him to deliver tangible benefits to the Palestinian people, Sharon’s strategy contributed directly to Hamas’s electoral victory. With Hamas in power, however, Israel has another excuse not to negotiate. The US administration has supported Sharon’s actions (and those of his successor, Ehud Olmert). Bush has even endorsed unilateral Israeli annexations in the Occupied Territories, reversing the stated policy of every president since Lyndon Johnson.

US officials have offered mild criticisms of a few Israeli actions, but have done little to help create a viable Palestinian state. Sharon has Bush ‘wrapped around his little finger’, the former national security adviser Brent Scowcroft said in October 2004. If Bush tries to distance the US from Israel, or even criticises Israeli actions in the Occupied Territories, he is certain to face the wrath of the Lobby and its supporters in Congress. Democratic presidential candidates understand that these are facts of life, which is the reason John Kerry went to great lengths to display unalloyed support for Israel in 2004, and why Hillary Clinton is doing the same thing today.

Maintaining US support for Israel’s policies against the Palestinians is essential as far as the Lobby is concerned, but its ambitions do not stop there. It also wants America to help Israel remain the dominant regional power. The Israeli government and pro-Israel groups in the United States have worked together to shape the administration’s policy towards Iraq, Syria and Iran, as well as its grand scheme for reordering the Middle East.

Pressure from Israel and the Lobby was not the only factor behind the decision to attack Iraq in March 2003, but it was critical. Some Americans believe that this was a war for oil, but there is hardly any direct evidence to support this claim. Instead, the war was motivated in good part by a desire to make Israel more secure. According to Philip Zelikow, a former member of the president’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the executive director of the 9/11 Commission, and now a counsellor to Condoleezza Rice, the ‘real threat’ from Iraq was not a threat to the United States. The ‘unstated threat’ was the ‘threat against Israel’, Zelikow told an audience at the University of Virginia in September 2002. ‘The American government,’ he added, ‘doesn’t want to lean too hard on it rhetorically, because it is not a popular sell.’

On 16 August 2002, 11 days before Dick Cheney kicked off the campaign for war with a hardline speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the Washington Post reported that ‘Israel is urging US officials not to delay a military strike against Iraq’s Saddam Hussein.’ By this point, according to Sharon, strategic co-ordination between Israel and the US had reached ‘unprecedented dimensions’, and Israeli intelligence officials had given Washington a variety of alarming reports about Iraq’s WMD programmes. As one retired Israeli general later put it, ‘Israeli intelligence was a full partner to the picture presented by American and British intelligence regarding Iraq’s non-conventional capabilities.’

Israeli leaders were deeply distressed when Bush decided to seek Security Council authorisation for war, and even more worried when Saddam agreed to let UN inspectors back in. ‘The campaign against Saddam Hussein is a must,’ Shimon Peres told reporters in September 2002. ‘Inspections and inspectors are good for decent people, but dishonest people can overcome easily inspections and inspectors.’

At the same time, Ehud Barak wrote a New York Times op-ed warning that ‘the greatest risk now lies in inaction.’ His predecessor as prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, published a similar piece in the Wall Street Journal, entitled: ‘The Case for Toppling Saddam’. ‘Today nothing less than dismantling his regime will do,’ he declared. ‘I believe I speak for the overwhelming majority of Israelis in supporting a pre-emptive strike against Saddam’s regime.’ Or as Ha’aretz reported in February 2003, ‘the military and political leadership yearns for war in Iraq.’

As Netanyahu suggested, however, the desire for war was not confined to Israel’s leaders. Apart from Kuwait, which Saddam invaded in 1990, Israel was the only country in the world where both politicians and public favoured war. As the journalist Gideon Levy observed at the time, ‘Israel is the only country in the West whose leaders support the war unreservedly and where no alternative opinion is voiced.’ In fact, Israelis were so gung-ho that their allies in America told them to damp down their rhetoric, or it would look as if the war would be fought on Israel’s behalf.

Within the US, the main driving force behind the war was a small band of neo-conservatives, many with ties to Likud. But leaders of the Lobby’s major organisations lent their voices to the campaign. ‘As President Bush attempted to sell the . . . war in Iraq,’ the Forward reported, ‘America’s most important Jewish organisations rallied as one to his defence. In statement after statement community leaders stressed the need to rid the world of Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction.’ The editorial goes on to say that ‘concern for Israel’s safety rightfully factored into the deliberations of the main Jewish groups.’

Although neo-conservatives and other Lobby leaders were eager to invade Iraq, the broader American Jewish community was not. Just after the war started, Samuel Freedman reported that ‘a compilation of nationwide opinion polls by the Pew Research Center shows that Jews are less supportive of the Iraq war than the population at large, 52 per cent to 62 per cent.’ Clearly, it would be wrong to blame the war in Iraq on ‘Jewish influence’. Rather, it was due in large part to the Lobby’s influence, especially that of the neo-conservatives within it.

The neo-conservatives had been determined to topple Saddam even before Bush became president. They caused a stir early in 1998 by publishing two open letters to Clinton, calling for Saddam’s removal from power. The signatories, many of whom had close ties to pro-Israel groups like JINSA or WINEP, and who included Elliot Abrams, John Bolton, Douglas Feith, William Kristol, Bernard Lewis, Donald Rumsfeld, Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz, had little trouble persuading the Clinton administration to adopt the general goal of ousting Saddam. But they were unable to sell a war to achieve that objective. They were no more able to generate enthusiasm for invading Iraq in the early months of the Bush administration. They needed help to achieve their aim. That help arrived with 9/11. Specifically, the events of that day led Bush and Cheney to reverse course and become strong proponents of a preventive war.

At a key meeting with Bush at Camp David on 15 September, Wolfowitz advocated attacking Iraq before Afghanistan, even though there was no evidence that Saddam was involved in the attacks on the US and bin Laden was known to be in Afghanistan. Bush rejected his advice and chose to go after Afghanistan instead, but war with Iraq was now regarded as a serious possibility and on 21 November the president charged military planners with developing concrete plans for an invasion.

Other neo-conservatives were meanwhile at work in the corridors of power. We don’t have the full story yet, but scholars like Bernard Lewis of Princeton and Fouad Ajami of Johns Hopkins reportedly played important roles in persuading Cheney that war was the best option, though neo-conservatives on his staff – Eric Edelman, John Hannah and Scooter Libby, Cheney’s chief of staff and one of the most powerful individuals in the administration – also played their part. By early 2002 Cheney had persuaded Bush; and with Bush and Cheney on board, war was inevitable.

Outside the administration, neo-conservative pundits lost no time in making the case that invading Iraq was essential to winning the war on terrorism. Their efforts were designed partly to keep up the pressure on Bush, and partly to overcome opposition to the war inside and outside the government. On 20 September, a group of prominent neo-conservatives and their allies published another open letter: ‘Even if evidence does not link Iraq directly to the attack,’ it read, ‘any strategy aiming at the eradication of terrorism and its sponsors must include a determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq.’ The letter also reminded Bush that ‘Israel has been and remains America’s staunchest ally against international terrorism.’ In the 1 October issue of the Weekly Standard, Robert Kagan and William Kristol called for regime change in Iraq as soon as the Taliban was defeated. That same day, Charles Krauthammer argued in the Washington Post that after the US was done with Afghanistan, Syria should be next, followed by Iran and Iraq: ‘The war on terrorism will conclude in Baghdad,’ when we finish off ‘the most dangerous terrorist regime in the world’.

This was the beginning of an unrelenting public relations campaign to win support for an invasion of Iraq, a crucial part of which was the manipulation of intelligence in such a way as to make it seem as if Saddam posed an imminent threat. For example, Libby pressured CIA analysts to find evidence supporting the case for war and helped prepare Colin Powell’s now discredited briefing to the UN Security Council. Within the Pentagon, the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group was charged with finding links between al-Qaida and Iraq that the intelligence community had supposedly missed. Its two key members were David Wurmser, a hard-core neo-conservative, and Michael Maloof, a Lebanese-American with close ties to Perle. Another Pentagon group, the so-called Office of Special Plans, was given the task of uncovering evidence that could be used to sell the war. It was headed by Abram Shulsky, a neo-conservative with long-standing ties to Wolfowitz, and its ranks included recruits from pro-Israel think tanks. Both these organisations were created after 9/11 and reported directly to Douglas Feith.

Like virtually all the neo-conservatives, Feith is deeply committed to Israel; he also has long-term ties to Likud. He wrote articles in the 1990s supporting the settlements and arguing that Israel should retain the Occupied Territories. More important, along with Perle and Wurmser, he wrote the famous ‘Clean Break’ report in June 1996 for Netanyahu, who had just become prime minister. Among other things, it recommended that Netanyahu ‘focus on removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq – an important Israeli strategic objective in its own right’. It also called for Israel to take steps to reorder the entire Middle East. Netanyahu did not follow their advice, but Feith, Perle and Wurmser were soon urging the Bush administration to pursue those same goals. The Ha’aretz columnist Akiva Eldar warned that Feith and Perle ‘are walking a fine line between their loyalty to American governments . . . and Israeli interests’.

Wolfowitz is equally committed to Israel. The Forward once described him as ‘the most hawkishly pro-Israel voice in the administration’, and selected him in 2002 as first among 50 notables who ‘have consciously pursued Jewish activism’. At about the same time, JINSA gave Wolfowitz its Henry M. Jackson Distinguished Service Award for promoting a strong partnership between Israel and the United States; and the Jerusalem Post, describing him as ‘devoutly pro-Israel’, named him ‘Man of the Year’ in 2003.

Finally, a brief word is in order about the neo-conservatives’ prewar support of Ahmed Chalabi, the unscrupulous Iraqi exile who headed the Iraqi National Congress. They backed Chalabi because he had established close ties with Jewish-American groups and had pledged to foster good relations with Israel once he gained power. This was precisely what pro-Israel proponents of regime change wanted to hear. Matthew Berger laid out the essence of the bargain in the Jewish Journal: ‘The INC saw improved relations as a way to tap Jewish influence in Washington and Jerusalem and to drum up increased support for its cause. For their part, the Jewish groups saw an opportunity to pave the way for better relations between Israel and Iraq, if and when the INC is involved in replacing Saddam Hussein’s regime.’

Given the neo-conservatives’ devotion to Israel, their obsession with Iraq, and their influence in the Bush administration, it isn’t surprising that many Americans suspected that the war was designed to further Israeli interests. Last March, Barry Jacobs of the American Jewish Committee acknowledged that the belief that Israel and the neo-conservatives had conspired to get the US into a war in Iraq was ‘pervasive’ in the intelligence community. Yet few people would say so publicly, and most of those who did – including Senator Ernest Hollings and Representative James Moran – were condemned for raising the issue. Michael Kinsley wrote in late 2002 that ‘the lack of public discussion about the role of Israel . . . is the proverbial elephant in the room.’ The reason for the reluctance to talk about it, he observed, was fear of being labelled an anti-semite. There is little doubt that Israel and the Lobby were key factors in the decision to go to war. It’s a decision the US would have been far less likely to take without their efforts. And the war itself was intended to be only the first step. A front-page headline in the Wall Street Journal shortly after the war began says it all: ‘President’s Dream: Changing Not Just Regime but a Region: A Pro-US, Democratic Area Is a Goal that Has Israeli and Neo-Conservative Roots.’

Pro-Israel forces have long been interested in getting the US military more directly involved in the Middle East. But they had limited success during the Cold War, because America acted as an ‘off-shore balancer’ in the region. Most forces designated for the Middle East, like the Rapid Deployment Force, were kept ‘over the horizon’ and out of harm’s way. The idea was to play local powers off against each other – which is why the Reagan administration supported Saddam against revolutionary Iran during the Iran-Iraq War – in order to maintain a balance favourable to the US.

This policy changed after the first Gulf War, when the Clinton administration adopted a strategy of ‘dual containment’. Substantial US forces would be stationed in the region in order to contain both Iran and Iraq, instead of one being used to check the other. The father of dual containment was none other than Martin Indyk, who first outlined the strategy in May 1993 at WINEP and then implemented it as director for Near East and South Asian Affairs at the National Security Council.

By the mid-1990s there was considerable dissatisfaction with dual containment, because it made the United States the mortal enemy of two countries that hated each other, and forced Washington to bear the burden of containing both. But it was a strategy the Lobby favoured and worked actively in Congress to preserve. Pressed by AIPAC and other pro-Israel forces, Clinton toughened up the policy in the spring of 1995 by imposing an economic embargo on Iran. But AIPAC and the others wanted more. The result was the 1996 Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, which imposed sanctions on any foreign companies investing more than $40 million to develop petroleum resources in Iran or Libya. As Ze’ev Schiff, the military correspondent of Ha’aretz, noted at the time, ‘Israel is but a tiny element in the big scheme, but one should not conclude that it cannot influence those within the Beltway.’

By the late 1990s, however, the neo-conservatives were arguing that dual containment was not enough and that regime change in Iraq was essential. By toppling Saddam and turning Iraq into a vibrant democracy, they argued, the US would trigger a far-reaching process of change throughout the Middle East. The same line of thinking was evident in the ‘Clean Break’ study the neo-conservatives wrote for Netanyahu. By 2002, when an invasion of Iraq was on the front-burner, regional transformation was an article of faith in neo-conservative circles.

Charles Krauthammer describes this grand scheme as the brainchild of Natan Sharansky, but Israelis across the political spectrum believed that toppling Saddam would alter the Middle East to Israel’s advantage. Aluf Benn reported in Ha’aretz (17 February 2003):

Senior IDF officers and those close to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, such as National Security Adviser Ephraim Halevy, paint a rosy picture of the wonderful future Israel can expect after the war. They envision a domino effect, with the fall of Saddam Hussein followed by that of Israel’s other enemies . . . Along with these leaders will disappear terror and weapons of mass destruction.

Once Baghdad fell in mid-April 2003, Sharon and his lieutenants began urging Washington to target Damascus. On 16 April, Sharon, interviewed in Yedioth Ahronoth, called for the United States to put ‘very heavy’ pressure on Syria, while Shaul Mofaz, his defence minister, interviewed in Ma’ariv, said: ‘We have a long list of issues that we are thinking of demanding of the Syrians and it is appropriate that it should be done through the Americans.’ Ephraim Halevy told a WINEP audience that it was now important for the US to get rough with Syria, and the Washington Post reported that Israel was ‘fuelling the campaign’ against Syria by feeding the US intelligence reports about the actions of Bashar Assad, the Syrian president.

Prominent members of the Lobby made the same arguments. Wolfowitz declared that ‘there has got to be regime change in Syria,’ and Richard Perle told a journalist that ‘a short message, a two-worded message’ could be delivered to other hostile regimes in the Middle East: ‘You’re next.’ In early April, WINEP released a bipartisan report stating that Syria ‘should not miss the message that countries that pursue Saddam’s reckless, irresponsible and defiant behaviour could end up sharing his fate’. On 15 April, Yossi Klein Halevi wrote a piece in the Los Angeles Times entitled ‘Next, Turn the Screws on Syria’, while the following day Zev Chafets wrote an article for the New York Daily News entitled ‘Terror-Friendly Syria Needs a Change, Too’. Not to be outdone, Lawrence Kaplan wrote in the New Republic on 21 April that Assad was a serious threat to America.

Back on Capitol Hill, Congressman Eliot Engel had reintroduced the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act. It threatened sanctions against Syria if it did not withdraw from Lebanon, give up its WMD and stop supporting terrorism, and it also called for Syria and Lebanon to take concrete steps to make peace with Israel. This legislation was strongly endorsed by the Lobby – by AIPAC especially – and ‘framed’, according to the Jewish Telegraph Agency, ‘by some of Israel’s best friends in Congress’. The Bush administration had little enthusiasm for it, but the anti-Syrian act passed overwhelmingly (398 to 4 in the House; 89 to 4 in the Senate), and Bush signed it into law on 12 December 2003.

The administration itself was still divided about the wisdom of targeting Syria. Although the neo-conservatives were eager to pick a fight with Damascus, the CIA and the State Department were opposed to the idea. And even after Bush signed the new law, he emphasised that he would go slowly in implementing it. His ambivalence is understandable. First, the Syrian government had not only been providing important intelligence about al-Qaida since 9/11: it had also warned Washington about a planned terrorist attack in the Gulf and given CIA interrogators access to Mohammed Zammar, the alleged recruiter of some of the 9/11 hijackers. Targeting the Assad regime would jeopardise these valuable connections, and thereby undermine the larger war on terrorism.

Second, Syria had not been on bad terms with Washington before the Iraq war (it had even voted for UN Resolution 1441), and was itself no threat to the United States. Playing hardball with it would make the US look like a bully with an insatiable appetite for beating up Arab states. Third, putting Syria on the hit list would give Damascus a powerful incentive to cause trouble in Iraq. Even if one wanted to bring pressure to bear, it made good sense to finish the job in Iraq first. Yet Congress insisted on putting the screws on Damascus, largely in response to pressure from Israeli officials and groups like AIPAC. If there were no Lobby, there would have been no Syria Accountability Act, and US policy towards Damascus would have been more in line with the national interest.

Israelis tend to describe every threat in the starkest terms, but Iran is widely seen as their most dangerous enemy because it is the most likely to acquire nuclear weapons. Virtually all Israelis regard an Islamic country in the Middle East with nuclear weapons as a threat to their existence. ‘Iraq is a problem . . . But you should understand, if you ask me, today Iran is more dangerous than Iraq,’ the defence minister, Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, remarked a month before the Iraq war.

Sharon began pushing the US to confront Iran in November 2002, in an interview in the Times. Describing Iran as the ‘centre of world terror’, and bent on acquiring nuclear weapons, he declared that the Bush administration should put the strong arm on Iran ‘the day after’ it conquered Iraq. In late April 2003, Ha’aretz reported that the Israeli ambassador in Washington was calling for regime change in Iran. The overthrow of Saddam, he noted, was ‘not enough’. In his words, America ‘has to follow through. We still have great threats of that magnitude coming from Syria, coming from Iran.’

The neo-conservatives, too, lost no time in making the case for regime change in Tehran. On 6 May, the AEI co-sponsored an all-day conference on Iran with the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and the Hudson Institute, both champions of Israel. The speakers were all strongly pro-Israel, and many called for the US to replace the Iranian regime with a democracy. As usual, a bevy of articles by prominent neo-conservatives made the case for going after Iran. ‘The liberation of Iraq was the first great battle for the future of the Middle East . . . But the next great battle – not, we hope, a military battle – will be for Iran,’ William Kristol wrote in the Weekly Standard on 12 May.

The administration has responded to the Lobby’s pressure by working overtime to shut down Iran’s nuclear programme. But Washington has had little success, and Iran seems determined to create a nuclear arsenal. As a result, the Lobby has intensified its pressure. Op-eds and other articles now warn of imminent dangers from a nuclear Iran, caution against any appeasement of a ‘terrorist’ regime, and hint darkly of preventive action should diplomacy fail. The Lobby is pushing Congress to approve the Iran Freedom Support Act, which would expand existing sanctions. Israeli officials also warn they may take pre-emptive action should Iran continue down the nuclear road, threats partly intended to keep Washington’s attention on the issue.

One might argue that Israel and the Lobby have not had much influence on policy towards Iran, because the US has its own reasons for keeping Iran from going nuclear. There is some truth in this, but Iran’s nuclear ambitions do not pose a direct threat to the US. If Washington could live with a nuclear Soviet Union, a nuclear China or even a nuclear North Korea, it can live with a nuclear Iran. And that is why the Lobby must keep up constant pressure on politicians to confront Tehran. Iran and the US would hardly be allies if the Lobby did not exist, but US policy would be more temperate and preventive war would not be a serious option.

It is not surprising that Israel and its American supporters want the US to deal with any and all threats to Israel’s security. If their efforts to shape US policy succeed, Israel’s enemies will be weakened or overthrown, Israel will get a free hand with the Palestinians, and the US will do most of the fighting, dying, rebuilding and paying. But even if the US fails to transform the Middle East and finds itself in conflict with an increasingly radicalised Arab and Islamic world, Israel will end up protected by the world’s only superpower. This is not a perfect outcome from the Lobby’s point of view, but it is obviously preferable to Washington distancing itself, or using its leverage to force Israel to make peace with the Palestinians.

Can the Lobby’s power be curtailed? One would like to think so, given the Iraq debacle, the obvious need to rebuild America’s image in the Arab and Islamic world, and the recent revelations about AIPAC officials passing US government secrets to Israel. One might also think that Arafat’s death and the election of the more moderate Mahmoud Abbas would cause Washington to press vigorously and even-handedly for a peace agreement. In short, there are ample grounds for leaders to distance themselves from the Lobby and adopt a Middle East policy more consistent with broader US interests. In particular, using American power to achieve a just peace between Israel and the Palestinians would help advance the cause of democracy in the region.

But that is not going to happen – not soon anyway. AIPAC and its allies (including Christian Zionists) have no serious opponents in the lobbying world. They know it has become more difficult to make Israel’s case today, and they are responding by taking on staff and expanding their activities. Besides, American politicians remain acutely sensitive to campaign contributions and other forms of political pressure, and major media outlets are likely to remain sympathetic to Israel no matter what it does.

The Lobby’s influence causes trouble on several fronts. It increases the terrorist danger that all states face – including America’s European allies. It has made it impossible to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a situation that gives extremists a powerful recruiting tool, increases the pool of potential terrorists and sympathisers, and contributes to Islamic radicalism in Europe and Asia.

Equally worrying, the Lobby’s campaign for regime change in Iran and Syria could lead the US to attack those countries, with potentially disastrous effects. We don’t need another Iraq. At a minimum, the Lobby’s hostility towards Syria and Iran makes it almost impossible for Washington to enlist them in the struggle against al-Qaida and the Iraqi insurgency, where their help is badly needed.

There is a moral dimension here as well. Thanks to the Lobby, the United States has become the de facto enabler of Israeli expansion in the Occupied Territories, making it complicit in the crimes perpetrated against the Palestinians. This situation undercuts Washington’s efforts to promote democracy abroad and makes it look hypocritical when it presses other states to respect human rights. US efforts to limit nuclear proliferation appear equally hypocritical given its willingness to accept Israel’s nuclear arsenal, which only encourages Iran and others to seek a similar capability.

Besides, the Lobby’s campaign to quash debate about Israel is unhealthy for democracy. Silencing sceptics by organising blacklists and boycotts – or by suggesting that critics are anti-semites – violates the principle of open debate on which democracy depends. The inability of Congress to conduct a genuine debate on these important issues paralyses the entire process of democratic deliberation. Israel’s backers should be free to make their case and to challenge those who disagree with them, but efforts to stifle debate by intimidation must be roundly condemned.

Finally, the Lobby’s influence has been bad for Israel. Its ability to persuade Washington to support an expansionist agenda has discouraged Israel from seizing opportunities – including a peace treaty with Syria and a prompt and full implementation of the Oslo Accords – that would have saved Israeli lives and shrunk the ranks of Palestinian extremists. Denying the Palestinians their legitimate political rights certainly has not made Israel more secure, and the long campaign to kill or marginalise a generation of Palestinian leaders has empowered extremist groups like Hamas, and reduced the number of Palestinian leaders who would be willing to accept a fair settlement and able to make it work. Israel itself would probably be better off if the Lobby were less powerful and US policy more even-handed.

There is a ray of hope, however. Although the Lobby remains a powerful force, the adverse effects of its influence are increasingly difficult to hide. Powerful states can maintain flawed policies for quite some time, but reality cannot be ignored for ever. What is needed is a candid discussion of the Lobby’s influence and a more open debate about US interests in this vital region. Israel’s well-being is one of those interests, but its continued occupation of the West Bank and its broader regional agenda are not. Open debate will expose the limits of the strategic and moral case for one-sided US support and could move the US to a position more consistent with its own national interest, with the interests of the other states in the region, and with Israel’s long-term interests as well.

هل الشيعة مضطهدون حقا ؟

2006-03-24T14:01:00.000-08:00

هل الشيعة مضطهدون حقا ؟

وما هي مواقعهم خلال حكم الرئيس صدام ؟

د. نوري المرادي

جرى الحديث كثيرا عن مظلومية الشيعة، الأمر الذي اتخذ منه مبعثا لبيع العراق لأمريكا ومن ثم لإيران. ولابد مقدما من القول أن مذهب التشيع في العراق يؤخذ من فقهائه وأئمته البررة كالحسني البغدادي والخالصي والمؤيد ومن على خطهم . أما نحلة التلمودوصفويين بقيادة المراجع الأربعة ( الإيرانيين سستاني وسعيد حكيم، والأفغاني بشير والباكستاني الفياض ) ومعهم المجلس الأعلى للثورة الإسلامية بقيادة الإيراني عبد العزيز حكيم وابنه عمار، وحزب الدعوة بقيادة الباكستاني إبراهيم اشيقر المتسمي بالجعفري، فالتشيع من هؤلاء ومن معهم براء وما هم سوى نحلة تلمودوصفوية في التشيع والإسلام معا. وهم خارجون عن الدين، وسلوكهم ارتداد ما أتى الله به من سلطان .

وقد كان بالقرآن ورسول الله اسوة حسنة وكفى به ومنهج آل البيت شروعا. والقرآن أُشبِع تفسيرا. وسير الأئمة، والأنبياء أيضا، معلومة وبكل دقائقها. ولم يبق خلال 1400 عام من الدراسات والتمحيص ما سيعوز المسلم المؤمن في الحقوق والواجبات خارج القانون الوضعي .

ولكن وعلى غفلة من الزمن ظهر علينا تقليد ومرجعية لها من السلطة ما ليس لله ذاته. فالتقليد في التشيع نشأ عام 1917 وعلى يد الإيراني محمد صادق يزدي، وجعل المرجع الشيعي بمنزلة الحاخام الأعلى وأطره بأسماء لم ترد في التراث الشيعي، بل في المدرسة التلمودية فقط من اليهودية. فاللقب "روح الله" يعني أن المرجع شق من الله. واللقب "آية الله" يضع الملقب به بمنزلة الشمس والقمر واختلاف الليل والنهار. واللقب "حجة الإسلام والمسلمين" يجعل سلوك وقول المعني حجة ما بين مذاهب المسلمين وللمسلمين على غيرهم من الأديان، أي إنه يبطل ما عداه من الأديان والمذاهب. أما اللقب "قدس الله سره" فيعني العصمة في العمل والقول والتفكير. فضلا عن الإطناب المتضمن في اللاحقة "دام ظله الوارف" . كما للمرجع حق مناقضة القرآن والإفتاء بعكس ما يقوله.

وفتوى سستاني بالجنة للمنتخبين والنار للممتنعين شاهد والتي فيها صاغر الحدود بين الكفر والإيمان لتصبح مجرد ورقة انتخاب. ويزدي نتاج حوزة قم التي هي أصلا نتاج التوجه التلمودي في الإسلام والمبني على تأصيل شعور بالظليمة والاضطهاد، ليجري بها ابتزاز الآخرين، كالذي عند يهود على الملل الأخرى. وبالمناسبة، فحوزة قم، وبشهادة الإمام الخالصي، احتفلت وتوزعت الحلاوي واللحمان بمناسبة انتصار إسرائيل على العرب المسلمين عام 1967...

أما كذبة هلاكوست الشيعة التي يرددها التلمودوصفويون ويطالبون بإستحقاقاتها، فلا مراء أنها لجر العراق إلى طائفية ومذهبية. وفي دراسة سبق وأعدها زميل لي اسمه إبراهيم الأوسي، تبين أن أول من كتب ونظر لاضطهاد الشيعة هو حنا بطاطو ثم مجيد خدوري. وبطاطو حصل على معلوماته من مديرية الأمن العامة ما بين العهد الملكي وبداية التسعينات. لكن معلوماته مغلوطة الاستنتاج كليا. فليس صحيحا إن الملكية اضطهدت الشيعة في العراق بل إن فيصل تم ترشيحه بمضابط العشائر الشيعية وحضا النظام الملكي عموما بدعم شيوخ العشائر الشيعية فتحصل أغلبهم على مناصب نيابية ووزارية وامتيازات مالية قل نظيرها. وهذه القوى التي أغلبها شيعي هم الذين سنوا اتفاق 1936 الذي همش المرجعية ومنعها من العمل السياسي. وهذه أول بوادر اضطهاد شيعي شيعي. وبعد سقوط النظام الملكي انطلقت الحركات الشعبية في العراق وكان الشيعة الأغلبية السائدة فيها. وأهم هذه الأحزاب والحركات الحزبان الشيوعي والبعث. وبينما الشيوعي مختلط الأصول التأسيسية، فحزب البعث هو حزب شيعي بالكامل. وتأسس في الناصرية والنجف ومؤسسه الركابي كان شيعيا وكل قادته حتى انقلاب 1963 وهم 13 عضو قيادة قطرية كانوا جميعا شيعة، ناهيك عن أمين سره في العراق وعضو قيادته القومية على صالح السعدي وهو شيعي. وقد حضا البعث بدعم منقطع النظير من محسن الحكيم المرجع الشيعي الأعلى وقتها. وكان عضو الارتباط بين حزب البعث والحكيم هو حسين الصافي. هذا رغم عدم الإنكار بأن قيادة البعث كانت علمانية رغم تشيعها الكامل.

وفي عهد الرئيسين عبد السلام وعبد الرحمن عارف كانت السيطرة للعسكر وكان الولاء للعسكر وهو المنسوخ من طبيعة سلطة جمال عبد الناصر الذي ألقى بظله على الحكم في العراق. ولم تظهر خلال هذه الفترة أية مقاومة سياسية أو ثقافية لنظام الحكم يمكن الإشارة إلى طائفيتها. وربما ذلك أيضا بسبب سيادة الصراع العربي الصهيوني أو أن بسبب أن الغالب على الحكومات هو سياسة التوازن للتيارات القومية والاشتراكية.

أما انقلاب 17 – 30 تموز 1968 الذي أتى بالبعث مجددا إلى السلطة فقد كان بين قياداته الأساسية احمد حسن البكر وحردان التكريتي وصدام حسين وصالح مهدي عماش وحماد شهاب وعبد الخالق السامرائي وعبد الكريم الشيخلي. وجميعهم علمانيون. لكن لو تبينا طائفيتهم فنصفهم تماما شيعة. وبقيت النسبة ما بين الشيعة والسنة تتأرجح حول التناصف في السنين اللاحقة عموما لكنها تفاوتت مابين صعود ونزول حسب البعد والقرب من مراكز القرار وحسب نتيجة الصراع على السلطة، إلى إن استقرت السلطة في الحزب والدولة بحوزة صدام حسين. وصدام حسين لم يكن طائفيا مذهبيا، بله كان مناطقيا بالتعبير الأصح، حيث استبعد أهل بغداد وسامراء (وهم من السنة) من الدائرة الضيقة المحيطة به. ومنذ السبعينات بدأ النظام السياسي للبعث في قص أجنحة التيارات المعادية أو المتقاطعة معه دونما طائفية. فقد استطاع احتواء التيار الشيوعي وضربه وإنهائه وحيّد الكرد وانتصر علهم باتفاقية الجزائر.

وأول من تلقى الضربة من التيارات الدينية هم علماء الدين السنة ومنهم إمام مسجد الإسكان.

وحقيقة فحتى حين حكمت محكمة أمن الدولة على المقبور مهدي الحكيم بالإعدام بسبب قيادته لخلية تجسس يهودية في العراق، بين أبرز عناصرها اليهود: حاييم زلخة وصادق جعفر الحاوي، حتى هذه اللحظة (1969) لم تكن مرجعية الشيعة معادية لصدام ولا البعث. لكن صدام تطاول على حد يعتبر واحدا من تابوهات المرحعية التلمودوصفوية في العراق. فصدام حسين انتبه ومنذ السبعينات إلى الجهل والفقر المدقع الذي عليه جنوب العراق ووسطه. لذاه زار الهور وبقية مناطق الجنوب وأهدي أحيانا أجهزة تلفاز من مخصصات الرئاسة. كما شيد الطرق والدور العصرية ورفع من مستوى المنطقة الثقافي وحدّثها بشكل متسارع وجذب أبناءها إلى الوظائف الحكومية والأكاديمية, كانت أكثر البعثات الدراسية (التي منها الشهرستاني وعادل عبد المهدي) من مناطق الوسط والجنوب. وكان هذا لإدراك صدام حسين أن الفقر والجهل هما المبعث الوحيد لقوة المرجعية التلمودوصفوية في العراق. وهو الخط الأحمر الخطير للمرجعية، التي لولا الجهل ما عشعشت في هذه المناطق. لذاها وحين اكتشفت أن صدام تجاوز خطها الأحمر وفي عقر دارها، صبت جام غضبها عليه وكونت لذلك مدرسة تسقيط استخدمت ما يرد وما لا يرد على البال بحقه. لكن، وحيث كانت الدولة لازالت قوية، فقد كان أبناء الجنوب الأشد شراسة في قتال الإيرانيين خلال الحرب.

وبعد التسعينات، وحيث ضعف جهاز الدولة وقلت إمكانياتها في التحديث وقل اهتمامها بالوسط والجنوب وبقية المناطق عاد الجهل ليسود من جديد، وتترسخ مكانة المرجعية إلى الحد الذي نراه الآن.

وإن عدنا القهقرى مجددا، فالتيار الديني الشيعي انتفض نظام صدام حسين بثلاث محاولات.

الأولى في مؤامرة عبد الغني الراوي التي قادها بمؤازرة من السفاك وإفرادها كلهم من التيار الشيعي العلماني الموالي للشاه. وأحبطها النظام في مهدها.

والثانية محاولة الاغتيال الفاشلة في الدجيل والتي أحبطها النظام بسرعة قياسية، والثالثة هي مظاهرات خان النص والتي لم تكن محاولة لإسقاط نظام أكثر منها مظاهرة انفعال محدودة نتجت عن إحساس المرجعيات بأن البعث سيقص أجنحتها تباعا.

وبعد نجاح الثورة الإيرانية وبدء تصدير الثورة تواطأت مرجعية الخوئي بشكل علني مع النظام فأعدم محمد باقر الصدر، ثم غادر رؤوس المرجعية العراق بعد أن طغى الطابع الوطني على الطائفي خلال حرب الخليج فهربت المرجعيات إلى إيران ( لاحظ أدناه ! ) وما تبقى منها وتياراتها الطائفية تم تقزيمه وتدميره بضربات وقائية قادها الجيش الشعبي والمخابرات والأمن، وجميع هذه الأجهزة من الشيعة. وبعد وفاة الخميني انتكست الحركة الطائفية الشيعية ولم تظهر أي محاولة للتمرد واضحة. بل خلال غزو الكويت ركبت مرجعية حكيم حركة التذمر في الشارع فكانت سببا أساسيا في تمكن النظام من القضاء عليها بسرعة. وأهم عامل في القضاء عليها عدا قوة الجيش العراقي هو غدر الإيرانيين حيث سحبوا رجال مخابراتهم، لتركن بعدها القيادات المرجعية الشيعية إلى نضال الفنادق.

وكل محاولات الانقلاب على النظام ما بعد التسعينات أتت من السنة، ومنها مثلا محاولة اغتيال الرئيس من عشيرة الجبور في العرض العسكري، ومحاولة انقلاب راجي التكريتي وبشير الطالب وجاسم مخلص التكريتي التي كشفها الأمريكان لصدم حسين، وكذلك محاولة اللواء الطيار محمد مظلوم الدليمي وانشقاق حسين كامل وانشقاق حامد الجبوري وهشام الشاوي. كما وإثر محاولات تآمرية على النظام أعدم سنة في سامراء وتكريت. وعلى العكس وطد الشيعة كجمهور علاقتهم بالنظام السياسي وكانت نسب مشاركتهم في أجهزة الحزب والدولة كالأتي :

الجهاز الحزبي 90% من القواعد 75% من القيادات الوسطية و50 % من أعضاء القيادة القطرية

الجيش 80% من المراتب 60% من الضباط

الحرس الجمهوري 60% من المراتب 50% من الضباط

الحرس الخاص 30% من المراتب 20% من الضباط

المخابرات 60% من الجسم العام

الأمن العام 75% من المراتب 40% من الضباط

الدوائر الحكومية 80% من الموظفين 60% من المدراء العامين

القيادة العليا مجلس قيادة الثورة القيادة القطرية مجلس الوزراء 55% من الشيعة

القائمة التي أعلنها الغزاة الأمريكان (قائمة الـ 55 مطلوبا) هي 35 شيعة و14 سنة و1 مسيحي.

نسبة المعاهد والكليات والمدارس إلى الكثافة السكانية في مناطق الشيعة أعلى منها في المناطق السنية وبما قد يصل أحيانا إلى 65%

وللإيضاح نذكر كيف كان الشيعة يتندرون على أن السني عزت الدوري بنى كربلاء وحدثها هي والنجف، بينما السيد بن رسول الله قائد العوادي أشاع بالمدينتين الإرهاب والعبث. ويتذكر العامة الآن ما هي حال مدينة النجف وكربلاء وكل مدن الجنوب أيام صدام بينما يعجز الباكون من اضطهاد صدام عن رفع المزابل عنها.

هذا والأسماء الأشد سطوعا في المسؤولية خلال حكم البعث، هي : ناظم كزار، مدير الأمن العام والأشد سطوة في عالم التعذيب والقتل، على وتوت حاكم عسكري وهو الذي حكم على مهدي حكيم بجرم الخيانة العظمة، جعفر قاسم حمودي، سعد قاسم حمودي، حمزة الزبيدي رئيس الوزراء الشيعي والذي تلاه أيضا رئيس وزراء شيعي آخر وهو سعدون حمادي ثم صار رئيسا للبرلمان طوال فترة الحكم، هاني الفكيكي، حسن علوي، عدنان حمداني، حسن على العامري، مزبان خضير هادي، عزيز صالح النومان ومحمد سعيد الصحاف.

وهؤلاء جميعا شيعة.

وفي زمن حزب البعث تم ولأول مرة في تاريخ العراق استيزار وزير دفاع شيعي وهو سعدي طعمة الجبوري، وأول رئيس أركان جيش شيعي وهو الفريق عبد الواحد شنان آل رباط. وأطول وزير خارجية فترة هو الصحاف وأطول وزير نفط فترة وهو سعدون حمادي ثم قاسم محمد تقي، وأول محافظ بنك مركزي ولأطول فترة وهو عبد الحسن زلزلة وبعده طارق التكمجي وهو شيعي أيضا. وأول مدير أمن عامة وهو ناظم كزار ومعاونه كردي فيلي شيعي وهو على رضا باوة. وأول مسؤول عن التحقيقات الجنائية عامة والذي تولى التحقيق مع المنتمين إلى حزب الدعوة وكان الأشد قسوة عليهم هو عقيد الأمن علي الخاقاني وهو نجفي. وأول من تولى محكمة الثورة شيعيان وهما هادي وتوت ومسلم الجبوري. وتراس 4 شيعة شركة النفط الوطنية ومنهم عبدالأمير الأنباري وفاضل جلبي (بن عم أحمد الكلب) ورمزي سلمان. و60% من المدراء العامين في التصنيع العسكري وأكثر من 70% من الكادر الهندسي المتقدم والذين تابعوا دراستهم على حساب النظام هم شيعة. وأطول فترة برئاسة وكالة الطاقة الذرية العراقية كانت للشيعي عبدالرزاق الهاشمي. وأغلب علماء الطاقة الذرية العراقيين والذين تأهلوا بدراسات في الخارج هم شيعة منهم جعفر ضياء جعفر وحسين اسماعيل البهادلي وحسين الشهرستاني. والمسؤول عن مشاريع تطوير الإنتاج في التصنيع العسكري شيعي وهو نزار القصير. وأكثر فترة قضاها كمدير عام في الدولة شيعي وهو مدحت الهاشمي. وقائد صنف المدفعية العراقية في حرب الخليج شيعي وهو اللواء الركن صبيح العمران وبعد شيعي آخر وهو حامد الورد. وكذلك قائد صنف الدروع شيعي وأمين سر وزارة الدفاع شيعي وهو سعد المالكي ومن ثم جياد الإمارة وهما شيعيان، وقائد الفيلق الثالث شيعي وهو سعدي طعمة الجبوري ومدير إدارة التوجيه السياسي وهو عبدالجبار اللامي وهو شيعي. وأربعة من مندوبي العراق الدائمين في الأمم المتحدة كانوا شيعة وهم طالب شبيب والأنباري وسعيد المشاط وسعيد الموسوي، ومن بعدهم جاء فيلي شيعي وهو عبدالكريم الشيخلي. ومندوبا العراق في اليونسكو شيعيان فقط هما عزيز الحاج وعبد الأمير الأنباري. وآخر رئيس تحرير لجريدة الثورة الناطقة باسم البعث هو سامي مهدي شيعي ومن التبعية الإيرانية. والمستشار الإعلامي للرئيس صدام وهو عبدالجبار محسن شيعي، ومستشار صدام للشؤون الحزبية وهو محسن راضي السلمان شيعي، ومرافق صدام من السبعينات حتى بداية التسعينات هو صباح محمود ميرزا وهو شيعي كردي فيلي.

وزيادة في التوضيح، فجميع المطربين وشعراء الأغنية الذين تغنوا بحب البعث وصدام وطوال فترة البعث كانوا شيعة. وجميع الشعراء الشعبيين الذين مدحوا القائد كانوا شيعة. بل ومن مفارقات الزمن ومهازله ان البعثيين الذين انقلبوا على البعث وارتضوا الارتماء في أحضان أجهزة المخابرات الأمريكية وتعاونوا معها على العدوان على العراق وعلى احتلاله كانوا من الشيعة عموما وهم الذين يتباكون اليوم على اضطهاد الشيعة. بل لنذكر أسماء هؤلاء ودرجتهم الحزبية أيضا وهم:

اياد علاوي، شيعي ـ عضو شعبة. طاهر البكاء، شيعي ـ عضو شعبة. راسم العوادي، شيعي ـ عضو فرع. حازم الشعلان، شيعي ـ عضو قاعدة. داود البصري، شيعي، يكتب في الصحافة، كان نصير متقدم في منظمة السفارة العراقية في الكويت. زهير كاظم عبود، شيعي ـ عضو فرقة. منذر الفضل، شيعي ـ عضو فرقة. العميد سعد العبيدي، شيعي ـ عضو شعبة. العميد توفيق الياسري، شيعي ـ عضو شعبة. فالح حسون الدراجي، شيعي ـ مؤلف اغاني ، عضو عامل. هاشم العقابي، شاعر، شيعي ـ عضو عامل في تنظيمات فرع صدام. حسن العلوي، صحفي، شيعي ـ عضو فرقة. أمير الحلو صحفي ومدير عام في وزارة الإعلام، عضو فرقة ( فرقة المثنى ـ منطقة زيونة في بغداد). عبد الكريم المحمداوي، رئيس عرفاء هارب من الخدمة في الجيش العراقي نصير متقدم في تنظيمات شعبة الرافدين العسكرية فرع ذي قار العسكري.

وإسوة بالمدراء العامين والوزراء وكبار المسؤولين في الدولة العراقية تم تزويد سدنة الروضات الحيدرية والحسينية والعباسية والكاظمية وكبار رجال الدين في كربلاء والنجف وبغداد والبصرة ومنهم سيستاني ومحمد صادق الصدر بسيارات معفاة قطع غيارها من الجمارك.

وقبل هذا وذاك، فصدام هذا المتهم باضطهاد الشيعة، لأنه لم يسمح بلطم الصدور وشق الجيوب، خاض 4 حروب ولم يجرؤ أن يمد يده على قرش واحد من ممتلكات خزائن العتبات المقدسة. بينما هؤلاء التلموصفويون سرقوها من السنة الأولى لاحتلال العراق وباعوها في شوارع تل أبيب...

Saudi Students Return to U.S. Colleges

2006-03-24T13:56:00.000-08:00

Saudi Students Return to U.S. Colleges

By Tom Banse
Corvallis, Oregon
24 March 2006

College for many international students starts with intensive English. Reading and writing instructor Barbara Dowling is used to hearing a potpourri of accents. But this quarter, her Oregon State University students come overwhelmingly from one place, Saudi Arabia.

It's a huge turnaround. After the terrorist attacks in September of 2001, nearly all the Saudi students studying in the United States went home for fear of being caught in an anti-Arab backlash.

Last year, the Saudi government decided to try to repair relations with people-to-people contact. "I think a country's best ambassadors are their people," says Saudi embassy spokesman Nail Al-Jubeir, adding that a scholarship program will expose Americans to ordinary, friendly Saudis. "And in this case, we have the best and brightest who are coming to study here, to learn about America, what America is first hand." And that leads to the more important goal, says Al-Jubeir: to foster a more favorable view at home of the monarchy's partnership with America.

"We have a generation that graduated from the U.S. whose children in the last four or five years have never been here and we're trying to encourage them to come to the U.S." he explains. "What we're seeing is a new generation that is coming of age, that is learning what America is on television. Unfortunately, that is not what America is."

Al-Jubeir says the Kingdom plans to award 20,000 scholarships over the next four years -- each one covering full tuition, room, and board.

But one Middle East expert in Washington suggests it would take political breakthroughs, like an end to the Iraq War or a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, to reduce ill will significantly. Nevertheless, retired Ambassador Phil Wilcox welcomes the Saudi student resurgence. "Twenty thousand more students is a lot of students," he observes. "Presumably, [after] the benefit of higher education in this country they'll go back into senior positions in business and government and academia in Saudi Arabia and that would have a positive change in their society."

They've already brought about a positive change in Oregon. The director of OSU's English Language Institute, Deborah Healey, has 88 Saudis enrolled this quarter, the most since the early 1980's. "It's really a good deal for the state and helps subsidize the domestic students by having other people who pay the full ride. So we are doing our bit to balance the trade deficit," she laughs.

The new enrollees are not helping balance the gender distribution on campus, though. Healey says the vast majority of the Saudi students coming over are male. "Women really can't travel without a chaperone. We have at least one who came with her brother. So he was also admitted as a student and that enabled her to come. Her family would not worry about her that way."

Personal recommendations seem to play a big role in how students pick their schools. Fahad Al Mohazey, 20, compared Michigan State and Oregon State and ended up here in Corvallis, "because my friend told me it is a quiet city, a nice city. The weather is not so bad, except the rain."

The moisture -- and the lush greenery that results -- are actually a major attraction for some of his cohorts. Al Mohazey says he wasn't scared to come to the U.S. because he believes Americans no longer equate Arabs with terrorism. "I think everything is cool right now," he says. "I am very welcome here. I feel that the Corvallis people are very kindful and nice with me." Al Mohazey is taking intensive English before pursuing studies in accounting at OSU.

Maha Mohamed, 23, says she's here because her American-educated father spoke highly of Oregon. " I might take my masters in computer sciences and a M.B.A." she says. She wears a headscarf in the computer lab, but otherwise blends in with a Western style sweater and dressy pants. She explains that her family was not worried about sending her to the United States. "I am married. My husband is with me." He is also a student at OSU. Mohamed says she hopes to open her own business when she gets back home.

The first wave of Saudi scholarship recipients enrolled at colleges in nearly every state of the union, making the influx a nationwide phenomenon. Saudi students are on track to become one of the biggest foreign contingents at the University of Arkansas. Gonzaga University in Spokane, Washington, has seven presently enrolled, but expects to go as high as 80 over the next few years.

Administrators say the numbers would have been even higher this winter were it not for visa troubles. Student visa applicants undergo extensive background checks and must appear at a consulate for an in-person interview. However, at the same time that more Saudis hope to attend U.S. schools, on-going security threats have forced a reduction in U.S. consulate staffing around the Kingdom.

Iraq's oil and the Saudi welfare state

2006-03-24T01:45:00.000-08:00

Iraq's oil and the Saudi welfare state

By Bill Moore

Vice President Dick Cheney and former President George H.W. Bush walks with newly crowned King Abdullah during a retreat at King Abdullah's Farm in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia Friday, August 5, 2005, following the death of his half-brother King Fahd who passed away August 1, 2005. Interpreter Gamal Helal, center, is also pictured. White House photo by David Bohrer

INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALIST Greg Palast has a theory purportedly supported by a secret, 323-page U.S. State Department plan for Iraq’s oil. Palast first came to my attention when he uncovered efforts in Florida to illegally disenfranchise black voters in advance of the 2000 election. He has continued to be a journalistic gadfly whose reports appear in the Guardian newspaper in the United Kingdom and on the BBC.

Now he claims to have in his possession a secret State Department plan that he alleges proves the U.S. invaded Iraq because of its oil, but not to secure it for its own consumption. Instead, the purpose of the invasion was to keep Iraq’s oil off the market.

That’s right, OFF the market.

He writes…

Specifically, the system ordered up by the Bush cabal would keep a lid on Iraq's oil production -- limiting Iraq's oil pumping to the tight quota set by Saudi Arabia and the OPEC cartel.

The more I think about, the less far-fetched this sounds. Here’s why.

It’s believed by many experts that Iraq sits atop the world’s second largest collection of crude oil fields. While it appears that those fields were overworked and mismanaged during the sanction’s period after the First Gulf War, in time, with care, they could be refurbished and the oil start to flow in sufficient quantities to impact the global price of oil, which is largely set by the Saudis -- as well as oil speculators.

This much is clear, maps of Iraq’s oil fields were included in the original Cheney energy task force in 2001, as revealed by FOIA requests from the conservative watchdog group, Judicial Watch.

Why was the task force interested in these maps, which included lists of energy companies interested in various fields? One possibility is that oil company’s like Exxon and Chevron, who participated in task force meetings as revealed by recent Congressional testimony, wanted to get on the inside track of lucrative contracts once the country was liberated and the industry privatized.

In the light of the three year-long insurgency and its frequent attacks on Iraq’s oil infrastructure, that plan hasn’t worked out too well… assuming that was the plan in the first place.

On the other hand, what if the task force wanted to inventory the fields to get a better sense of their production potential, not for contract purposes, but for competitive reasons? Maybe they wanted to know how much oil could be pumped into the market and when. Remember, oil isn’t avocados, it’s not perishable. It’s been sitting in the ground for millions of years and as time progresses, it only gets more valuable.

Let’s assume for the sake of argument that the invasion of Iraq never took place. Instead, Sadam is still in power and has successfully negotiated an end to U.S.-British sanctions. He is now able to open the taps of his nation’s fields -- as well as requiring all purchases to be paid in Euros instead of dollars -- what would that have done to the price of oil, which prior to 2003 was below $30 a barrel?

My guess is it would have sent the price of oil south. That might be a good thing for Detroit and American SUV owners, but not for oil companies and producing nations, especially, Saudi Arabia.

In 2000, Gregory Gause III, who is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Vermont and author of Oil Monarchies, wrote an essay in the May/June issues of Foreign Affairs magazine entitled, "Saudi Arabia: Over a Barrel."

From 1999 to 2000, the price of oil went from a low to $10 to $30 a barrel. He explains why in this summary:

A key reason for today's skyrocketing oil prices is the behavior of one of America's closest allies: Saudi Arabia. The world's largest oil exporter was the driving force behind the deal that turned off the spigots. Riyadh is risking a crisis with Washington because the once-flush kingdom has gone broke sustaining a vast welfare state for an exploding population. America must push the Saudis toward privatization and fiscal reform. The House of Saud must get its house in order.

Professor Gause isn’t the only academic to link oil prices with the health of the Saudi welfare state. In a 2004 article for the same magazine, Michael Scott Doran, an Assistant Professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University and Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations wrote:

Saudi Arabia is in the throes of a crisis. The economy cannot keep pace with population growth, the welfare state is rapidly deteriorating, and regional and sectarian resentments are rising to the fore.

Former CIA operative, Robert Baer notes in a May 2003 article that was published in The Atlantic Monthly and based on his book, "The Fall of the House of Saud" that "per capita income in Saudi Arabia fell from $28,600 in 1981 to $6,800 in 2001".

Can you imagine how you’d react if you saw your family income erode that much? Now put yourself in the shoes of the Saudi leadership, which Doran characterizes as "a fragmented entity, divided between the fiefdoms of the royal family". You want desperately to stay in power and keep the nation from descending into an even more restrictive Sunni theocracy than it already is. To do so, you need to keep a lid on political and religious dissent with a combination of the proverbial "carrot and stick".

As for the carrot, 38.2 percent of the 2002 national budget of $56.9 billion was allocated to education, health care and welfare programs. That budget included a $12 billion deficit.

As for the "stick," Robert Baer estimates...

"Taking into account its murky 'off-budget' defense spending, Saudi Arabia may spend more per capita on defense than any other country in the world (some estimates put the figure at 50 percent of its total revenues), and the House of Saud believes this is necessary for its personal protection."

Now back to Palast’s allegation that the purpose of the invasion of Iraq was to make sure it’s oil flow didn’t disrupt the market, but stayed within OPEC’s quota limits. The effect of an invasion and its resulting economic disruption in Iraq, would virtually guarantee the price of oil would remain high enough to keep the Saudi national security state and welfare system afloat a bit longer.

$60 a barrel oil might be an inconvenience for millions of American's -- who the president himself said are "addicted to oil" -- but it’s been a positive boon to oil states like Saudi Arabia and Dubai.

In 2005, Saudi oil income was $157 billion, an increase of 48 percent.

The Washington Times reported on September 7, 2005:

"The increased wealth is beginning to trickle down to ordinary Saudis," said Ihsan Buhuleiga, a leading economist and member of the Shura Council, in an interview with The Washington Times.

While some economic analysts have expressed worries over an overheating stock market, Mr. Buhuleiga said he hoped to see the surge of new listings continue.
"The number of companies currently listed are only 80. In Oman, they have double that number. More Saudi companies should be listed, as this will encourage more job creation," he said.

Job creation is something the Saudi government desperately wants to achieve in order to stop young, unemployed Saudi men from being lured into joining terrorist groups…

The paper adds...

The spurt in oil revenue may also help the ruling al-Saud royal family to secure its popularity.

On Aug. 22, the government announced a 15 percent increase in the wages of all government employees, a move ordered by newly enthroned Saudi King Abdullah to garner popular support and to inject money into the local economy.

Even before the salary raise, Saudis had seen their per-capita gross domestic product grow from $7,437 in 1998 to $11,052 in 2004. Samba estimates per capita GDP in 2005 to reach $13,603.

Clearly the Saudis and other oil producing nations have benefited from the chaos in Iraq, where gasoline is in such short supply that people often sleep in their cars overnight waiting in line for fuel.

Multinational oil companies have certainly profited. ExxonMobil enjoyed profits of $36 billion in 2005, as has Dick Cheney’s old company, Halliburton, along with various defense contractors. Even the U.S. alternative fuels industry is being helped as high prices drive investments in ethanol and biodiesel plants, as well as wind turbines and solar panels production.

The real losers -- for the moment -- are the poor in the developing world for whom the price of kerosene is now unaffordable... and of course, the Iraqi people.

Saudi Arabia: The Sands Run Out

2006-03-24T01:41:00.000-08:00

Saudi Arabia: The Sands Run Out

by Michael T. Klare; http://mondediplo.com/; March 23, 2006

Last month’s foiled attack on a Saudi Arabian oil installation demonstrated yet again the world’s extreme vulnerability to any check on oil supplies. But what if the Saudi oilfields are running lower on untapped supplies than the kingdom, and the West, have estimated?

As concern rises in the United States and elsewhere over the future availability of oil, the global community of energy experts has split into two camps: the optimists believe that oil is abundant and will remain so for years to come, while the pessimists think supplies will become increasingly scarce. For both, Saudi Arabia, the world’s leading oil producer, has a pivotal role. The optimists believe that it will continue to expand its output, thereby satisfying ever-increasing global demand; the pessimists contend that its oilfields will soon decline, eliminating any prospect of expanding the world’s net oil supply. To reach any conclusions about world supply, we must first consider Saudi Arabia.

It is impossible to exaggerate Saudi Arabia’s importance in the global oil-supply equation. Not only is it the leading producer and exporter of oil, but it is also the only major supplier with substantial spare capacity, allowing it to boost output quickly in times of crisis. This was of decisive importance in 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait and both countries’ production was no longer on the market. By swiftly upping its own output, Saudi Arabia prevented another global oil shock like those after the Arab oil embargo of 1973-74 and the Iranian revolution of 1979.

Given its unique ability to increase output in times of crisis, Saudi Arabia has long been viewed in Washington as a vital part of US energy security. When the price of crude began its meteoric rise in spring 2005, the first thing President George Bush did was to invite Crown Prince (now King) Abdullah to his ranch in Crawford, Texas, to plead with him to boost Saudi output. “The crown prince understands that it is very important [to] make sure that the price is reasonable,” Bush told reporters before the meeting (1).

After the meeting, a Bush aide announced that Abdullah had promised to increase Saudi output, and noted that this “can’t help but have a positive downward effect” on oil prices (2). Although Abdullah’s promises to increase Saudi output have yet to produce a marked decline in energy prices, Washington has continued to put pressure on Riyadh to expand its production.

The oil future

Even more important than its role as a swing producer in times of crisis is Saudi Arabia’s expected contribution to future oil output. “With one-fourth of the world’s proven oil reserves,” the US department of energy (DoE) observed in 2004, “Saudi Arabia is likely to remain the world’s largest net oil exporter for the foreseeable future” (3). Every assessment released by the DoE indicates that Saudi oil production will continue to grow and that it will play a critical role in satisfying the ever-increasing global demand for petroleum. The DoE predicts that Saudi Arabia will provide over one-quarter of all new oil added to global supplies between 2001 and 2025.

To appreciate fully Saudi Arabia’s pivotal role, it is useful to consult the projections of future supply and demand released each year by the DoE. In 2004 it predicted that world oil demand would rise by 57% between 2001 and 2025, from 77m to 121m barrels per day (mbd). In response to this, Saudi oil output was expected to rise by 120% during this period, from 10.2mbd to 22.5mbd, a net increase of 12.3mbd. No other country or group of countries came close in anticipated growth rates. Russia and the former Soviet republics of the Caspian Sea region have a combined anticipated increase of 8.5mbd; Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait were jointly projected to achieve an increase of 7.6mbd; and Nigeria, the leading producer in Africa, was expected to gain only 1.6mbd. Most other regions were projected to experience declining or stagnant production, so Saudi Arabia’s addition was deemed essential to satisfying anticipated demand (4). But is Saudi Arabia truly capable of increasing its oil output by 12.3mbd - or by any amount at all? This question has stirred up controversy among oil analysts.

The controversy began in February 2004, when the New York Times reported that a number of analysts had concluded that Saudi Arabia’s major oil-fields had been more thoroughly depleted than was commonly thought, raising significant doubt about its ability to boost output beyond the then current rate of 9-10mbd. Although its production had kept pace with international demand in the past, said the Times, its “oil-fields now are in decline, prompting industry and government officials to raise serious questions about whether the kingdom will be able to satisfy the world’s thirst for oil in coming years” (5).

Anger and alarm

This article provoked anger and alarm in Saudi Arabia. A few days later senior officials of Saudi Aramco, the state-owned oil company, told an audience in Washington that the company was fully capable of boosting its output in future. “We have the potential to add more oil than anyone else,” said Mahmoud Abdul-Baqi, Aramco’s vice-president for exploration. “We will continue to deliver for another 70 years at least” (6). The Saudi Arabian oil minister, Ali al-Naimi, was even more emphatic: If world demand continued to rise, “we’re going to be ready to meet it” (7).

These assurances were reiterated by the US DoE, which generally assumes an optimistic stance in the debate over global petroleum availability. In the 2004 edition of its International Energy Outlook, the DoE reported that Saudi Arabian officials “are confident in their ability to sustain significantly higher levels of production capacity well into the middle of this century” (8).

This was not the final word. In May 2005 Houston banker Matthew Simmons published a bombshell of a book, Twilight in the Desert, in which he claimed that most major Saudi oil-fields are in decline and incapable of sustaining higher output: “There is only a small probability that Saudi Arabia will ever deliver the quantities of oil that are assigned to it in all the major forecasts of world oil production. Saudi Arabian production is at or very near its peak sustainable volume... and it is likely to go into decline in the very foreseeable future” (9).

Four main points

Simmons is not a militant environmentalist or an anti-oil partisan. He is the chairman and CEO of one of the world’s leading oil-industry investment banks, Simmons & Company International. For decades he has been pouring billions of dollars into the energy business, financing the exploration and development of new oil reservoirs around the world. He has become a friend and associate of many top figures in the oil industry and the US government, including Bush and the vice president, Dick Cheney. He has also accumulated a storehouse of information about the status of major oil fields, making him one of the most knowledgeable figures in the field. That is why his dour assessment is so significant.

His argument boils down to these points: most of Saudi Arabia’s oil is extracted from four or five giant fields; these were first developed 40-50 years ago, and have since given up must of their easily extracted petroleum; to maintain high levels of production in these fields, the Saudis have increasingly come to rely on the use of water injection and other secondary recovery methods to compensate for the drop in natural field pressure; in time, the ratio of water to oil in these underground fields will grow to the point where further oil extraction becomes difficult, if not impossible.

Twilight in the Desert is not easy to read. Most of it consists of a detailed account of Saudi Arabia’s vast oil infrastructure, relying on technical papers written by Saudi oil engineers on aspects of production in particular fields. Much of this has to do with the ageing of Saudi oilfields and the use of water injection to maintain the pressure in underground reservoirs , which can result in the degradation of untapped supplies. By drawing on these technical studies, Simmons is able to demonstrate that Saudi Arabia’s largest fields are rapidly approaching the end of their productive life.

The Saudis responded to these allegations with anger and alarm. At a conference in Washington, Naimi disputed the claims and insisted that his country was fully capable of raising its output as needed. “I want to assure you here today that Saudi Arabia’s reserves are plentiful and that we stand ready to increase output as the market dictates,” he declared on 17 May 2005. At a meeting in Paris, he announced plans to increase Saudi oil production from 10mbd to 12mbd by 2009 and indicated that it could rise to as much as 15mbd if demand continued to expand (10).

But this time there has been greater scepticism from experts. Many analysts have noted that the extra oil being pumped by Saudi Arabia is high in sulphur content, making it unusable for many refineries, and that the Saudis are not making great progress in efforts to increase output. Speaking of the encounter between Bush and Abdullah, Jason Schenker of the Wachovia Corporation said: “There will be no real change as a result of this meeting” (11).

The US changes its mind

The most striking indication of this change in outlook is the new assessment in the DoE’s International Energy Outlook 2005, released last July. The 2004 edition gave that Saudi 12.3mbd increase we mentioned, but the new edition projected an increase of only 6.1mbd by 2025, less than half as much (12). No explanation was provided for this turnaround, but it can only be assumed that the analysis of Simmons and other sceptics has begun to influence official thinking in Washington.

It is likely that even the DoE’s much-reduced projection will prove wildly optimistic. Not even Naimi, in his most expansive moments, has claimed that Saudi Arabia can push its oil output above 15mbd, and he has never explicitly promised that it will rise much above 12mbd. If Simmons is right, even that level may prove beyond the kingdom’s reach.

None of this discussion has addressed the separate question of whether political conditions in Saudi Arabia will affect oil production. A major domestic upheaval, such as that in Iran after the overthrow of the shah in 1978-79, would almost certainly produce a downturn in production, possibly for many years. A powerful terrorist attack on Saudi oil facilities (such as almost happened last month) would have a similar result.

But even if conditions remain relatively stable, we should begin to plan for a world in which the global supply of oil will probably never satisfy the insatiable demand.

Michael T Klare is professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College, Amherst, Massachusetts, and author of ‘Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America’s Growing Dependency on Imported Petroleum’ (Henry Holt, 2004)

(1) See “Bush-Saudi talks focus on long-range oil plan,” Reuters, 25 April 2005.

(2) “Bush urges Saudis to boost oil production,” Los Angeles Times online edition, 25 April 2005.

(3) US Department of energy, energy information administration (DoE/EIA), “Saudi Arabia, Country Analysis Brief”, 23 June 2004.

(4) DoE/EIA, International Energy Outlook 2004. (Washington, DC, 2004), tables A4 and D1.

(5) Jeff Gerth, “Forecast of rising oil demand challenges tired Saudi fields”, New York Times, 24 February 2004.

(6) “Saudis refute claims of oil field production declines”, Oil and Gas Journal, 8 March 2004.

(7) “Saudi oil minister Al-Naimi sees kingdom sustaining oil supply linchpin role for decades”, Oil and Gas Journal, 5 April 2004.

(8) DoE/EIA, International Energy Outlook 2004, op cit.

(9) Matthew R Simmons, Twilight in the Desert: The Coming Saudi Oil Shock and the World Economy, John Wiley, Hoboken, New Jersey, 2005.

(10) Doris Leblond, “Saudi production growth detailed in Paris oil summit,” Oil and Gas Journal, 2 May 2005.

(11) “Saudis offer oil capacity plan, no immediate relief,” Bloomberg News, 25 April 2005.

(12) DoE/EIA, International Energy Outlook 2005, Washington DC, 2005, table E1.

US government report on Saudi Arabia's human rights

2006-03-23T19:22:00.000-08:00

US government report on Saudi Arabia's human rights

Saudi Arabia, Politics, 3/23/2006

The US Department Of State released the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices- 2005, by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. As relating to Saudi Arabia, the report said:

Saudi Arabia is a monarchy ruled by the Al Saud family without elected representative institutions at the national level and with a 2004 population of approximately 26.7 million of which an estimated 7 million were foreign citizens. On August 1, King Abdullah bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud ascended the throne upon the death of his half-brother, King Fahd bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud. As the custodian of Islam's two holiest sites in Mecca and Medina, the government bases its legitimacy in governance according to its interpretation of Islamic law (Shari'a). The Basic Law sets out the system of government, rights of citizens, powers, and duties of the state, and provides that the Koran and the Traditions (Sunna) of the Prophet Muhammad serve as the country's constitution. The government generally maintained effective control over the security forces.

Human rights issues have not historically been the subject of public discourse but have become increasingly prominent during the year. The government's human rights record remained poor overall with continuing serious problems, despite some progress. The following human rights problems were reported:

no right to change the government
infliction of severe pain by judicially sanctioned corporal punishments
beatings and other abuses
arbitrary arrest
incommunicado detention
denial of fair public trials
exemption from the rule of law for some individuals and lack of judicial independence
political prisoners
infringement of privacy rights
significant restriction of civil liberties--freedoms of speech and press, assembly, association, and movement
no religious freedom
widespread perception of corruption
lack of government transparency
legal and societal discrimination against women, religious and other minorities
strict limitations on worker rights.

For the first time since 1963, elections for governmental bodies occurred during the year. On February 10, March 3, and April 21, a male electorate chose 592 members, half of the seats, on 178 advisory municipal councils. Women were not permitted to vote or stand for office. On December 14, the king and crown prince appointed the other half of the council members. During the year public attention to human rights increased; unlike in previous years, human rights issues were discussed in the media. On September 12, the Council of Ministers approved the establishment of the Human Rights Commission, a specialized governmental entity, aimed at protecting and enhancing human rights as well as raising public awareness and ensuring the implementation of human rights in line with Shari'a rule.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From:

a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life

There were no reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings; however, the government executed persons for criminal offenses after closed trials, making it impossible to assess whether legal protections were applied (see section 1.e.). The country's highest court, the Supreme Judicial Council, is responsible for reviewing cases involving sentences of stoning, amputation, or death, and sentences can only be enforced pursuant to a royal decree issued by the king.

b. Disappearance

There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The Basic Law prohibits torture and Shari'a prohibits judges from accepting confessions obtained under duress; however, authorities abused both citizens and foreigners. Ministry of Interior (MOI) officials were responsible for most incidents of abuse of prisoners, including beatings, whippings, and sleep deprivation. In addition, there were allegations of beatings with sticks and suspension from bars by handcuffs. There were allegations that these practices were used to force confessions from prisoners.

During the year the religious police (Mutawwa'in) harassed, abused, and detained citizens and foreigners of both sexes. These incidents were most common in the central region, including the capital, Riyadh, and less frequent in the eastern and western regions of the country.

The government sentenced criminals to punishment according to its interpretation of Shari'a. Corporal punishments provided by law included public execution by beheading, amputation, lashing, and other measures deemed appropriate by the judicial authorities, including potentially as eye-gouging.

By year's end, the press reported approximately 86 executions. Executions were for killings, narcotics-related offenses, rape, and armed robbery. The authorities punished repeated thievery and other repeated offenses by amputation of the right hand and left foot. The government also punished convicted persons by lashing, According to press reports, lashes were generally administered with a thin reed by a man who must hold a book under his arm to prevent him from lifting the arm too high. The strokes, delivered through a thin shirt, are not supposed to leave permanent damage, but to leave painful welts that bleed and bruise. Persons convicted of less serious offenses, such as alcohol-related offenses or being alone in the company of an unrelated person of the opposite sex sometimes were punished by lashing.

According to January 6 press reports, two young citizens, Barjis bin Faleh and Abdulrahman bin Haif, were sentenced to prison terms (12 years and 1,200 lashes and 2 years and 200 lashes) for orchestrating, filming with a camera phone and distributing a video on the Internet of a foreign driver sexually assaulting a 17-year-old girl. The driver was sentenced to 2 years and 600 lashes. The press reported on January 24 that a 12-year-old Bangladeshi boy was arrested for pickpocketing pilgrims and lashed 80 times after conviction by an ad hoc court in Mina.

After arrest at a private party in Jeddah on March 10, more than one hundred men were convicted and sentenced after closed trials for "dancing and behaving like women." More than 70 men were sentenced to one year's imprisonment. Thirty one men received sentences ranging from six months to one year and 200 lashes for each. Four men were sentenced to two year's imprisonment and two thousand lashes each, according to the NGO Human Rights Watch (HRW).

On November 14, a court in Qassim Province ordered 750 lashes, as well as a prison sentence of 40 months and a ban from teaching for Muhammad al-Harbi, a high school chemistry teacher, reportedly after accusations of "trying to sow doubt in a student's creed" by speaking positively about his views on Christianity, Judaism, and analyzing the causes of terrorism (see sections 1.e. and 2.a.). There was domestic as well as international media attention to the case and the sentences were not carried out because the king pardoned al-Harbi in December.

In a similar case in 2001, Muhammad al-Suhaimi, a teacher in an intermediate school, was suspended from teaching and was told not to talk to the media after reportedly engaging in a discussion with students about love in relation to marriages in the country and in relation to God. Authorities accused him of encouraging students to engage in homosexuality and to commit adultery. In a subsequent trial in 2001, al-Suhaimi was sentenced to three years in prison and 300 lashes, but appealed the conviction. He began serving his sentence during the year and served two weeks in prison before receiving a pardon from King Abdullah on December 8.

At year's end the case Puthan Veettil 'Abdul Latif Noushad, an Indian citizen was still under review under review in the appeals court in Riyadh. In 2003 the greater Shari'a Court of Dammam sentenced him to have his right eye gouged out in punishment for his role in a fight which injured a Saudi citizen. Noushad was sentenced to prison for three years

Following a December 16, 2004 political demonstration, 15 demonstrators were sentenced to between 100 and 250 lashes.

The government reserved its position on Article 20 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and does not recognize the jurisdiction of the Committee against Torture to investigate allegations of systematic torture.

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

Conditions at prisons and detention centers were generally acceptable, according to international standards. However, there were some prisons with below-acceptable standards in hygiene, food, medical, and social services, and prolonged detention of prisoners in poor health. Many jails remained overcrowded, and some detainees were allowed family visits only after a significant period of time after their initial incarceration. The authorities restricted access of foreign visitors to the prisons, 80 percent of whose inmates were nonSaudis, according to HRW. The governmentpatronized NSHR published a report in December 2004, including information on its prison visits.

d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention

The Basic Law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention and limits the period of arrest to five days without charges being filed; however, ambiguities in implementation of the law and lack of due process give the minister of interior broad powers to detain persons indefinitely. In practice, persons were held weeks or months and sometimes longer.

Role of the Police and Security Apparatus

King Abdullah remained in command of the National Guard. Crown Prince Sultan remained the minister of defense and aviation with responsibility for all armed forces of the Ministry of Defense and Aviation. The minister of interior, Prince Nayif, exercised control over government internal security forces: police and border forces, and the General Directorate of Investigation (GDI), its internal security service (Mabahith), and its own special forces. The religious police (Mutawwa'in) or the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice constitute a semiautonomous agency, reporting to the king via the Royal Diwan (the king's private office). They monitor public behavior to enforce strict adherence to conservative Islamic norms.

Arrest and Detention

The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention and limits the period of arrest to 5 days without charges being filed; however, in practice, persons were held weeks, months and sometimes longer, and the law gives the minister of interior broad powers to detain persons indefinitely.

At times the authorities arrested and detained persons without following explicit legal guidelines. The religious police intimidated, harassed and brought to police stations, persons whom they accused based on their own religious interpretations of committing "crimes of vice" including arrests for witchcraft and sorcery (see section 2.c.).

The regulations provide for bail for less serious crimes, although authorities at times released detainees on the recognizance of a patron or sponsoring employer without payment of bail. Throughout the country several Committees for Collection of Donations for Impoverished Prisoners raised funds to pay fines stemming from traffic accidents and civil cases since prisoners remain in custody until the fines are paid, regardless of length of sentence.

If accused persons were not released, authorities typically detained them for an average of two months before sending the case to trial or, in the case of some foreigners, summarily deporting them. There were no established procedures providing detainees the right to inform their family of their arrest.

By royal decree, the religious police have the authority to detain persons for no more than 24 hours for violations of the strict standards of proper dress and behavior that they themselves determine; however, they often exceeded this limit before delivering detainees to the police (see section 1.f.).

The religious police generally complied with the requirement that a police officer accompany them at the time of an arrest; however, there were cases in which religious police detained persons without the presence of a police officer. During the year in the conservative Nejd region that includes Riyadh, reports continued of religious police accosting, abusing, arresting, and detaining persons alleged to have violated dress and behavior standards. There were also a number of reports of religious police in Mecca taking similar actions. The risk of harassment was substantial. The religious police detained young men for offenses that included eating in restaurants with young women not related to them, allegedly making lewd remarks to women in shopping malls, or walking in groups through family-only sections of shopping centers. Religious police detained women of many nationalities for actions such as riding in a taxi with a man who was not their relative, appearing with their heads uncovered in shopping malls, and eating in restaurants with males who were not their relatives. Many such prisoners were held for days, sometimes weeks, without officials notifying their families or, in the case of noncitizens, their embassies.

There continued to be cases in which religious police arrested and detained Christians for practicing their faith; some were charged with holding services in their homes, while others were apparently arrested arbitrarily (see section 2.c.).

The authorities may detain without charge persons who publicly criticize the government, or may charge them with attempting to destabilize the government (see sections 2.a. and 3).

Political detainees arrested by the internal security service were held incommunicado in special prisons during the initial phase of an investigation. This period may last weeks or months under the MOI's broad legal authority. Access by families or lawyers to detainees was restricted.

Political protestors arrested and detained in December 2004 were held for weeks prior to being charged. Islamist dissident Shaykh Sa'eed bin Za'er remained in jail without charge from April 19, 2004 until his pardon on August 8.

The government continued to discriminate and commit abuses against members of the Shi'a Muslim minority. Government security forces, mostly religious police, reportedly arrested Shi'a based on scant suspicion, held them in custody for lengthy periods, and then released them without explanation.

Citizens can report abuses by security forces at any police station; however, there is no information publicly available on how complaints were handled.

Amnesty

The government continued its tradition of releasing prisoners on special occasions and during Ramadan and religious holy days. On August 8, the king pardoned Islamist dissident Shaykh Sa'eed bin Za'er and three jailed political dissidents who advocated constitutional reform and their lawyer (see sections 1.e., 2.a., and 2.d.). King Abdullah also pardoned five Libyans who had plotted to assassinate him when he was crown prince and, during Ramadan, thousands of prisoners held for petty crimes.

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

The Basic Law provides for an independent judiciary, and the judiciary usually decided cases on their merits; however, members of the royal family were not required to appear before the courts, and their associates have influenced judges. The Supreme Judicial Council, whose members are appointed by the king, appoints, transfers, and removes judges. The Ministry of Justice disciplines judges. The Basic Law allows for a public trial; however most trials were closed to the public.

The legal system is based on the government's interpretation of Islamic law in all courts. Courts exercise jurisdiction over common criminal cases and civil suits regarding marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance. Their jurisdiction extends to nonMuslims for crimes committed in the country. Cases involving relatively small penalties were tried in summary courts. More serious crimes are adjudicated in courts of common pleas from which appeals may be made to the courts of appeal.

Other civil proceedings, such as those involving claims against the government and enforcement of foreign judgments, were held before various specialized administrative tribunals including the Commission for the Settlement of Labor Disputes. The Board of Grievances hears complaints against government actions, including against the religious police. Plaintiffs have won their cases in these tribunals against government actions and been able to enforce foreign judgments.

On April 3, the late King Fahd issued a royal decree endorsing a reorganization plan for the judiciary proposed by the ministerial committee for administrative reforms. During the year the government was implementing the plan under which Shari'a remains the basis for the judicial system.

The government permitted Shi'a Muslims to use their own legal tradition to adjudicate cases involving domestic issues, inheritance, and Islamic endowments. However, there were only two judges. The two courts, one in Al-Hasa and the other in Qatif, handled cases of Shi'a family law. However, these courts did not have adequate resources to serve the large Shi'a population in the Eastern Province, and either party to a dispute can appeal the Shi'a court's decision to a Shari'a (Sunni) court based on the Hanbali school of jurisprudence.

There was no comparable right for non-Muslims or foreigners, whose cases were handled in Shari'a courts.

The military justice system has jurisdiction over uniformed personnel and civil servants who are charged with violations of military regulations. The minister of defense and aviation and the king review the decisions of courts-martial.

According to the Justice Ministry, judges are free to base their decisions on any of the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence, although in practice judges usually follow the Hanbali school.

The Supreme Judicial Council may not reverse decisions made by courts of appeal; however, the Council may review lower-court decisions and refer them back to the lower court for reconsideration.

The Council of Senior Religious Scholars (Ulema) is an autonomous advisory body of 20 senior religious jurists, including the minister of justice, which interprets Shari'a establishing the legal principles to guide lower-court judges.

Trial Procedures

The Criminal Procedure Law provides persons under investigation the right to a lawyer and permits lawyers to present arguments in criminal courts. The Law also provides the right to inform convicts of their right to appeal rulings.

A woman's testimony does not carry the same weight as that of a man. In a Shari'a court, the testimony of one man equals that of two women. Under the Hanbali interpretation of Shari'a followed in the kingdom, judges may discount the testimony of persons who are not practicing Muslims or who do not adhere to Hanbali doctrine. Legal sources reported that testimony by Shi'a was often ignored in courts of law or was deemed to have less weight than testimony by Sunnis.

Female parties to court proceedings such as divorce and family law cases generally had to deputize male relatives to speak on their behalf. In the absence of two witnesses, or four witnesses in the case of adultery, confessions before a judge were almost always required for criminal conviction--a situation that has led prosecuting authorities to coerce confessions from suspects by threats and abuse (see section 1.c.).

Laws and regulations state that defendants should be treated equally; however, sentencing was not uniform and crimes against Muslims received harsher penalties than those against nonMuslims. In the case of wrongful death, the amount of indemnity or "blood money" awarded to relatives varied with the nationality, religion, age, and sex of the victim. A sentence may be changed at any stage of review, except for punishments stipulated by the Koran.

Islamic law considers Hindus to be polytheists and on this basis justify discrimination in calculating accidental death or injury compensation. According to the country's Hanbali interpretation of Shari'a, once fault is determined by a court, a Muslim male receives 100 percent of the amount of compensation determined, a Jew or Christian male receives 50 percent, and all others receive 1/16 of the amount a male Muslim receives. Women receive 50 percent of what men receive in each of these categories.

Provincial governors (all of whom were members of the royal family during the year) have authority to reduce a sentence. In court cases between two individuals, the wronged party has the right to accept money or impose no punishment instead of the punishment decreed by the judge. In general, members of the royal family and other powerful families were not subject to the same rule of law as ordinary citizens.

The king and his advisors review cases involving capital punishment. The king has the authority to commute death sentences and grant pardons, except for capital crimes committed against individuals. In such cases, he may request the victim's next of kin to pardon the killer--usually in return for compensation from the family of the convicted person or from the king.

Political Prisoners

The government did not provide information regarding political prisoners or respond to inquiries about them. The government conducted closed trials for persons who may have been political prisoners and in other cases has detained persons incommunicado for long periods while under investigation.

On August 8, King Abdullah pardoned imprisoned political reformers and dissidents Abdullah al-Hamid, Matrouk al-Faleh, and Ali alDemaini as well as their lead attorney, Abdul Rahman al-Lahem, who had been arrested on November 6, 2004, and held without charge. The political reformers had been imprisoned since March 2004. After a closed trial, they were convicted of "sowing dissent and disobeying the ruler," for advocating peaceful democratic reform such as calling for a constitutional monarchy, planning to establish their own human rights organization, and protesting the composition of the board of the National Society for Human Rights (NSHR), which was funded by a donation by King Fahd. They were sentenced on May 15 to prison terms of between six and nine years. Their appeal had been denied in July (see section 2.a.).

Local human rights activists criticized the pardon because the political reformers were released without actual due process and open trials, meaning that the reformers were "unconditionally" pardoned rather than found "not guilty" and thus continued to be defined as convicted criminals. This could potentially have legal implications for them at a later date (see sections 1.d. and 2.d.). Sometimes pardoned persons' passports have been confiscated and they also may experience difficulty securing employment.

f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence

The Basic Law guarantees the inviolability of homes and the privacy of correspondence. The Criminal Procedure Law requires authorities to obtain a warrant prior to searching a residence, or a court order prior to perusing personal correspondence or documents. The government generally respected this inviolability; however, there were cases in which the government infringed on these rights, notably religious police raids on private residences. Royal decrees include provisions calling for the government to defend the home from unlawful intrusions, while laws and regulations prohibit officials from intercepting mail and electronic communications except when necessary during criminal investigations. The police generally must demonstrate reasonable cause and obtain permission from a provincial governor before searching a private home.

Despite these provisions, customs officials routinely opened mail and shipments to search for contraband, including material deemed pornographic and that appeared to be non-Sunni Islamic religious material. Customs officials arbitrarily confiscated or censored materials including Christian Bibles and religious videotapes (see section 2.c.). The authorities also opened mail and used informants and wiretaps in internal security and criminal matters. Informants and an informal system of ward bosses in some districts reported to the MOI "seditious ideas," antigovernment activity, or "behavior contrary to Islam" in their neighborhoods.

The government enforced most social and Islamic religious norms, the government's interpretations of which are matters of law (see section 5). Women may not marry noncitizens without government permission; men must obtain government permission to marry noncitizen women outside the six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). In accordance with Shari'a, women are prohibited from marrying non-Muslims; men may marry Christians and Jews, as well as Muslims (see section 2.c.). The government does not refuse marriage licenses between Sunni and Shi'a couples; tradition and culture, not law, restrict marriages between Sunni and Shi'a citizens.

According to the law, men who work in certain government positions, such as the military, cannot marry noncitizens though in practice exceptions are made. The government subjects top civil servants and security officials applying to marry foreigners to extensive questioning. Due to certain cultural norms, the government tends to be more lenient when approving marriages of foreigners to elderly and disabled Saudis. The marital restrictions also applied to citizens studying overseas on government scholarships. Violators risked disciplinary action; however, this policy was frequently violated and there were no reports of sanctions being imposed.

While religious police practices and incidents of abuse varied widely in different regions of the country, they were most numerous in the central Nejd region. In certain areas, the religious police and religious vigilantes, acting on their own, harassed, abused, arrested, and detained citizens and foreigners (see section 1.d.).

Religious police enforcement of strict standards of social behavior included closing commercial establishments during the five daily prayer observances, insisting upon compliance with strict norms of public dress, and dispersing gatherings of women in public places designated for men, as well as preventing unaccompanied or single men from entering public places designated for families. Religious police frequently reproached both citizen and foreign women for failure to observe strict dress codes, and arrested men and women found together who were not married or closely related.

Incidents involving the religious police increased during Ramadan because many religious police felt they had added license to assert their authority during the holy month.

The government blocked access to some Internet Web sites, claiming that these restrictions bar access to pornography. However, the government also blocked access to sites with religious and political material that the government considered offensive or sensitive.

Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

a. Freedom of Speech and Press

According to the Basic Law, the media's role is to educate the masses and to promote national unity; however, media outlets can be banned if they give rise to mischief and discord, compromise the security of the state and its public image, or offend man's dignity and rights. The government continued to restrict freedom of speech and press and censored articles that the government deemed negative towards it, the royal family or Islam. Authorities routinely censored foreign print sources. However, during the year, there was regular discussion in the media of social, economic, and political issues previously considered taboo such as reform, trafficking in persons, prostitution, homosexuality, the religious establishment, women's rights, and human rights.

In March 2004, journalist Faris bin Hozam al-Harbi was banned from writing or working for any newspaper; however, he was a frequent commentator on television on the topic of security and was often quoted in the press. On November 6, 2004, the lead attorney for the arrested political reformers, Abdul Rahman alLahem, was arrested. He had signed an agreement with the government undertaking not to speak to the press about the case, but continued to give interviews, telling one journalist that he did not accept the government's attempt to silence him. On August 8, the king pardoned al-Lahem with his political reformer clients (see section 1.e.).

The print media were censored and privately owned, but subsidized, and some were owned, financially backed by, or had other close ties to members of the royal family. Journalists also practiced self-censorship, refraining from direct criticism of government officials. A media policy statement and a national security law both prohibit the dissemination of criticism of the royal family and the government. The government media policy statement urged journalists to uphold Islam, oppose atheism, promote Arab interests, and preserve cultural heritage. The Ministry of Information appoints, and may remove, all editors in chief. The government also provided guidelines to newspapers regarding controversial issues. The government-owned Saudi Press Agency expressed official government views.

The Saudi Journalist Association was founded in 2004 under a charter granted by the government in 2003. Membership is voluntary and open to both men and women. Some journalists chose not to join. Non-Saudi journalists working in the kingdom were eligible to join as nonvoting members. The organization's board of directors, which was elected on June 7, 2004, had nine members, including two women.

The authorities continued to ban government employees from criticizing the government. The government enforced existing laws based on Article 12 of the Basic Law that provides the state with the authority to "prevent anything that may lead to disunity, sedition, and separation." Accordingly, all public employees are enjoined from "participating, directly or indirectly, in the preparation of any document, speech or petition, engaging in dialogue with local and foreign media, or participating in any meetings intended to oppose the State's policies."

Newspapers routinely investigated and published stories on crime and terrorism. Two London-based Arabic dailies, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat and AlHayat, continued to be owned by members of the royal family and were widely distributed and read in the country. Both newspapers practiced self-censorship.

The government owned and operated most domestic television and radio companies. Government censors removed any reference from foreign programs and songs to politics, religions other than Islam, pork or pigs, alcohol, and sex.

During the year, the Consultative Council (Majlis al-Shura) continued partial, delayed television coverage of its proceedings and allowed journalists to attend sessions. The December National Dialogue meeting on relations with Muslim minorities and non-Muslims was simultaneously broadcast throughout the kingdom (see sections 2.b. and 2.c.).

There were several million satellite-receiving dishes in the country, which provided citizens with foreign television programming. Access to outside sources of information, such as Arabic and Western satellite television channels and the Internet was widespread.

The government banned books, magazines, and other materials that it considered sexual or pornographic in nature. The Ministry of Information compiled and updated a list of publications that were prohibited from being sold in the country. The government censored most forms of public artistic expression and prohibited cinemas and public musical or theatrical performances, except those that were considered folkloric.

Access to the Internet was available through local governmentmonitored servers. There were as many as one million Internet subscribers. Some citizens circumvented controls by accessing the Internet through servers in other countries. The government attempted to block Web sites that it deemed sexual, pornographic, politically offensive, or "un-Islamic;" however, many citizens were able to circumvent some or most of these restrictions. The government did have an "appeal" process, through which citizens could request reconsideration of a decision to block a particular Web site and authorities reportedly at least partially unblocked some Web sites.

A Shi'a professor continued to face a travel ban for his 2003 criticisms of the government's discriminatory policies against the Shi'a. There were other reports during the year that Shi'a activist writers and other public figures were banned from traveling and that the government had confiscated their passports.

The government continued to restrict academic freedom. The government prohibited the study of evolution, Freud, Marx, Western music, and Western philosophy. Some professors believed that informants monitored their classroom comments and reported them to government and religious authorities.

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

Freedom of Assembly

The Basic Law does not address freedom of assembly, and the government strictly limited it in practice and prohibited all public demonstrations.

In December 2004, police arrested 21 persons for taking part in an antigovernment protest in Jeddah. The protest was called by Saad al-Faqih, a London-based Saudi and supporter of international terrorism. At year's end, the detainees were still awaiting trial (see sections 1.d. and 3).

Public meetings were usually segregated by sex. The authorities monitored any large nonfamily gathering, particularly if women were present. The religious police dispersed any large nonfamily groups found in public places, such as restaurants.

Freedom of Association

The Basic Law does not address freedom of association, and the government strictly limited it in practice.

The government prohibited the establishment of political parties or any type of group that the government considered counter to its regime, or overstepping the bounds of criticism by challenging the king's authority (see section 3).

From January 2003 until the arrest of political reformers in March 2004, reform supporters submitted a series of petitions to the government. Their recommendations covered reform, women's rights, religious moderation, and political participation. In June 2003 the government instituted a series of "National Dialogue" discussions, to discuss issues involving religion, women, youth, extremism, and education. The fifth National Dialogue discussion took place in December, and dealt with relations with Muslim minorities and non-Muslims. The government also instituted a permanent National Dialogue Center in Riyadh. The government licensed a large number of humanitarian organizations and tribal and professional societies, such as the Saudi Chemists Society and the Saudi Pharmacists Society.

c. Freedom of Religion

The government does not provide legal protection for freedom of religion, and such protection did not exist. Islam is the official religion, and Islamic law as interpreted by the government requires that all citizens be Muslims. Government leaders called for tolerance and moderation, and King Abdullah and other leaders made public pronouncements condemning religious extremism.

The government continued to prohibit the public practice of nonMuslim religions and put limits on religious practices of Shi'a and Sufi sects. In general, the government has stated that nonMuslims are able to worship privately, but have not offered clear guidelines as to what constitutes private worship. Conversion by a Muslim to another religion is considered apostasy. Apostasy is a crime under Shari'a and, according to the government's interpretation, is punishable by death. In October 2004 a citizen, whom international NGO and local media reports claimed had converted to Christianity, was arrested in Hofuf and jailed. No further information was available at year's end.

Citizens and especially foreigners widely believed in and sometimes practiced magic and superstition. However, under the government's interpretation of Shari'a, the practice of magic was regarded as the worst form of polytheism, an offense for which no repentance was accepted, and which was punishable by death. An unknown number of detainees were held in prison on the charge of "sorcery" or the alleged practice of "black magic" or witchcraft.

The practice of other schools of Sunni Islam was discouraged, and adherents of the Shi'a branch of Islam faced various forms of discrimination condoned by the government, including restrictions on religious practice and on the building of mosques and community centers (see also sections 1.e., 3, and 5).

The Shi'a Muslim minority, estimated to be between 10 and 15 percent of the citizen population, lived mostly in the Eastern Province, although a significant number also resided in Medina in the Western Province and in Najran in the southwest. Its members were subjected to officially sanctioned discrimination of various forms (see also sections 1.e., 3, and 5). Many Shi'a view the ultimate jurisdiction of Shari'a (Sunni) courts over intra-Shi'a family matters as impinging on their religious freedom (see section 1.e.).

An estimated 700 thousand Sulaimani Ismailis, a subset of Shi'a Islam, live in the country, primarily in Najran. Reportedly, at least 57 Sulaimani Ismailis are still in jail following rioting in Najran in 2000. Allegedly, the government discriminated against them by prohibiting them from having their own religious books, allowing religious leaders to declare them unbelievers, denying them government employment or restricting them to lowerlevel jobs, and relocating them from the Southwest to other parts of the country or encouraging them to emigrate

Shi'a Ismailis (Seveners) in Najran reportedly were charged with practicing magic; however, the Shi'a Ismailis maintained that their practice adheres to the Seveners' interpretation of Islam.

On September 17, the NGO Human Rights First Society (HRFS) reported that Ismailis in Najran paid allegiance to the king, but requested that the government provide equal employment opportunities for Ismailis and the release of the Najran prisoners. They also requested that those "exiled" from Najran after riots be allowed to return, and a university and a literary and cultural club be established in Najran to raise the level of education and awareness.

The government tolerated the celebration of the Shi'a holiday of Ashura and other minor Shi'a holidays in the eastern province city of Qatif. The police monitored the celebrations. No other public Ashura celebrations were allowed in the country, and many Shi'a traveled to Qatif or to Bahrain to participate in Ashura celebrations. The government continued to enforce other restrictions on the Shi'a community, such as banning Shi'a books. Shi'a were not allowed to teach religion to classes higher than the elementary grade level, and the government did not allow Shi'a to open private schools for girls.

There was discrimination in the availability of facilities for religious activities. The government issued permits to construct a few Shi'a mosques, such as a new and large mosque in Qatif, although the process was more cumbersome and took far longer for them than for Sunnis. The Shi'a have declined government offers to build state-supported mosques because the government would prohibit the incorporation and display of Shi'a motifs in any such mosques.

Significant numbers of Sufis in the Western Province engaged in technically illegal practices such as celebrating the Mawlid, or Prophet's birthday, without government interference.

The government prohibited public non-Islamic religious activities. Non-Muslim worshippers risked arrest, lashing, deportation, and abuse for engaging in overt religious activity that attracted official attention. Though private worship by non-Muslims was ostensibly allowed, the government did not provide explicit guidelines (such as the number of persons permitted to attend and acceptable locations) for determining what constitutes private worship. Such lack of clarity, as well as instances of arbitrary enforcement by the authorities, forced most non-Muslims to worship in a manner so as to avoid discovery by the government or others. Authorities deported those detained for non-Islamic worship, almost always after lengthy detention (see section 1.f.).

Christians were detained for practicing their religion. For example, the newspaper Al-Jazeerah reported that 40 Pakistani citizens, including one Muslim, were arrested on April 12 after conducting Christian religious services in an apartment in Riyadh. However, during the year, there were fewer raids, arrests, and detentions of Christians throughout the country than in the past.

Unlike in previous years, there were no deportations of resident Christians for providing an Arabic Bible to a citizen. Also, unlike in previous years there were no reports of religious police arrests, beatings, and confiscations of property of Christians for religious reasons following a Christian's dispute with a citizen employer.

The government did not officially permit non-Muslim clergy to enter the country for the purpose of conducting religious services, although some came under other auspices. Such restrictions made it very difficult for most non-Muslims to maintain contact with clergymen and attend services. Catholics and Orthodox Christians, who require a priest on a regular basis to receive the sacraments required by their faith, were particularly affected.

Proselytizing by non-Muslims, including the distribution of nonIslamic religious materials such as Bibles, was illegal. Anyone publicly wearing any kind of religious symbols risked a confrontation with the religious police.

Under the Hanbali interpretation of Shari'a, judges may discount the testimony of persons who are not practicing Muslims or who do not adhere to "correct doctrine"(see section 1.e.). Islamic religious education was mandatory in public schools at all levels. All students received religious instruction, which generally was limited to that of the Hanbali school of Islam. In accordance with the religious establishment's interpretation of Shari'a, women were prohibited from marrying non-Muslims, but men were permitted to marry Christians and Jews, as well as Muslims (see section 1.f.).

The government required noncitizens to carry legal resident identity cards (Iqamas), which contained a religious designation for "Muslim" or "non-Muslim." There were reports that individual members of the religious police pressured sponsors not to renew employment-based legal resident identity cards of individuals based on religious affiliation.

During the holiday season, the press reported that shopkeepers in Riyadh sold Christmas cards under the counter. During the year the religious police prohibited the sale of cards and flowers for exchange on Valentine's Day.

Societal Abuses and Discrimination

There were no public places of worship for non-Muslims in the country. While significant numbers of Christians reside in the country, there are very few Jews. There were no synagogues or churches in the country. While there have been no specific reports of physical violence against or harassment of Jewish persons, there were numerous reports of violence against and harassment of Christians, due to societal discrimination against foreigner workers coupled with religious discrimination. The majority of noncitizens in the kingdom were low-paid workers from developing countries (for example, the Philippines, India, and Ethiopia).

Although to a lesser extent than in the past, mosque preachers, whose salaries are paid by the government, frequently used strong anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic language in their sermons. There continued to be instances in which mosque speakers prayed for the death of Jews, including from the Grand Mosque in Mecca and the Prophet's Mosque in Medina.

Anti-Semitic editorial comment appeared in the print and electronic media. For example, references supporting the idea of "Jewish control over the world," and to the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion" appeared the newspaper Ar-Riyadh on March 6. Cartoons typically used classic anti-Semitic imagery directed against the actions of Israel as a "Zionist" state, particularly in regard to treatment of Palestinians. Questions in the media were raised, at times whether modern Christians and Jews should be considered "people of the book" and thus due the respect required by the Koran. On December 16, according to an NGO, Shaykh Abdul al-Aziz Fawzan al-Fawzan, a professor of Islamic law at Al-Imam University, urged on Al-Majd television a nonracist, compassionate "hatred" toward infidels that would guide and reform them.

NGOs have reported on intolerance in the education system and, in particular that religious textbooks emphasized intolerance and hatred of all other religious traditions, especially Christianity and Judaism. Saudi officials claimed to have revised textbooks to remove content disparaging religions other than Islam. However, many recently published textbooks continued to contain language that was intolerant of Judaism, Christianity, and the Shi'a tradition in particular.

For a period of time in 2004, the Ministry of Tourism Web site contained a statement that Jews were banned from entering the country. However, no such ban was enforced in practice, and after this statement on the Web site was reported in the media, the government removed this language from the Web site and issued a statement denying that banning Jews was its policy.

On June 20, during a preparatory meeting for the December National Dialogue Forum in Abha in the Asir region, religious and intellectual leaders debated the relationships of Saudis with non-Saudis, and decided to replace in the country's religious and media pronouncements the word "infidel" with "other" when referring to non-Muslims or unbelievers.

King Abdullah, then the crown prince, began the National Dialogue initiative in 2003 in response to calls for real and practical reform in the kingdom. The December session was the culmination of 13 preparatory meetings held in the country between April and November where scholars and civil society members, both men and women, discussed political reform, religious tolerance, and the role of women and youth in the country. The title of the Forum was "We and the Other: A National Vision for Dealing with World Cultures." Over 700 male and female scholars and intellectuals representing civil society and the government attended the event, which sought to find ways to deal with other world cultures. The National Dialogue Center presented the recommendations the Forum generated to the king for his consideration.

For a more detailed discussion, see the 2005 International Religious Freedom Report.

d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

Male citizens have the freedom to travel within the country and abroad; however, the government restricted these rights for women based on its interpretation of Islamic Law. All women in the country were prohibited from driving and were dependent upon men for transportation. Likewise, they must obtain written permission from a male relative or guardian before the authorities allow them to travel abroad (see section 5). The requirement to obtain permission from a male relative or guardian applied also to foreign women married to citizens or to the minor and single adult daughters of citizen fathers. Since 2001 women have been able to obtain their own identity cards; however, the government required that they obtain permission to receive a card from a male relative or guardian (see section 5). In March the press reported that by 2006 it would be compulsory for every citizen woman to have her own identification card with a photograph, terminating the current practice of women carrying family cards only listing their names. Citizen women who have valid passports can obtain identity cards without needing verification from a male guardian; however, if a woman does not have a passport, she needs a male guardian to verify her identity (see section 5). During the year, the government continued to issue national identity cards to women, despite a national campaign against the practice by some religious conservatives.

The restrictions on travel also applied to dual nationality children of citizen fathers. In cases where there were custody disputes between foreign citizen women and their citizen husbands, the husband was legally able to prevent the travel of the children out of the country. These restrictions on travel can continue even after female children reach adulthood, although the government has worked with foreign consular officials to overcome a father's or husband's refusal to permit the travel of adult foreign citizen female relatives. During the year, senior officials considered, on a case-by-case basis, allowing adult foreign citizen women to travel despite objections by their husbands, fathers, or other male relatives or guardians. However, government officials took long periods of time to make such decisions, and caused additional burdens and security concerns to those individuals attempting to leave the kingdom.

Foreigners typically were allowed to reside or work in the country only under the sponsorship of a citizen or business. Media reports in October announced an easing of this restriction for businessmen.

The government required citizens and foreign residents to carry identification cards. It did not permit foreigners to change their workplace without their sponsor's permission.

During the year the government continued to provide citizenship under Article 9 of the law on naturalization to some of the thousands of native residents who live in the country without possessing citizenship of any nation.

Collectively known as "Bidoons" ("without" in Arabic), these are nativeborn residents who lack citizenship due to an ancestor's failure to obtain Saudi nationality, including descendents of nomadic tribes such as the Anaiza and Shammar, some of whose ancestors were not counted among the native tribes during the reign of the kingdom's founder, King Abdul al-Aziz; descendants of foreignborn fathers who emigrated to the country before citizenship was institutionalized; and rural migrants whose parents failed to register their births. Because of their lack of citizenship, they were denied employment and educational opportunities, and had a limited ability to travel. Bidoons are among the poorest residents of the country, and reside at the margins of society.

The Basic Law prohibits employers from retaining foreign workers' passports; however, in practice most sponsors reportedly often retained possession of foreign workers' passports. Foreign workers must obtain permission from their sponsors to travel abroad. If sponsors were involved in a commercial or labor dispute with foreign employees, they may ask the authorities to prohibit the employees from departing the country until the dispute is resolved. In some contract disputes, sponsors used this as a pressure tactic to resolve disputes in their favor by forcing employees to accept nominal amounts of the money owed to them or by having foreign employees deported (see sections 5 and 6.c.).

The government seized the passports of all potential suspects and witnesses in criminal cases and suspended the issuance of exit visas to them until the case was concluded. As a result, some foreign nationals were forced to remain in the country for lengthy periods against their will.

Citizens may emigrate. The government prohibited dual citizenship; however, children who hold other citizenship by virtue of birth abroad were permitted to leave the country using non-Saudi passports. In October the government passed a new citizenship law by which long-term residents and other foreigners could obtain citizenship

The government did not use forced exile; however, it previously revoked the citizenship of opponents of the government who reside outside the country (see section 3).

The government imposed travel bans on some of the reformers arrested in March 2004 (see sections 1.d. and 1.e.). The authorities sometimes confiscated the passports of suspected oppositionists and their families. In addition, the government has revoked the rights of some citizens to travel outside the country. In several cases, it has done so for political reasons without notifying the individual or providing opportunities to contest the restriction decision.

Protection of Refugees

The Basic Law does not provide for the granting of asylum or refugee status in accordance with the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 protocol, but the government has established a system for providing protection to refugees. In practice the government provided protection against refoulement, the return of persons to a country where they feared persecution. The Basic Law provides that "the state will grant political asylum, if so required by the public interest."

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Representative Office to the GCC countries reported that 364 Iraqi refugees still reside at the Rafha refugee camp situated a few miles from the Saudi-Iraqi border. The government has underwritten the entire cost of providing safe haven to the Iraqi refugees and continued to provide logistical and administrative support to the UNHCR. The UNHCR facilitated the spontaneous repatriation of 84 persons to Iraq from Rafha during the year and found no evidence of forcible repatriation. UNHCR has facilitated the spontaneous repatriation of more than eight thousand Iraqi refugees since 1991 (see section 1.c.). NGOs present in the camp included the Saudi Red Crescent and the International Islamic Relief Organization.

Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government

The Basic Law states that the government is established on the principal of shura or consultation, and requires the king and crown prince to hold open majlises. (A majlis is an open-door meeting held by the king, a prince, or an important national or local official where, in theory, any male citizen or foreign national may express an opinion or a grievance.) The Basic Law states that all individuals have the right to communicate with public authorities on any issue. This right to petition is interpreted by the government as a right to be exercised within traditional nonpublic means, i.e., not through the use of mass media. In practice, there were restrictions, as shown by the conviction of the three political reformers convicted of "sowing dissent and disobeying the ruler," for overtly advocating democratic reform (see sections 1.e and 2.a.).

Elections and Political Participation

Only a few members of the ruling family had a voice in the choice of leaders or in changing the political system. The government ruled on civil and religious matters within limitations established by the Basic Law, religious law, tradition, and the need to maintain consensus among the ruling family and religious leaders. During the year for the first time since 1963, the government organized elections throughout the country for half of the seats on municipal advisory councils.

The king serves as prime minister and appoints his crown prince and who serves as deputy prime minister. The king also appoints all other ministers, who in turn appoint subordinate officials with cabinet concurrence.

Male, nonmilitary citizens 21 years of age or older voted in the nationwide elections for 592 seats on 178 municipal advisory councils (half of the total seats) in February, March, and April. Women were not permitted either to vote or to stand for office. Unofficial estimates are that between 10 percent and 15 percent of eligible voters actually voted. The king completed the formation of the councils on December 15 by appointing 592 men to fill the other half of the council seats.

The Majlis al-Shura, consists of 150 appointed male members and is divided into 11 committees. This consultative council reviewed and voted on legislation and often suggested amendments to the government. The government generally accepted amendments made by it. The Majlis al-Shura held hearings with some government officials to review the performance of their ministries and has the power to request documents from government ministries.

The Council of Senior Islamic Scholars is another advisory body to the king and the Cabinet (see section 1.e.). It reviews the government's public policies for compliance with Shari'a. The government viewed the council as an important source of religious legitimacy and took the council's opinions into account when promulgating legislation.

Communication between citizens and the government traditionally has been expressed through client-patron relationships and by affinity groups such as tribes, families, and professional hierarchies. During the year, King Abdullah held a variety of meetings with citizens throughout the country, including with women. Ministers and district governors can be approached for discussion at a majlis, which were held on a regular basis.

Since 2003, various oppressed groups, including women and Shi'a, have submitted petitions to then Crown Prince Abdullah calling for reform. The repercussions of the March 2004 arrest of the 12 political reformers (and the subsequent arrest of the lawyer for the three that stood trial) accused of signing a petition calling for the implementation of a constitutional monarchy among other things, and the long, drawn out appeal for a public trial, discouraged the submission of additional reform petitions.

The London-based extremist Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR), established in 1993, and its splinter group, the Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia (MIRA), established in 1996, continued to advocate overthrowing the monarchy by force. One of the founders of the CDLR, Abdullah al-Hamid, was among the 12 political reformers arrested in March 2004.They criticized the government, using the Internet and satellite radio stations. In December 2004 police arrested 21 persons for taking part in Jeddah in an antigovernment protest sponsored by MIRA, whose leader, Sa'ad al-Faqih, was a supporter of international terrorism. At year's end, the detainees were awaiting trial (see sections 1.d. and 2.b.)

Following a 2003 MIRA-sponsored demonstration in Riyadh, hundreds of citizens gathered October 23 in Riyadh, Jeddah, Dammam, and Ha'il. The government arrested most of the demonstrators, detained many of them for a period of time without sentencing, then convicted them on charges of public demonstrating and sentenced most to sentences ranging from imprisonment to flogging. At year's end there were no reports that the sentences had been commuted (see sections 1.d. and 2.b.).

There was one female advisor to the Majlis al-Shura. Women also advised members of the Majlis al-Shura in private, closed-door sessions or through female members of the royal family. After two women were elected in December to the board of the Jeddah Chamber of Commerce, the government appointed two additional women to the board. In addition a woman was elected to the board of directors of the Saudi Engineers Council. There continued to be women's councils to advise local governors on issues concerning women (see section 5). There were no women or religious minorities in the Cabinet, and at least 4 of the 150-member Majlis al- Shura were Shi'a, from a Shi'a population estimated to be between 10 and 15 percent of the country's citizens.

Government Corruption and Transparency

There was a widespread public perception of corruption on the part of some members of the royal family and the executive branch of the government. The absence of transparency in government accounts and in decision making encouraged this perception. There are no laws providing for public access to government information. Information concerning specific instances, allegations regarding corruption, or government actions against corruption was not available to the public.

Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights

The government viewed its interpretation of Islamic law as the only necessary guide to protect human rights. There was no system to register NGOs other than as charities.

The human rights NGO Human Rights First Society (HRF)-the Society for Protecting and Defending Human Rights in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia--continued to operate without official government recognition. The local media on a number of occasions quoted the HRF president, Ibrahim Mugaiteeb, and reported on its operations. After having previously been deprived of his passport, by year's end, Mugaiteeb's passport was returned to him.

In March 2004 the king authorized the creation of and endowed the governmentpatronized National Society for Human Rights (NSHR), which characterized itself as a national nongovernmental organization with no affiliation to governmental institutions. In practice, the Society was not fully independent of the government. According to its chairman, who was himself a member of the government-appointed Majlis al-Shura, none of its members had ties to the executive branch of the government; they were consultants, professors, and retirees. Ten of its 41 members were women.

The NSHR has established offices in Jeddah, Dammam, Riyadh, and Jizan. By year's end, it claimed to have handled more than 5 thousand complaints, international as well as domestic, including "political injustices, administrative corruption, and reports by expatriate workers alleging abuse." A December 2004 press report noted that citizens' complaints against government bodies amounted to 25 percent of the cases, and foreign workers lodged 17 percent of the cases. The NSHR published weekly, monthly, quarterly, and annual reports in Arabic. The HRW criticized the NSHR for not supporting the political reformers--al-Doumani, al-Faleh and al-Hamed when they were in legal jeopardy.

The NSHR prefers to resolve cases by working with government agencies rather than bringing court cases. However, on May 18, in the first family case brought by the NHRS, the Jeddah General Court ruled in favor of two orphaned girls and their mother who had approached the NSHR seeking justice from the girls' half-brother and guardian. The girls had been living in a shelter for the poor because their brother denied them their share of their deceased father's pension and other assets (see sections 1.e. and 2.a).

On September 21, the press reported that the NSHR opened a new branch in Jizan, adjacent to the Yemeni border, following the opening of offices in the Eastern and Western Provinces. The press also reported that the NHRS suspended the membership of Ahmad al-Bahkaly because he was a government employee.

On September 12, the Council of Ministers, chaired by King Abdullah, approved the establishment of the Human Rights Commission (HRC). This specialized government organization has broad powers and reports directly to the King. Headquartered in Riyadh, the HRC was designed to protect and enhance human rights as well as raise awareness and ensure the implementation of human rights in line with Shari'a rule. On October 3, the king appointed Dr. Turki bin Khaled al-Sudairi as chairman of the commission with ministerial rank.

Section 5 Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons

The law prohibits discrimination based on race, but not nationality, although racial discrimination occurred. There is legal and systemic discrimination based on gender. The government and private organizations cooperated in providing services for persons with disabilities; however, there is no legislation mandating public access. The Shi'a minority continued to suffer social, legal, economic, and political discrimination (see section 2.c.).

Women

Shari'a prohibits abuse and violence against all innocent persons, including women. Although the government did not keep statistics on spousal abuse or other forms of violence against women, such violence and abuse appeared to be common problems based on anecdotal and media information available regarding physical spousal abuse and violence against women. Hospital workers reported that many women were admitted for treatment of injuries that apparently resulted from spousal violence; hospitals now are required to report any suspicious injuries to authorities.

In August the HRFS advocated on behalf of a battered woman seeking shelter from an abusive husband, the first case of its kind to be addressed by any human rights organization. At year's end the status of the case was not known. In May the NSHR won a family case on behalf of two orphaned girls and their mother (see section 4).

Foreign embassies continued to receive many reports that employers abused foreign women working as domestic servants. Some embassies of countries with large domestic servant populations maintained safe houses to which their citizens may flee to escape work situations that included forced confinement, withholding of food, nonpayment of salaries, beating and other physical abuse, and rape. Often female citizens are accused of committing many of the reported abuses. During the year, the media reported more frequently on cases involving domestic abuse of women, servants, and children, and there were more reports about employers being punished for abuse of domestic servants.

However, in general, the government considered such cases to be family matters and did not intervene unless charges of abuse were brought to its attention. It was almost impossible for foreign women to obtain redress in the courts due to the courts' strict evidentiary rules and the women and servants' own fears of reprisals.

For example, Nour Miyati, an Indonesian maid, accused her employer and his wife of tying her up for a month in a bathroom, beating her severely, injuring her eyes and knocking out several teeth. Her significant physical injuries resulted in gangrene in her fingers, toes, and right foot. Her sponsor's wife was found culpable for beating her and sentenced to 35 lashes. Nour Miyati was sentenced to 79 lashes because she gave contradictory testimony. She had signed a statement (which she could not read) that contradicted her oral testimony, and her oral testimony was inconsistent. At year's end both sides were appealing the verdicts.

Prostitution is illegal. Some women, primarily noncitizens, engaged in prostitution. The extent of prostitution was not known (see section 5, Trafficking)

Law and custom discriminate against women. Although they have the right to own property and are entitled to financial support from their husbands or male relatives, women have few political or social rights and were not treated as equal members of society. There were no active women's rights groups. Women may not legally drive motor vehicles and were restricted in their use of public facilities when men were present. Women must enter city buses by separate rear entrances and sit in specially designated sections. Women risked arrest by the religious police for riding in a vehicle driven by a male who was not an employee or a close male relative. On July 24 the religious police issued a statement that they never have, and never will, employ women.

The law provides that women may not be admitted to a hospital for medical treatment without the consent of a male relative; however this was not generally enforced. By law and custom, women may not undertake domestic or foreign travel alone (see section 2.d.).

In public, a woman was expected to wear an abaya (a black garment that covers the entire body) and also to cover her head and hair. The religious police generally expected Muslim women to cover their faces, and non-Muslim women from other countries in Asia and Africa to comply more fully with local customs of dress than non-Muslim Western women. During the year, religious police admonished and harassed women who failed to wear an abaya and hair cover.

Women also were subject to discrimination under Shari'a as interpreted in the country, which stipulates that daughters receive half the inheritance awarded to their brothers. While Shari'a provides women with a basis to own and dispose of property independently, women often were constrained from asserting such rights because of various legal and societal barriers, especially regarding employment and freedom of movement. In a Shari'a court, the testimony of one man equals that of two women (see section 1.e.). Although Islamic law permits as many as four wives, polygamy was becoming less common due to demographic and economic changes. Islamic law enjoins a man to treat each wife equally. In practice, such equality was left to the discretion of the husband. The government placed greater restrictions on women than on men regarding marriage to noncitizens and non-Muslims (see section 1.f.).

Women must demonstrate legally specified grounds for divorce, but men may divorce without giving cause. In doing so, men were required to pay immediately an amount of money agreed upon at the time of the marriage, which serves as a one-time alimony payment. Women who demonstrate legal grounds for divorce also were entitled to this alimony. If divorced or widowed, a Muslim woman normally may keep her children until they attain a specified age: seven years for boys and nine years for girls. Children over these ages were awarded to the divorced husband or the deceased husband's family. Numerous divorced foreign women continued to be prevented by their former husbands from visiting their children after divorce.

Women had access to free but segregated education through the university level. They constituted more than 58 percent of all university students but were excluded from studying such subjects as engineering, journalism, and architecture. Men may study overseas; the law provides that women may do so only if accompanied by a spouse or an immediate male relative. However, this restriction was not enforced in practice, and many women studied overseas without a guardian.

During the year there was increased attention in the press to women's issues, including questions such as gender discrimination, domestic abuse, health, rising divorce rates, employment, driving, and legal problems women face in the business world. On December 1, two women were elected to the board of Directors of the Jeddah Chamber of Commerce, the first elections in the country in which women were candidates.

Most employment opportunities for women were in education and health care. Despite limited educational opportunities in many professional fields, some female citizens were able to study abroad and returned to work in professions such as architecture, law, and journalism. Many foreign women worked as domestic servants and nurses.

Women who wished to enter nontraditional fields were subject to discrimination. Women may not accept jobs in rural areas if there are no adult male kin present with whom they may reside and who agree to take responsibility for them. Most workplaces in which women were present were segregated by gender. Frequently, contact with a male supervisor or client was allowed only by telephone or fax machine. However, the degree of segregation varied by region, with the central region having the most restrictions and the eastern and western regions being more relaxed. Despite gender segregation, the law provides women the right to obtain business licenses for work in fields that might require them to supervise foreign workers, interact with male clients, or deal on a regular basis with government officials.

While there is no law prohibiting women from obtaining licenses to open businesses their applications for licenses in most sectors are denied because most governing ministries do not have women's sections that can monitor the business. However, in hospital settings and in the energy industry, women and men worked together, and, in some instances, women supervised male employees. During the year the government allowed citizen female radio news broadcasters to work for the first time. A new labor law in September expanded the right of women to maternity leave and required that employers provide child care if they employed 50 or more female employees.

Children

The government provided all children with free education and medical care. Children were segregated by sex in schools, usually beginning at the age of seven; however, schools were integrated through the fourth grade in some areas.

Abuse of children was a problem, although it was difficult to gauge the prevalence of child abuse, since the government kept no national statistics on such cases. Although in general the culture greatly prizes children, studies by citizen female doctors indicated that severe abuse and neglect of children appeared to be more widespread than previously reported. At least two NGOs, one in Riyadh and one in Jeddah, run shelters for women and children. The press has also raised national consciousness about the problem.

In 2003, the MOI's center for crime prevention and research reported that 21 percent of male children suffered from some form of abuse. The report stated that 34 percent of the abused suffered from some sort of psychological abuse, and 25 percent suffered physical abuse. The figures excluded female children and accusations of sexual abuse, as the ministry stated that the issues were too sensitive for public discussion.

The Ministry of Education continued to teach children their rights under the UN Convention on the Rights of Children.

Trafficking in Persons

The country does not have an antitrafficking law, although most forms of trafficking are criminalized under existing statutes. On September 27, the government gazetted a new labor law stipulating that within the next six months, the government is to issue implementing regulations regarding domestic workers. These regulations will apply to citizen and foreign domestic workers. Currently, domestic laborers are not protected under the country's labor law. The majority of cases involving trafficking were settled out of court by mediation and settlements.

The government has not taken sufficient measures to improve its performance on trafficking issues, although it did name an official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to assume responsibility for trafficking in persons.

Foreign laborers', including domestic workers', passports were often illegally retained by their employers and can sometimes result in forced labor. Foreign nationals who have been recruited abroad have, after their arrival in the country, been presented with work contracts that specified lower wages and fewer benefits than originally promised. A reportedly small number of noncitizen women were thought to engage in prostitution, comprising a minor element of the trafficking problem in the kingdom (see sections 5, Women, 6.c., and 6.e.).

Persons with Disabilities

The law provides hiring quotas for persons with disabilities. There is no legislation that mandates public accessibility; however, newer commercial buildings often included such access, as did some newer government buildings. The provision of government social services increasingly has brought persons with disabilities into the public mainstream. The government and private charitable organizations cooperated in education, employment, and other services for persons with disabilities.

During the year the government took a variety of steps promoting more rights and elimination of discrimination against persons with disabilities. The government established an endowment committee for children with disabilities, and a supreme council to deal with the affairs of the disabled, with the crown prince as chairman. Foreign criminal rings reportedly imported children with disabilities for the purpose of forced begging (see sections 5, Trafficking in Persons, 6.c. and 6.f.). There were numerous government-sponsored centers for persons with disabilities, including organizations for children with Down's syndrome and autism.

Police generally transported persons with mental disabilities found wandering alone in public to their families or a hospital. Police asserted that, according to Islam, family members should be taking care of such individuals.

In September the press reported that the government was investigating allegations of abuse in which hundreds of naked mental patients at a Taif hospital were herded into a group shower where they were sprayed by a high-pressure stream from the water hose of a tanker truck. Such demeaning forced public nakedness was considered contrary to Shari'a.

National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities

Although racial discrimination is illegal, there was substantial societal prejudice based on ethnic or national origin. Foreign workers from Africa and Asia were subject to various forms of formal and informal discrimination and had the most difficulty in obtaining justice for their grievances. For example, some bilateral agreements governed pay, benefits and work conditions. Consequently, pay scales for identical or similar labor or professional services were set by nationality such that two similarly qualified and experienced foreign nationals performing the same employment duties received varied compensation based on their nationalities.

Other Societal Abuses and Discrimination

Under Shari'a as interpreted in the kingdom, sexual activity between two people of the same gender is punishable by death or flogging. The law also prohibits men from behaving like women or wearing women's clothes and women from wearing men's clothes (see section 1.c.).

Although the media has been urged to discourage discrimination against AIDs patients and those infected with HIV, the press reported that the government failed to provide proper medical treatment to HIV positive noncitizens and treated them poorly until their deportation. The Ministry of Health has set up three HIV centers that provided diagnostic and preventive services

Section 6 Worker Rights

a. The Right of Association

The Basic Law does not address freedom of association. The government prohibited the establishment of labor unions; however, since 2001, the government has authorized the establishment of labor committees for citizens in local companies, including factories, having more than 100 employees; however, no practical steps have been taken to implement this decision.

b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively

The Basic Law does not provide for collective bargaining. Collective bargaining remained prohibited. Foreign workers comprised approximately 88 percent of the work force in the private sector. During the year, the Indonesian government suspended recruitment of its nationals by Saudi firms for several months. Recruitment only recommenced after the signing of an agreement between the two governments that detailed minimum salary levels for domestic workers and other worker rights.

There are no export processing zones.

c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

The law prohibits forced or compulsory labor; however, employers often retained possession of foreign laborers' passports and identity cards, giving them significant control over the movements of foreign employees. This practice sometimes resulted in forced labor, especially in remote areas where workers were unable to leave their places of work and cannot legally travel without an identity card. In addition some sponsors prevented foreign workers from obtaining exit visas to pressure them to sign a new work contract, or to drop claims against their employer for unpaid salary or benefits (see section 2.d.). Finally, some sponsors refused, for legitimate and nonlegitimate reasons, to provide foreign workers with a "letter of no objection" that would allow them to be employed by another sponsor for legitimate and nonlegitimate reasons.

There were many reports of workers whose employers refused to pay several months, or even years, of accumulated salary or other promised benefits. More foreign workers than in the past went to labor courts, which regularly ruled in favor of the workers. However, this was a long and difficult process and it was difficult to enforce judgments. Labor courts, while generally fair, sometimes took many months to reach a final appellate ruling, during which time the employer could prevent the foreign laborer from leaving the country. Often noncitizen workers engaged in a court case against their employers cannot legally work, placing an additional burden on them and compelling a negotiated settlement. Another tactic was for an employer to delay a case until a worker's funds were exhausted, and the worker was forced to withdraw his case in exchange for the employer allowing the worker to return to his/her home country.

The Ministry of Labor established the department for protection of foreign workers to address abuse and exploitation of foreign workers (such as sexual harassment, mistreatment and nonpayment of salaries). Workers may also submit complaints and seek help from the 37 labor ministry offices throughout the country.
In the first 6 months of the year, the labor minister had banned 52 companies from obtaining labor visas. Of these 43 were banned for trading in visas and others were banned for a variety of reasons, including delayed payment of more than 4 months of wages.

The law does not specifically prohibit forced or compulsory labor by children, and there were a few reports that it occurred (see section 6.d.).

d. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment

Child labor did not appear to be a problem, with the possible rare exceptions of forced child begging rings, and possibly family businesses. The government implemented a regulation requiring that all camel jockeys be at least 18 years of age, and there were indications that it was enforced.

Under a new labor law, no juvenile under the age of 15 can work in any vocational field unless he is the only family worker. There is no minimum age for workers employed in family-owned businesses or in other areas that are construed as extensions of the household, such as farming, herding, and domestic service.

Children under the age of 18 may not be employed in hazardous or harmful industries, such as mining, or industries employing power-operated machinery. While there is no formal government entity responsible for enforcing the minimum age for employment of children, the Ministry of Justice has jurisdiction and has acted as plaintiff in the few cases that have arisen against alleged violators. However, in general, children played a minimal role in the work force.

Child beggars were reportedly often noncitizens who had been trafficked into the country for that purpose or are Hajj or Umra overstayers. The Ministry of Social Affairs maintained special offices in both Mecca and Medina to combat the growing problem of child beggars.

e. Acceptable Conditions of Work

While there is no official minimum wage for citizen workers, the unofficial private sector minimum wage was $320 (1,200 riyals) per month until October. However, once the kings 15 percent public sector wage increase took effect on October 4, the chambers of commerce announced a voluntary private sector wage increase to $400 (1,500 riyals) per month. A defacto minimum wage has been set based on the minimum monthly contribution to the pension system which is now 1,500 riyals a month. For noncitizen workers, there was no official minimum wage. Where they exist, bilateral agreements set wages. Individual contracts also set wages which vary according to the type of work performed and the nationality of the worker (see section 5). Labor regulations establish a 48-hour workweek at regular pay and allow employers to require up to 12 additional hours of overtime at time-and-a-half pay. Labor law provides for a 24hour rest period, normally on Fridays, although the employer may grant it on another day. The new labor law increased annual leave for citizen employees from 14 to 21 days and provided a minimum 6-week maternity leave for female citizen employees and new requirements to provide child care at places of employment. The average wage generally provided a decent standard of living for a citizen worker and family.

During the year, sources have produced varying estimates of the actual rate of citizen unemployment. The minister of labor stated the unemployment rate was only 5 percent (because very few citizens enrolled in a recent job placement program). The minister of finance claimed unemployment was 9.6 percent. In October in his first televised interview, the king claimed that only 100 thousand citizens were seeking jobs but could not find them. Some bankers believed the unemployment rate was 20 percent and a prominent royal and business leader recently stated the number was closer to 30 percent. None of these estimates included women, who were prohibited from working in the majority of business sectors and positions.

Approximately 80 percent of all working citizens worked directly for the government. If one adds the parastatals, like Saudia Airline and Saudi Aramco, the military, and the farmers who depend on subsidies nearly all citizens worked for the government in one way or another. However, the private sector was the reverse image. According to the government, citizen workers accounted for only 12 percent, less than 800 thousand of the approximately 6.76 million persons employed in the private sector; foreign nationals held the remaining 88 percent of the jobs (see section 6.b.).

The law prohibits employers from holding their employees' passports without the employee's consent; however, this law was not well known to foreign employees and, as a result, was frequently violated.

Labor regulations require employers to protect most workers from job-related hazards and disease. However, foreign nationals reported frequent failures to enforce health and safety standards. Farmers, herdsmen, domestic servants, and workers in family-operated businesses were not covered by these regulations. Workers risked losing employment if they removed themselves from hazardous work conditions.

Foreign nationals who have been recruited abroad have, after their arrival in the country, been presented with work contracts that specified lower wages and fewer benefits than originally promised. Other foreign workers have signed contracts in their home countries and later were pressured to sign less favorable contracts upon arrival. Some employees reported that, at the end of their contract service, their employers refused to grant permission to allow them to return home. Foreign employees involved in disputes with their employers may find their freedom of movement restricted (see sections 2.d.and 6.a.). Recognizing this issue, the authorities have created a booklet on foreign workers' rights that reportedly will be distributed at the airports and foreign embassies in the country.

The labor laws, including those designed to limit working hours and regulate working conditions, did not apply to foreign domestic servants, who may not seek the protection of the labor courts. However, the bilateral labor agreements stipulate work conditions which provide for one day of rest per week. There were credible reports that female domestic servants sometimes were forced to work 16 to 20 hours per day, 7 days per week. There were numerous confirmed reports of maids fleeing employers and seeking refuge in their embassies or consulates (see section 5). Foreign embassies continued to receive reports of employers abusing domestic servants. Such abuse included withholding of food, beatings, and other physical abuse, and rape (see section 5

The government has established welfare shelters to house female domestic servants who flee their place of work. The government offered arbitration between the worker and employer and investigated allegations of abuse. Allegations were either settled in court or through negotiation.

The ongoing campaign to remove illegal immigrants from the country has done little to reduce unemployment or to increase the number of jobs held by citizens. Illegal immigrants worked in positions which most citizens considered unworthy. The government carried out the campaign to remove the illegal aliens by widely publicizing its enforcement of existing laws against both the illegal aliens and the citizens employing or sponsoring them.

The effect of the expeditious repatriation of some illegal immigrants and the legalization of others has been to improve overall working conditions for legally employed foreigners. Illegal immigrants generally were willing to accept lower salaries and fewer benefits than legally employed immigrants. The departure or legalization of illegal workers reduced the competition for certain jobs and thereby reduced the incentive for legal immigrants to accept lower wages and fewer benefits as a means of competing with illegal immigrants. Furthermore, their departure or legalization removed a large portion of the class of workers most vulnerable to abuse and exploitation because of their illegal status.

Islamic Activism Sweeps Saudi Arabia

2006-03-23T19:06:00.000-08:00

Islamic Activism Sweeps Saudi Arabia
Cartoons of Muhammad Spur Homemakers, Students, Professionals to Organize

By Faiza Saleh Ambah
Special to The Washington Post
Thursday, March 23, 2006; A18

JIDDAH, Saudi Arabia -- More than a dozen women in black cloaks, some with colorful head scarves, others with only their eyes visible through slits in black veils, filed into the dining room after sunset prayers. They sat around a long table set up with paper, pencils and thermoses of Arabic coffee, across from a small group of men, including that evening's guest, Sadeg al-Malki.

The women -- homemakers, physicians and college students -- had sought out Malki, a consultant at the Islamic Education Foundation, because they wanted help on a project they were embarking on: how to talk to non-Muslim co-workers and acquaintances about Islam and the prophet Muhammad.

The women, who have since taken several mini-courses with Malki on discussing their religion with non-Muslims, are part of a loosely knit grass-roots movement that has sprung up across the kingdom since January, when anger over cartoons of Muhammad sparked riots in Europe and several Muslim countries. The movement is made up of a diverse cross section of women, students, businessmen, lawyers and clerics, all campaigning under the banner of Nusrat al-Rasool, or Victory for the Prophet.

The activists' campaign includes a continuing economic boycott of Denmark, where the cartoons were first published, and a project to produce television ads about the prophet for broadcast in Europe. College students are attempting to collect 1 million signatures to present to the Danish Embassy, and lawyers are studying ways to make insulting Islam and its prophet illegal. A number of businessmen have launched competitions with prize money of more than $50,000 for the best essays on Muhammad. This month, several clerics and heads of local committees will travel to neighboring Kuwait and Bahrain to brainstorm with Islamic activists there.

Though in its early stages, the grass-roots movement is a demonstration of how, in this region, activism within a religious context is capable of motivating and energizing a wide swath of society in a way that politics cannot. It is also a study of the ways in which deeply felt religious disputes, when not handled by governments, cut their own path, pushing people to take matters into their hands.

Muhammad Kawther, a young activist who heads Youth Together for an Islamic Renaissance, believes the cartoon controversy was a godsend for his group. The activists were just starting out, putting together their first project -- CDs urging young people to perform their five daily prayers -- when anger over the cartoons erupted. Dropping everything else, they decided on a campaign to collect 1 million signatures in support of the prophet.

Inexperienced and a little apprehensive at first, they approached several malls for permission to set up booths there. Sensing the public mood, mall owners not only agreed but gave them free access and advertising. They also allowed them to bring in chanters to sing the praises of the prophet, the first open public performances in this conservative country.

Three weeks into the campaign, Together had gathered 70,000 signatures, dozens of new supporters and, most valuable of all, a ton of practical experience.

"I learned how to deal with the public, with people of different ages and from different social levels," said Rayan al-Khilewi, who emceed the group's children's competition on facts about the prophet. "I learned how to deal with the media, and I actually did a live television feed."

Khilewi, a 20-year-old marketing student and taekwondo aficionado, had been strolling the mall with his family when he heard something he'd never heard at a shopping center before: Islamic songs being broadcast through a loudspeaker. Drawn by the a cappella chants, Khilewi, a religious Muslim, hurriedly followed the tune, which led him to the group's booth. He joined on the spot.

"For years I had been looking for a way to be active, to do something meaningful, and this was the first time I had found it," he said. "I have Denmark to thank for that."

Many who have become involved in activism since the cartoon crisis have echoed Khilewi's sentiment, saying the cartoons have shown them how much they love the prophet and forced them to do something about it.

Malki, the Islamic Education Authority consultant and also co-founder of the Faith in Diversity Institute, based in Owings Mills, Md., says the cartoons have created a new kind of activism. "People don't just want to talk, they want to do something," Malki said. "No state can stop, or think to stop, this activism. It's widespread, it's strong, and because of the love people feel for the prophet, it's also very emotional."

The two-hour lecture Malki gave in a noisy dining room packed mainly with women was winding down when he told the group he wanted to read them something from the Bible. He picked up his leather-bound King James version, well-thumbed with yellow bits of paper sticking out, leafed through it and started to read from the Book of Isaiah: "And the book is delivered to him that is not learned, saying, read this, I pray thee; and he saith, I am not learned."

There was stunned silence in the room, a palpable astonishment as the listeners understood the passage to foreshadow Muhammad, who was illiterate before he became a prophet. A few whispered, "God is great," and several young men and women wiped tears from their eyes.

Sulaiman al-Buthi, a Riyadh-based spokesman for the International Committee for the Defense of the Final Prophet, says this religious but peaceful activism could put an end to violence and drive groups like al-Qaeda out of business. Analysts have long said that a lack of democracy and civic institutions in the Middle East is part of the appeal of extremist groups, which offer one of the only options for disaffected youth.

But Buthi said he was "very optimistic about this movement, this cartoon intifada. It has given people opportunities to take matters into their own hands and do something positive for their religion. It's generating a very potent feeling, and it's capable of destroying the pull and influence of groups like al-Qaeda."

On the other hand, lawyer and writer Bassem Alem says he believes that the cartoons were only a trigger within the context of an already burgeoning region-wide Islamic resurgence. People "look around and they see Islamists winning in Egypt and Palestine and Morocco," he said, referring to elections in those places. "They feel empowered, and this is just one more manifestation of that."

Alem says that people took matters into their own hands because their governments were not doing enough to assuage their anger. He also contends these ad hoc committees will supplant Western-style civic institutions. "The methodologies for setting up civic institutions here failed because they were a Western model," he said. "These indigenous movements will take root because they are based on our beliefs and real needs."

Kawther, back at his father's office, which serves as Together's headquarters, was more reflective. "Islam has gone through many phases, up and down," said the stocky young man with a dark patch on his forehead that comes from regular prayers. "For it to be strong again, for a new Islamic renaissance, the youth have to be involved, and that's why we're doing this."

At the Seirafi mega-mall, where Together had set up signing booths and several computers and helped passersby send more than 5,000 e-mails to Denmark, two 12-year-old boys were handing out brochures that explained the campaign and urged people to follow the example of the prophet by becoming more devout. One of the group's members, law student Abdul-Ilah Bawazir, picked up the microphone to address the hundreds of shoppers, men to one side, veiled women to the other, who had stopped to watch that evening's performance of the Heraa group of Islamic chanters.

"We are all here for one reason," he said to the crowd. "To show solidarity with the prophet. Now that you've enjoyed the show, please take a minute and sign your name in support of the finest of messengers, prophet Muhammad. We want the world to know how much we love our prophet and how much we're willing to sacrifice for him."

ثقافتنا..استثمارية أم ريعية؟

2006-03-21T15:55:00.000-08:00

ثقافتنا..استثمارية أم ريعية؟
2005/06/21	عبد الحافظ الصاوي**
ذات مرة، اتصل بي صديقي -الذي يعمل مهندسا- ليستشيرني في أمر تكوين محفظة أوراق مالية، فأخبرته بطبيعة هذه المحافظ، وأن النوع المعروض عليه يسمى في عالم البورصة بالمضاربة، غير أنه بادرني بسؤال آخر حول ماذا تستفيد بلادي من أني أشتري اليوم هذا السهم لأبيعه غدا أو بعد أسبوع، ثم أربح بعض الجنيهات كثرت أو قلت؟، فأجبته بأن هذا هو منطق البورصة. بعد أسبوع أخبرني صديقي بأنه وضع مدخراته في مشروع لتسمين الماشية مع زملائه، ثم فسر لي بعد مرور عدة أشهر لماذا رفض المضاربة في البورصة بقوله: إن مشروع الماشية أثمر مواشي آمنة صحيا، ووفر فرص عمل لتجار وجزارين وخلافه، وهو ما لم يكن سيحدث إذا ضارب في البورصة. أما صديقي الآخر الذي يملك شركة صغيرة تعمل في مجال الطباعة والإعلام، فكانت له اهتمامات مختلفة عن الصديق الأول، فكنا نسير معا ليلا في المنطقة التي نسكن بها، فمررنا بأحد المقاهي، فأخذ يسأل عن كيفية الحصول على هذه الأرض وكيفية ترخيصها لهذا النشاط، وعدد العمال... إلخ، ولما انتهى سألته: وما الداعي لهذا؟ قال: أريد أن يكون لي مشروع مثل هذا، وأنام في البيت ويأتيني كل يوم عائد وفير!. القصتان تشيران إلى نماذج حية في مجتمعانا العربية، فالنموذج الأول يملك ثقافة استثمارية قوامها تحقيق تراكم في رؤوس الأموال والثروة خلال فترة زمنية معقولة وبما يخلق فرص عمل داخل المجتمع، أما النموذج الثاني الذي يريد أن تأتيه الأموال وهو نائم في بيته فيمثل نمط الأعمال الريعية التي تعتمد على خروج عناصر الإنتاج عن نطاق عملها الطبيعي، فتبقى الأصول الإنتاجية دون زيادة أو تحقيق قيم مضافة، ولكنها تحقق عائدا كبيرا في مدة وجيزة. مجتمع عربي ريعي ورغم أن التنمية ترتبط بالنموذج الأول، فإن نمط الأعمال الريعية المرتبطة بثقافة "حصد العائد والنوم في المنزل" هي المنتشرة في عالمنا العربي، ولعل هذا جاء انعكاسا - كما يقول المفكر الاقتصادي د. محمود عبد الفضيل- للنمط السائد في الاقتصاديات الكلية، فهناك اقتصاد سعي منتج للقيمة المضافة، كما فعلت النمور الآسيوية، وهناك أيضا اقتصاد رزق أو ريعي يعيش على ما وفره باطن الأرض من موارد دون زيادة أي قيمة مضافة أو إنشاء قطاعات إنتاجية، وتمثل بعض دول الخليج هذا النموذج الريعي. ولعل عدم قدرة الاقتصاديات العربية على أن تخوض مضمار السعي ذي الطابع الاستثماري جعلها عاجزة عن تنفيذ مشروعات تنموية تواجه مشكلات مزمنة كالفقر والبطالة والتخلف التكنولوجي... وغيرها، ومن هنا يبدو أهمية تعميق ثقافة السعي الاستثمارية لدى المواطنين العرب، والتي تعني توجيه موارد المجتمع في أنشطه تحقق مصالحه، وتجني قيمة مضافة، وتساعد على عدالة توزيع الثروة. ويخطئ من يظن أن المعني بهذه الثقافة فقط هم المدخرون الصغار ورجال الأعمال والمسئولون الاقتصاديون في الحكومات، وإنما لا بد أن تؤمن كافة فئات المجتمع بهذه الثقافة سواء أكانوا إعلاميين أو غيرهم؛ لأن ذلك سيساعد على نشر قيم العمل المنتج، بدلا من القيم الريعية والاستهلاكية التي تحبذ نمط الربح السريع كما نراها في واقعنا. متطلبات ثقافة الاستثمار ولثقافة الاستثمار أو السعي متطلبات عدة لتحققها في مجتمعاتنا، ومنها: 1. تشييد الإنسان وإنشاء سلوكه الجديد: وفي هذا الصدد يقول المفكر الإسلامي مالك بن نبي في كتابه "مشكلات الحضارة.. المسلم في عالم الاقتصاد": "... إن الاقتصاد ليس قضية إنشاء بنك وتشييد مصانع فحسب، بل هو قبل ذلك تشييد الإنسان، وإنشاء سلوكه الجديد أمام كل المشكلات". فالإنسان هو أساس التنمية يصنعها ويجنى ثمارها. فإذا لم تستهدف العملية التنموية صناعة إدراك هذا الإنسان بأنه مكرم من قبل الله، وأنه مستخلف في مال الله، فبلا شك تسيطر على إدراكه الثقافي روح الأنانية، بل يرى استعباد الآخرين من أجل شهواته أمرا مباحا. 2- حتمية القيم الثقافية: وفي هذا السياق، يرى مالك بن نبي في كتابه المذكور أن المعارك الاقتصادية تدور حول القيم الثقافية، ووجهة النظر تلك نراها اليوم في واقع عصر العولمة، فثقافات الشعوب مستهدفة، ولعلنا نرى أن الدول العربية استسلمت لهيمنة الثقافة الأمريكية التي غيرت الأذواق والقيم من أجل فتح الأسواق، بينما نجد دولة كفرنسا، ظهر لوبي مدني يقاوم فتح أي فروع لمطاعم ماكدونالدز الأمريكية، خاصة في الريف الفرنسي، حتى لا تتغير أذواق الفرنسيين ومن ثم يخسرون اقتصادهم. 3- تنمية ملائمة للمجتمع: وفي هذا الصدد ينادي مفكرون وخبراء بأن الدول النامية ومنها العربية عليها اتباع نموذج تنموي يلائم مشاكلها وأدواتها الاقتصادية، فليس معقولا في مجتمعات تعاني من البطالة أن تجد تركيزا على قطاعات كثيفة رأس المال ولا تحتاج إلى عمالة أكبر. ولعل الناظر لتجربة الصين يجد أنها تعتمد على أساليب إنتاج تفضل كثافة الأيدي العاملة. 4- المال ضروري ولكنه ليس كل شيء: ولعل هذا المنطق يمكن إدراكه من قصة بسيطة رواها الدكتور أسامة الباز مستشار الرئيس المصري في أحد إصدارات معهد التخطيط القومي بالقاهرة حول أهمية المكون الثقافي في التجربة الاقتصادية للصين. يقول الباز: "ذات مرة قال لي مواطن صيني إنه يوجد أجانب كثيرين يدخلون إلى المحلات التي يبيعون فيها الهدايا، فيشتري أحدهم سجادة، ويشتري الآخر طقم قهوة، كل على حسب قدرته، وفي النهاية كل يوم بعدما تنتهي حركة البيع، يجلس العمال معا ويدرسون كيف يقيمون السلوك الجشع لهؤلاء الأجانب الذين يشترون أشياء غالية الثمن ويدفعون فيها ثمنا باهظا، ونحن الصينيين أفضل منهم؛ لأننا نحن الصناع ونحن البائعون... إن هؤلاء القوم جشعون لأنهم يأخذون أكثر من حاجتهم، ويتكرر التلقين عدة مرات قبل انصراف العمال وعودتهم إلى منازلهم.. قيم صارمة وقاطعة، والانضباط بها سلوك منهجي مستمر لا يتزعزع على الإطلاق". 5- حتمية المشروع القومي: فالقضية كما يقول بن نبي: "ليست إمكانا ماليا ولكنها قضية تعبئة الطاقات الاجتماعية، أي الإنسان والتراب والوقت، في مشروع تحركه إرادة حضارية لا تحجم أمام الصعوبات، ولا يأخذها الغرور...". ولعل العالم العربي والإسلامي يفتقد إلى وجود مشروع قومي، بحيث تستطع الدول والشركات أن تصوغ سياساتها في إطاره، وحتى على المستوى القطري غالبا ما تفقد كلمة المشروع القومي دلالاتها، حيث تجد بعض الحكومات تضفي على كل مشروع تقوم به صفة "القومي". روافد ثقافة الاستثمار وثمة روافد تمثل وقود ثقافة السعي أو الاستثمار التي ينظر لها الدكتور سلطان أبو علي أستاذ الاقتصاد في مصر في إحدى أوراقه البحثية حول "الثقافة الإسلامية وبيئة الأعمال" على أنها تطور الأداء الاقتصادي، ومن هنا يجب عدم ترك التنمية الاقتصادية للاقتصاديين وحدهم دون غيرهم، بل لا بد من مشاركة خبراء وعلماء من كافة العلوم الإنسانية؛ لأن الثقافة تتعدد روافدها لتشكل مكونا إيجابيا لدى الفاعلين في النشاط الاقتصادي. ومن أبرز الروافد كما يرى الدكتور أبو علي: - الدين: فمن يدرك المفهوم الصحيح للدين يتبين أنه مستخلف في هذا الكون، ومن ثم سيتصرف بشكل إيجابي في توظيف ماله، ومقدراته الاقتصادية الأخرى. - إعطاء الفرد الثقة: فالذي يثق في قدرته يستطيع أن يبحث ويطور ويبني ويضيف، ويقبل التحدي المفروض عليه، بل يحدد دوره في منظومة المجتمع الذي يعيش فيه. - قيمة العمل: وهي ليست فقط لجلب المال، ولكن لأنها ستحقق للإنسان تواجده وكينونته في الحياة. - العدالة: حيث إنه مع غيابها في المجتمعات، تضمحل التنمية، فالمجتمع الأوربي مثلا تعمل فيه دولة القانون بشكل جيد، ولذلك فالأفراد فيه واثقون من أن القانون هو الحكم الفصل فيما بينهم من أعمال، بينما في دولنا النامية لا يثق الناس في تحقيق العدالة، وتتفشى قيم سلبية مثل الرشوة وغياب القانون. - الديمقراطية: حيث إن التنمية طويلة الأجل لا تتحقق إلا في ظل الديمقراطية التي تعني مشاركة المعنيين بأمر ما في مناقشة أي قرار خاص بهم، ومن هنا يترسخ لدى الأفراد ثقافة المشاركة وتحمل المخاطر. - التعليم والإعلام: حيث إن ثمة حاجة حقيقية لتعليم جاد وإعلام يتوافق ومتطلبات المشروع الحضاري للأمة، يرسخ القيم ويعلي من أمر العمل، ويثمن الإبداع والتطوير ويحقر الرتابة والتخلف. - أهمية الوقت: حيث إن إهداره هو أهم أسباب تخلف مجتمعاتنا، ونلمس احترام الوقت في واقع الحضارة الغربية، وإلى أي مدى يحترم الوقت هناك، ولا نجد هذه الثقافة داخل مجتمعاتنا. - الالتزام بالأخلاق: وهو باب واسع يشمل العديد من الفضائل قد لا يتسع المقام لذكرها من صدق وأمانة، وعدم الغش والتدليس، وعدم الاحتكار... إلخ. إن من يرغب في الثقافة الاستثمارية سواء كان فردا أو دولة عليه أن يسعى لتحقيق المتطلبات والروافد، ومن دونها نصبح مجرد أناس يتم تسكينهم في خانة من ينتظرون رزقهم، ويعيشون علي الأعمال الريعية لا الاستثمارية.

توريث الحكم .. رؤية فقهية

2006-03-21T14:47:00.000-08:00

توريث الحكم .. رؤية فقهية
بسم الله، والحمد لله، والصلاة والسلام على رسول الله، وبعد..

فالحاكم الشرعي في الدولة المسلمة هو الذي يتم اختياره عن طريق أهل الحل والعقد، وهم الذين تتوافر فيهم العدالة والعلم والحكمة، ويجوز للحاكم أن يعهد بالحكم من بعده إلى من يراه مناسبا لسياسة أمر البلاد والعباد واختلف الفقهاء في موافقة أهل الحل العقد هل هي شرط في هذه الحالة أم لا، على قولين، ولكن لا يجوز للحاكم أن يعهد بالحكم إلى ولده أو والده لوجود التهمة وهي ميل النفس إليهما.

والناخب في نظر الإسلام شاهد فيشترط فيه ما يشترط في الشاهد من العدالة وحسن السيرة.

يقول فضيلة الشيخ الدكتور يوسف القرضاوي -حفظه الله –

دولة الإسلام ليست قيصرية ولا كسروية إنها لا تقوم على الوراثة التي تحصر الحكم في أسرة واحدة أو فرع من أسرة يتوارثه الأبناء عن الآباء والأحفاد عن الأجداد - كما يتوارثون العقارات والأموال - وإن كانوا أضل الناس عقولا وأفسدهم أخلاقًا.

إن العلم والحكمة والفضائل لا تورث بالضرورة فكم رأينا من آباء صالحين وأبناء فاسدين وقد قال الله عن إبراهيم وإسحاق:.

(وَمِن ذُرِّيَّتِهِمَا مُحْسِنٌ وَظَالِمٌ لِّنَفْسِهِ مُبِينٌ). (سورة الصافات: 113).

ولما قال الله تعالى لخليله إبراهيم:.

(إِنِّي جَاعِلُكَ لِلنَّاسِ إِمَاماً قَالَ وَمِن ذُرِّيَّتِي قَالَ لاَ يَنَالُ عَهْدِي الظَّالِمِينَ). (البقرة: 124).

ودولة الإسلام تقوم على أفضل ما في الديمقراطية من مبادئ ولكنها ليست نسخة من الديمقراطية الغربية.

إنها توافق الديمقراطية الغربية في ضرورة اختيار الأمة لمن يحكمها، فلا يجوز أن يفرض عليها من يقودها رغم أنفها.

وتوافقها في أنه مسئول أمام ممثليها من أهل الشورى وأصحاب الحل والعقد فيها ، حتى إن لهم أن يعزلوه إذا انحرف وجار ولم يستمع لنصح الناصحين.

وتزيد عليها أنها تجعل لكل فرد في الأمة - رجلاً كان أم امرأة - أن ينصح الحاكم ويأمره بالمعروف وينهاه عن المنكر بما له من ولاية المؤمن على المؤمن أيا كان منصبه ومنزلته:.

(وَالْمُؤْمِنُونَ وَالْمُؤْمِنَاتُ بَعْضُهُمْ أَوْلِيَاء بَعْضٍ يَأْمُرُونَ بِالْمَعْرُوفِ وَيَنْهَوْنَ عَنِ الْمُنكَرِ). (التوبة: 71).

ويمتاز نظام الشورى الذي تقوم عليه الدولة المسلمة بأن للشورى حدودًا لا تتعداها فعقائد الإسلام الإيمانية وأركانه العملية وأسسه الأخلاقية وأحكامه القطعية - وهي المقومات الأساسية التي ارتضاها المجتمع وأقام عليها نظام حياته - لا مجال فيها لشورى ولا يملك البرلمان ولا الحكومة إلغاء شيء منها لأن ما أثبته الله لا ينفيه الإنسان وما نفاه الله لا يثبته الإنسان.

والناخب في نظر الإسلام شاهد فيشترط فيه ما يشترط في الشاهد من العدالة وحسن السيرة. (وأشهدوا ذوي عدل منكم) (الطلاق: 2) . (ممن ترضون من الشهداء). (البقرة: 282).

كما يجب عليه إذا دعي إلى التصويت أن يدلي بشهادته ولا يكتمها.

(ومن يكتمها فإنه آثم قلبه) (البقرة 283) . (ولا يأبى الشهداء إذا ما دعوا). (البقرة: 282).

أما المرشح فيجب أن يكون: حفيظًا عليمًا ( إشارة إلى قوله تعالى على لسان سيدنا يوسف عليه السلام لملك مصر :"اجعلني على خزائن الأرض إني حفيظ عليم "(يوسف: 55 ) أو قويًّا أمينًا إشارة إلى قوله تعالى على لسان ابنة الشيخ الكبير في قصة موسى :"يا أبت استأجره إن خير من استأجرت القوي الأمين " (القصص: 26)، والقوة تعني: الكفاية والخبرة، والأمانة تعني :حياة الضمير وخشية الله وكلاهما يكمل الآخر) وإلا فسح المكان لغيره وإهمال هذا المبدأ يعجل بنهاية الأمة كما في الحديث: (إذا ضيعت الأمانة فانتظر الساعة قيل وكيف إضاعتها ؟ قال: إذا وسد الأمر إلى غير أهله فانتظر الساعة) رواه البخاري. أ.هـ

ويقول فضيلة الشيخ محمد خلف يوسف –من علماء مصر-:

موضوع الحكم وكيفية اختيار الحاكم من أهم أبواب الفقه الإسلامي، ونظرا لأهميته الشديدة ، ونظرا لأن الله سبحانه وتعالى هو الحاكم من خلال آيات القرآن وتوضيح السنة لها ، فإن علماء أهل السنة من المسلمين يبحثون هذا الباب في كتب العقائد لا كتب الفقه مع أنه منها، وهذا يدلك على أهميته الشديدة الحرجة التي هي في غاية الخطورة والحساسية.

ولقد بينت آيات القرآن أن الحكم بما أنزل الله من ألزم الفرائض، كما بينت أن الحكم بغير ما أنزل الله كفر وذلك في حق الحاكم والمحكوم أو الراعي والرعية فقال تعالى: (وَمَن لَّمْ يَحْكُم بِمَا أَنزَلَ اللّهُ فَأُوْلَـئِكَ هُمُ الْكَافِرُونَ) –آية: 44 المائدة- وقال : (فلا وربك لا يؤمنون حتى يحكموك فيما شجر بينهم ثم لا يجدوا في أنفسهم حرجا مما قضيت ويسلموا تسليما) [النساء] .

فكأن مهمة الحاكم هي الحكم بما أنزل الله، في كافة ما أمر الله به ورسوله ، ومهمة الأمة اختيار الحاكم الذي يقيم فيهم شرع الله تعالى ويعينوه على ذلك .

ومن هنا تحدث العلماء كثيرا عن :

1 –كيف يتم اختيار الحاكم أو الخليفة ؟

2- و من الذي يختاره ؟

ولبيان ذلك نقول من خلال كلام علمائنا على مر العصور :

لاختيار الحاكم طريقان ذكرهما علماؤنا في كثير من كتبهم

الطريق الأول : انتخاب الأمة الإسلامية (أو الشعب) .

الحديث عن انتخاب الأمة الإسلامية أو الشعب للحاكم يفرض أمرين :

وقد ذكر الإمام الماوردي الشافعي في الأحكام السلطانية ثلاثة شروط يجب توفرها في الناخبين وهى :

*العدالة : ويقصد بها هنا ألا يكون الناخب ملحدا في عقيدته ، وألا يكون فاسقا في أعماله ، أو بمعنى آخر أن يكون الناخب سليم العقيدة ، مؤديا للفرائض ، غير مجاهر بالكبائر ، وارتكاب المحرمات .

*العلم : أي أن يعرف الشروط التي يجب توافرها فيمن ينصب للرئاسة ، وأن يكون ملما بالشريعة الإسلامية بصفة عامة ، ويقول الشيخ رشيد رضا في كتابه الخلافة : وليس من الضروري أن يكون ـ الناخب ـ مجتهدا ، ويكفي أن يكون هناك مجتهد واحد بين جميع الناخبين.

*الحكمة : يقول العلامة عبد الرازق السنهورى : فيلزم أن يكون عند الناخب من الكفاءة ما يمكنه من أن يختار من يصلح للقيام بأعباء الحكم ، ويستلزم هذا الشرط أن يكون الناخب على معرفة بصفات كل مرشح ، وأن يكون متصلا بالشعب ليكون على علم بالظروف الاجتماعية والسياسية ليراعى ذلك .

يقول الدكتور عبد الرازق السنهورى: إن الناخبين الذين تتوفر فيهم هذه الشروط قد لا يوجدون بكثرة في عامة الشعب وإنما بين النخبة المثقفة ، ولذلك تسمى هيئة الناخبين هذه أهل الاختيار أو أهل الحل والعقد

ومعنى ذلك أن الانتخاب يتم على درجتين أو مرحلتين :

الأولى: اختيار الشعب أو الناخبين لأهل الحل والعقد بشروط معينة.

الثانية: اختيار أهل الحل والعقد للحاكم.

وهذا يجرنا للحديث عن الشروط الواجب توافرها في المرشحين للخلافة أو الرئاسة أو الحكم وهى إجمالا :

الذكورة، الحرية، البلوغ، اكتمال العقل، الإسلام، مع سلامة الحواس والأعضاء.

هذا بجانب الشروط المعنوية والأخلاقية وعلى رأسها: العدالة في أكمل صورها أي تسيطر العدالة على أعماله كلها، وهذه الشروط محل إجماع علماء المسلمين من أهل السنة والجماعة والمعتزلة وغيرهم .

وزاد بعض علمائنا شروطا أخرى هي محل خلاف بين علماء المسلمين ومنها :

*العلم : ويعنى بها أن يكون عالما بالشريعة ليكون قادرا على تنفيذها إذ ما اختير إلا لذلك ، حتى قال بعضهم أن يكون عالما مجتهدا .

· الحكمة :ويقصد بها سداد الرأي، وفطنة الذهن ؛ لأن الحاكم يقوم بوظيفة دبلوماسية وسياسية وإدارية في وقت واحد .

·الشجاعة والإقدام.

ثانيهما : إجراءات الانتخابات.

سبق أن ذكرنا أن الانتخاب يمر بمرحلتين ، ونذكر هنا بأمور منها:

1- تحديد الناخبين ( أهل الحل والعقد ) ضروري لاختيار الحاكم.

2- مشاركة كافة الشعب أو أغلبيته لاختيار الحاكم عن طريق اختيار أهل الحل والعقد أو من خلال أنفسهم إن توفرت الشروط التي سبق ذكرها

3- اختيار الأصلح الذي يغلب على الظن أنه تتوفر فيه الشروط والذي يغلب على الظن أنه سيقوم بالمهمة خير قيام من خلال شرع الله عز وجل .

الطريق الثاني:

اختيار الرئيس السابق بضوابط .

يجوز للحاكم السابق أن يرشح للاختيار من يراه صالحا لهذه المهمة، على أن تكون الإرادة الحقيقية للأمة، كما رشح أبو بكر رضى الله عنه عبد الرحمن بن عوف وعثمان بن عفان وعمر بن الخطاب ، وكما رشح عمر سبعة ممن رأى أنهم يصلحون لهذا الأمر. أ.هـ

ويقول عصام الشعار -الباحث الشرعي بالموقع-:

يجوز للحاكم أن يعهد بالحكم من بعده إلى من يتوسم فيه الخير والصلاح ومن يراه مناسبا لرعاية أمر البلاد والعباد، ولكن عليه أن يجهد رأيه في اختيار الأحق بها والأقوم بشروطها، واختلف الفقهاء هل يتقلد من عُهِد إليه بعهد الإمام السابق زمام الأمر دون حاجة إلى موافقة أهل الحل والعقد أم لا بد من موافقتهم؟ على قولين..

والخلاف السابق محله إذا لم يكن من عهد إليه الإمام والدا أو ولدا، ولكن لا يجوز للحاكم أن ينفرد بعقد البيعة لولد ولا لوالد حتى يشاور فيه أهل الاختيار فيروه أهلا لها فيصح منه حينئذ عقد البيعة له لأن ذلك منه تزكية له تجري مجرى الشهادة ; وتقليده على الأمة يجري مجرى الحكم ومعلوم أنه لا يجوز أن يشهد لوالد ولا لولد ولا يحكم لواحد منهما للتهمة العائدة إليه بما جبل من الميل إليه كما ذكر الإمام الماوردي في كتابه الأحكام السلطانية ص11 وما بعدها..

How Islamic inventors changed the world

2006-03-12T20:40:00.000-08:00

How Islamic inventors changed the world
From coffee to cheques and the three-course meal, the Muslim world has given us many innovations that we take for granted in daily life. As a new exhibition opens, Paul Vallely nominates 20 of the most influential- and identifies the men of genius behind them

Published: 11 March 2006

1 The story goes that an Arab named Khalid was tending his goats in the Kaffa region of southern Ethiopia, when he noticed his animals became livelier after eating a certain berry. He boiled the berries to make the first coffee. Certainly the first record of the drink is of beans exported from Ethiopia to Yemen where Sufis drank it to stay awake all night to pray on special occasions. By the late 15th century it had arrived in Mecca and Turkey from where it made its way to Venice in 1645. It was brought to England in 1650 by a Turk named Pasqua Rosee who opened the first coffee house in Lombard Street in the City of London. The Arabic qahwa became the Turkish kahve then the Italian caffé and then English coffee.
2 The ancient Greeks thought our eyes emitted rays, like a laser, which enabled us to see. The first person to realise that light enters the eye, rather than leaving it, was the 10th-century Muslim mathematician, astronomer and physicist Ibn al-Haitham. He invented the first pin-hole camera after noticing the way light came through a hole in window shutters. The smaller the hole, the better the picture, he worked out, and set up the first Camera Obscura (from the Arab word qamara for a dark or private room). He is also credited with being the first man to shift physics from a philosophical activity to an experimental one.
3 A form of chess was played in ancient India but the game was developed into the form we know it today in Persia. From there it spread westward to Europe - where it was introduced by the Moors in Spain in the 10th century - and eastward as far as Japan. The word rook comes from the Persian rukh, which means chariot.
4 A thousand years before the Wright brothers a Muslim poet, astronomer, musician and engineer named Abbas ibn Firnas made several attempts to construct a flying machine. In 852 he jumped from the minaret of the Grand Mosque in Cordoba using a loose cloak stiffened with wooden struts. He hoped to glide like a bird. He didn't. But the cloak slowed his fall, creating what is thought to be the first parachute, and leaving him with only minor injuries. In 875, aged 70, having perfected a machine of silk and eagles' feathers he tried again, jumping from a mountain. He flew to a significant height and stayed aloft for ten minutes but crashed on landing - concluding, correctly, that it was because he had not given his device a tail so it would stall on landing. Baghdad international airport and a crater on the Moon are named after him.
5 Washing and bathing are religious requirements for Muslims, which is perhaps why they perfected the recipe for soap which we still use today. The ancient Egyptians had soap of a kind, as did the Romans who used it more as a pomade. But it was the Arabs who combined vegetable oils with sodium hydroxide and aromatics such as thyme oil. One of the Crusaders' most striking characteristics, to Arab nostrils, was that they did not wash. Shampoo was introduced to England by a Muslim who opened Mahomed's Indian Vapour Baths on Brighton seafront in 1759 and was appointed Shampooing Surgeon to Kings George IV and William IV.
6 Distillation, the means of separating liquids through differences in their boiling points, was invented around the year 800 by Islam's foremost scientist, Jabir ibn Hayyan, who transformed alchemy into chemistry, inventing many of the basic processes and apparatus still in use today - liquefaction, crystallisation, distillation, purification, oxidisation, evaporation and filtration. As well as discovering sulphuric and nitric acid, he invented the alembic still, giving the world intense rosewater and other perfumes and alcoholic spirits (although drinking them is haram, or forbidden, in Islam). Ibn Hayyan emphasised systematic experimentation and was the founder of modern chemistry.
7 The crank-shaft is a device which translates rotary into linear motion and is central to much of the machinery in the modern world, not least the internal combustion engine. One of the most important mechanical inventions in the history of humankind, it was created by an ingenious Muslim engineer called al-Jazari to raise water for irrigation. His 1206 Book of Knowledge of Ingenious Mechanical Devices shows he also invented or refined the use of valves and pistons, devised some of the first mechanical clocks driven by water and weights, and was the father of robotics. Among his 50 other inventions was the combination lock.
8 Quilting is a method of sewing or tying two layers of cloth with a layer of insulating material in between. It is not clear whether it was invented in the Muslim world or whether it was imported there from India or China. But it certainly came to the West via the Crusaders. They saw it used by Saracen warriors, who wore straw-filled quilted canvas shirts instead of armour. As well as a form of protection, it proved an effective guard against the chafing of the Crusaders' metal armour and was an effective form of insulation - so much so that it became a cottage industry back home in colder climates such as Britain and Holland.
9 The pointed arch so characteristic of Europe's Gothic cathedrals was an invention borrowed from Islamic architecture. It was much stronger than the rounded arch used by the Romans and Normans, thus allowing the building of bigger, higher, more complex and grander buildings. Other borrowings from Muslim genius included ribbed vaulting, rose windows and dome-building techniques. Europe's castles were also adapted to copy the Islamic world's - with arrow slits, battlements, a barbican and parapets. Square towers and keeps gave way to more easily defended round ones. Henry V's castle architect was a Muslim.
10 Many modern surgical instruments are of exactly the same design as those devised in the 10th century by a Muslim surgeon called al-Zahrawi. His scalpels, bone saws, forceps, fine scissors for eye surgery and many of the 200 instruments he devised are recognisable to a modern surgeon. It was he who discovered that catgut used for internal stitches dissolves away naturally (a discovery he made when his monkey ate his lute strings) and that it can be also used to make medicine capsules. In the 13th century, another Muslim medic named Ibn Nafis described the circulation of the blood, 300 years before William Harvey discovered it. Muslims doctors also invented anaesthetics of opium and alcohol mixes and developed hollow needles to suck cataracts from eyes in a technique still used today.
11 The windmill was invented in 634 for a Persian caliph and was used to grind corn and draw up water for irrigation. In the vast deserts of Arabia, when the seasonal streams ran dry, the only source of power was the wind which blew steadily from one direction for months. Mills had six or 12 sails covered in fabric or palm leaves. It was 500 years before the first windmill was seen in Europe.
12 The technique of inoculation was not invented by Jenner and Pasteur but was devised in the Muslim world and brought to Europe from Turkey by the wife of the English ambassador to Istanbul in 1724. Children in Turkey were vaccinated with cowpox to fight the deadly smallpox at least 50 years before the West discovered it.
13 The fountain pen was invented for the Sultan of Egypt in 953 after he demanded a pen which would not stain his hands or clothes. It held ink in a reservoir and, as with modern pens, fed ink to the nib by a combination of gravity and capillary action.
14 The system of numbering in use all round the world is probably Indian in origin but the style of the numerals is Arabic and first appears in print in the work of the Muslim mathematicians al-Khwarizmi and al-Kindi around 825. Algebra was named after al-Khwarizmi's book, Al-Jabr wa-al-Muqabilah, much of whose contents are still in use. The work of Muslim maths scholars was imported into Europe 300 years later by the Italian mathematician Fibonacci. Algorithms and much of the theory of trigonometry came from the Muslim world. And Al-Kindi's discovery of frequency analysis rendered all the codes of the ancient world soluble and created the basis of modern cryptology.
15 Ali ibn Nafi, known by his nickname of Ziryab (Blackbird) came from Iraq to Cordoba in the 9th century and brought with him the concept of the three-course meal - soup, followed by fish or meat, then fruit and nuts. He also introduced crystal glasses (which had been invented after experiments with rock crystal by Abbas ibn Firnas - see No 4).
16 Carpets were regarded as part of Paradise by medieval Muslims, thanks to their advanced weaving techniques, new tinctures from Islamic chemistry and highly developed sense of pattern and arabesque which were the basis of Islam's non-representational art. In contrast, Europe's floors were distinctly earthly, not to say earthy, until Arabian and Persian carpets were introduced. In England, as Erasmus recorded, floors were "covered in rushes, occasionally renewed, but so imperfectly that the bottom layer is left undisturbed, sometimes for 20 years, harbouring expectoration, vomiting, the leakage of dogs and men, ale droppings, scraps of fish, and other abominations not fit to be mentioned". Carpets, unsurprisingly, caught on quickly.
17 The modern cheque comes from the Arabic saqq, a written vow to pay for goods when they were delivered, to avoid money having to be transported across dangerous terrain. In the 9th century, a Muslim businessman could cash a cheque in China drawn on his bank in Baghdad.
18 By the 9th century, many Muslim scholars took it for granted that the Earth was a sphere. The proof, said astronomer Ibn Hazm, "is that the Sun is always vertical to a particular spot on Earth". It was 500 years before that realisation dawned on Galileo. The calculations of Muslim astronomers were so accurate that in the 9th century they reckoned the Earth's circumference to be 40,253.4km - less than 200km out. The scholar al-Idrisi took a globe depicting the world to the court of King Roger of Sicily in 1139.
19 Though the Chinese invented saltpetre gunpowder, and used it in their fireworks, it was the Arabs who worked out that it could be purified using potassium nitrate for military use. Muslim incendiary devices terrified the Crusaders. By the 15th century they had invented both a rocket, which they called a "self-moving and combusting egg", and a torpedo - a self-propelled pear-shaped bomb with a spear at the front which impaled itself in enemy ships and then blew up.
20 Medieval Europe had kitchen and herb gardens, but it was the Arabs who developed the idea of the garden as a place of beauty and meditation. The first royal pleasure gardens in Europe were opened in 11th-century Muslim Spain. Flowers which originated in Muslim gardens include the carnation and the tulip.
"1001 Inventions: Discover the Muslim Heritage in Our World" is a new exhibition which began a nationwide tour this week. It is currently at the Science Museum in Manchester. For more information, go to http://www.1001inventions.com/.
1 The story goes that an Arab named Khalid was tending his goats in the Kaffa region of southern Ethiopia, when he noticed his animals became livelier after eating a certain berry. He boiled the berries to make the first coffee. Certainly the first record of the drink is of beans exported from Ethiopia to Yemen where Sufis drank it to stay awake all night to pray on special occasions. By the late 15th century it had arrived in Mecca and Turkey from where it made its way to Venice in 1645. It was brought to England in 1650 by a Turk named Pasqua Rosee who opened the first coffee house in Lombard Street in the City of London. The Arabic qahwa became the Turkish kahve then the Italian caffé and then English coffee.
2 The ancient Greeks thought our eyes emitted rays, like a laser, which enabled us to see. The first person to realise that light enters the eye, rather than leaving it, was the 10th-century Muslim mathematician, astronomer and physicist Ibn al-Haitham. He invented the first pin-hole camera after noticing the way light came through a hole in window shutters. The smaller the hole, the better the picture, he worked out, and set up the first Camera Obscura (from the Arab word qamara for a dark or private room). He is also credited with being the first man to shift physics from a philosophical activity to an experimental one.
3 A form of chess was played in ancient India but the game was developed into the form we know it today in Persia. From there it spread westward to Europe - where it was introduced by the Moors in Spain in the 10th century - and eastward as far as Japan. The word rook comes from the Persian rukh, which means chariot.
4 A thousand years before the Wright brothers a Muslim poet, astronomer, musician and engineer named Abbas ibn Firnas made several attempts to construct a flying machine. In 852 he jumped from the minaret of the Grand Mosque in Cordoba using a loose cloak stiffened with wooden struts. He hoped to glide like a bird. He didn't. But the cloak slowed his fall, creating what is thought to be the first parachute, and leaving him with only minor injuries. In 875, aged 70, having perfected a machine of silk and eagles' feathers he tried again, jumping from a mountain. He flew to a significant height and stayed aloft for ten minutes but crashed on landing - concluding, correctly, that it was because he had not given his device a tail so it would stall on landing. Baghdad international airport and a crater on the Moon are named after him.
5 Washing and bathing are religious requirements for Muslims, which is perhaps why they perfected the recipe for soap which we still use today. The ancient Egyptians had soap of a kind, as did the Romans who used it more as a pomade. But it was the Arabs who combined vegetable oils with sodium hydroxide and aromatics such as thyme oil. One of the Crusaders' most striking characteristics, to Arab nostrils, was that they did not wash. Shampoo was introduced to England by a Muslim who opened Mahomed's Indian Vapour Baths on Brighton seafront in 1759 and was appointed Shampooing Surgeon to Kings George IV and William IV.
6 Distillation, the means of separating liquids through differences in their boiling points, was invented around the year 800 by Islam's foremost scientist, Jabir ibn Hayyan, who transformed alchemy into chemistry, inventing many of the basic processes and apparatus still in use today - liquefaction, crystallisation, distillation, purification, oxidisation, evaporation and filtration. As well as discovering sulphuric and nitric acid, he invented the alembic still, giving the world intense rosewater and other perfumes and alcoholic spirits (although drinking them is haram, or forbidden, in Islam). Ibn Hayyan emphasised systematic experimentation and was the founder of modern chemistry.
7 The crank-shaft is a device which translates rotary into linear motion and is central to much of the machinery in the modern world, not least the internal combustion engine. One of the most important mechanical inventions in the history of humankind, it was created by an ingenious Muslim engineer called al-Jazari to raise water for irrigation. His 1206 Book of Knowledge of Ingenious Mechanical Devices shows he also invented or refined the use of valves and pistons, devised some of the first mechanical clocks driven by water and weights, and was the father of robotics. Among his 50 other inventions was the combination lock.
8 Quilting is a method of sewing or tying two layers of cloth with a layer of insulating material in between. It is not clear whether it was invented in the Muslim world or whether it was imported there from India or China. But it certainly came to the West via the Crusaders. They saw it used by Saracen warriors, who wore straw-filled quilted canvas shirts instead of armour. As well as a form of protection, it proved an effective guard against the chafing of the Crusaders' metal armour and was an effective form of insulation - so much so that it became a cottage industry back home in colder climates such as Britain and Holland.
9 The pointed arch so characteristic of Europe's Gothic cathedrals was an invention borrowed from Islamic architecture. It was much stronger than the rounded arch used by the Romans and Normans, thus allowing the building of bigger, higher, more complex and grander buildings. Other borrowings from Muslim genius included ribbed vaulting, rose windows and dome-building techniques. Europe's castles were also adapted to copy the Islamic world's - with arrow slits, battlements, a barbican and parapets. Square towers and keeps gave way to more easily defended round ones. Henry V's castle architect was a Muslim.
10 Many modern surgical instruments are of exactly the same design as those devised in the 10th century by a Muslim surgeon called al-Zahrawi. His scalpels, bone saws, forceps, fine scissors for eye surgery and many of the 200 instruments he devised are recognisable to a modern surgeon. It was he who discovered that catgut used for internal stitches dissolves away naturally (a discovery he made when his monkey ate his lute strings) and that it can be also used to make medicine capsules. In the 13th century, another Muslim medic named Ibn Nafis described the circulation of the blood, 300 years before William Harvey discovered it. Muslims doctors also invented anaesthetics of opium and alcohol mixes and developed hollow needles to suck cataracts from eyes in a technique still used today.
11 The windmill was invented in 634 for a Persian caliph and was used to grind corn and draw up water for irrigation. In the vast deserts of Arabia, when the seasonal streams ran dry, the only source of power was the wind which blew steadily from one direction for months. Mills had six or 12 sails covered in fabric or palm leaves. It was 500 years before the first windmill was seen in Europe.
12 The technique of inoculation was not invented by Jenner and Pasteur but was devised in the Muslim world and brought to Europe from Turkey by the wife of the English ambassador to Istanbul in 1724. Children in Turkey were vaccinated with cowpox to fight the deadly smallpox at least 50 years before the West discovered it.
13 The fountain pen was invented for the Sultan of Egypt in 953 after he demanded a pen which would not stain his hands or clothes. It held ink in a reservoir and, as with modern pens, fed ink to the nib by a combination of gravity and capillary action.
14 The system of numbering in use all round the world is probably Indian in origin but the style of the numerals is Arabic and first appears in print in the work of the Muslim mathematicians al-Khwarizmi and al-Kindi around 825. Algebra was named after al-Khwarizmi's book, Al-Jabr wa-al-Muqabilah, much of whose contents are still in use. The work of Muslim maths scholars was imported into Europe 300 years later by the Italian mathematician Fibonacci. Algorithms and much of the theory of trigonometry came from the Muslim world. And Al-Kindi's discovery of frequency analysis rendered all the codes of the ancient world soluble and created the basis of modern cryptology.
15 Ali ibn Nafi, known by his nickname of Ziryab (Blackbird) came from Iraq to Cordoba in the 9th century and brought with him the concept of the three-course meal - soup, followed by fish or meat, then fruit and nuts. He also introduced crystal glasses (which had been invented after experiments with rock crystal by Abbas ibn Firnas - see No 4).
16 Carpets were regarded as part of Paradise by medieval Muslims, thanks to their advanced weaving techniques, new tinctures from Islamic chemistry and highly developed sense of pattern and arabesque which were the basis of Islam's non-representational art. In contrast, Europe's floors were distinctly earthly, not to say earthy, until Arabian and Persian carpets were introduced. In England, as Erasmus recorded, floors were "covered in rushes, occasionally renewed, but so imperfectly that the bottom layer is left undisturbed, sometimes for 20 years, harbouring expectoration, vomiting, the leakage of dogs and men, ale droppings, scraps of fish, and other abominations not fit to be mentioned". Carpets, unsurprisingly, caught on quickly.
17 The modern cheque comes from the Arabic saqq, a written vow to pay for goods when they were delivered, to avoid money having to be transported across dangerous terrain. In the 9th century, a Muslim businessman could cash a cheque in China drawn on his bank in Baghdad.
18 By the 9th century, many Muslim scholars took it for granted that the Earth was a sphere. The proof, said astronomer Ibn Hazm, "is that the Sun is always vertical to a particular spot on Earth". It was 500 years before that realisation dawned on Galileo. The calculations of Muslim astronomers were so accurate that in the 9th century they reckoned the Earth's circumference to be 40,253.4km - less than 200km out. The scholar al-Idrisi took a globe depicting the world to the court of King Roger of Sicily in 1139.
19 Though the Chinese invented saltpetre gunpowder, and used it in their fireworks, it was the Arabs who worked out that it could be purified using potassium nitrate for military use. Muslim incendiary devices terrified the Crusaders. By the 15th century they had invented both a rocket, which they called a "self-moving and combusting egg", and a torpedo - a self-propelled pear-shaped bomb with a spear at the front which impaled itself in enemy ships and then blew up.
20 Medieval Europe had kitchen and herb gardens, but it was the Arabs who developed the idea of the garden as a place of beauty and meditation. The first royal pleasure gardens in Europe were opened in 11th-century Muslim Spain. Flowers which originated in Muslim gardens include the carnation and the tulip.
"1001 Inventions: Discover the Muslim Heritage in Our World" is a new exhibition which began a nationwide tour this week. It is currently at the Science Museum in Manchester. For more information, go to http://www.1001inventions.com/

Iraq Death Squad Claims to Be Investigated

2006-02-16T09:44:00.000-08:00

Iraq Death Squad Claims to Be Investigated: "Iraq Death Squad Claims to Be Investigated

The Associated Press
Thursday, February 16, 2006; 1:47 AM

BAGHDAD, Iraq -- Iraq's Interior Ministry has launched an investigation into claims a police death squad has been operating in Iraq, a top official said Thursday.

The probe was launched as police found the bodies of 10 more men who had been shot dead execution-style and dumped in three different areas of Baghdad's predominantly Shiite suburb of Shula."

Maj. Gen. Hussein Kamal, Iraq's deputy interior minister in charge of domestic intelligence, said the probe was launched following U.S. military claims that soldiers had detained 22 men wearing police uniforms who were about to kill a Sunni Arab man.

"We have been informed about this and the interior minister has formed an investigation committee to learn more about the Sunni person and those 22 men, particularly whether they work for the Interior Ministry or claim to belong to the ministry," Kamal told The Associated Press.

A U.S. general said American forces had found evidence of a death squad operating in Iraq's Interior Ministry, the Chicago Tribune reported on its Web site Wednesday evening.

An American military official in Baghdad confirmed the report but declined to provide further details.

Maj. Gen. Joseph Peterson, who commands the civilian police training teams in Iraq, said the 22 men were employed by the Interior Ministry as highway patrol officers.

The bodies of Sunni Arabs, bound and gagged and shot in the head, have been turning up in Baghdad for months, fueling allegations of sectarian killings, which Sunni Arab leaders say often are carried out by Shiites in army or police uniforms.

Political earthquake as Hamas wins landslide

2006-01-29T23:10:00.000-08:00

China Worker: "Political earthquake as Hamas wins landslide
Published on 29/01/06 at 21:30:09 CET by chinaworker.org

Asia PacificHamas victory a blow to imperialism and capitalism in the Middle East

Kevin Simpson, CWI, London

Yet another political earthquake has struck the Middle East. Hamas, standing for the first time in national elections, won a massive landslide victory in Gaza and the West Bank. Hamas won 76 seats out of 132 in Parliament, and Fatah has only 43. It is the first time in over 40 years that Fatah has lost its position as the predominant organisation amongst Palestinians. Hamas won seats in all the major towns and cities in the West Bank and Gaza, even in places like Bethlehem where there is a large Christian population and Nablus which was historically a stronghold for Fatah. "

This was a crushing defeat for Fatah and particularly for the weak PA President Mohammed Abbas. But it is also a severe blow and a huge surprise for both the Israeli ruling class and western imperialist powers and their plans for an imposed "peace settlement". The win is a major embarrassment for the Bush administration’s campaign to "democratise" the Middle East which in reality was an attempt to secure more malleable leaders in the region. Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, known for his simplistic homespun analysis, commented that this was a "very, very, very bad result." Many of the corrupt Arab elite are also undoubtedly scurrying around their marble-lined, air-conditioned palaces wringing their hands at what this victory means for their already shaky grip on power.
The landslide has been accompanied by a torrent of propaganda in the western press about "terrorists" winning at the ballot box. More crude articles paint the Palestinians as a bloodthirsty, uncivilised mob. But the hypocrisy of the imperialist powers knows no limits. They have supported the Israeli capitalist state for decades. This regime has presided over one of the most brutal military occupations in the world using methods which can only be described as state terrorism. Benjamin Netanyahu, newly elected leader of the right-wing reactionary Likud Party, raged about "Hamastan" and the necessity to have nothing to do with "terrorists", the day after the election. And yet one of the founders of his party, Menachem Begin, was responsible for the bombing of the King David Hotel in 1946 when it was partly used as headquarters of the British Army and administration in Palestine. Ninety-one people died, one of the highest death tolls in any terrorist attack in the Middle East.

Protest vote
Hamas’s victory was in the main a huge protest vote against the corrupt Fatah leadership who, incapable of meeting Palestinian aspirations, wallowed in corruption at the head of the Palestinian Authority (PA) while the Palestinian majority slowly starved or were crushed under Israeli military occupation.
But the election’s significance is not just confined to the Gaza and West Bank. It could have profound consequences for the region. Given the huge tensions in the Middle East and its vital geo-political importance to US and other imperialist powers, this election victory could contribute – along with other events - to abrupt changes in international relations. It might also even be one in a cascade of events which contributes to a sharp deterioration in the world economy given the Middle East’s importance for oil production.
However, this has only been one in a series of major changes in the Middle East in the last few months. Of course accidental factors can contribute to instability in the region – such as the massive stroke suffered by Ariel Sharon, former Prime Minister of Israel, at the beginning of the year. However, even accidental events only lead to big changes if endemic instability is part of the political scenery.
And this is clearly the case in the Middle East. The region is characterised by various degrees of grinding poverty and social collapse made worse by the implementation of at least fifteen years of neo-liberal policies. The Arab elites have generally acted as the willing servants of the imperialist powers in this siphoning of wealth into the coffers of the multinationals, benefiting through kick-backs and contracts as a result. Israel’s ruling class has also conducted a massive attack on Israeli and Palestinian working class living standards. The collapse in living standards in the Middle East has in part exacerbated already burgeoning problems around the national question and the struggle of national minorities for their rights, particularly the Palestinians. The failure of imperialism’s "peace process" has actually complicated the situation further and led to more tension on this issue.
Some of the most extreme conditions in the region are to be found in Gaza and the West Bank. There, even according to the CIA, unemployment is 31% (although in reality it is much higher) and an incredible 81% of the population live below the poverty line. A recent UN report stated that 30% of the population suffer from food scarcity (i.e. cannot afford to buy enough food to survive) while another 40% live on the edge of this category.
This chronic social, economic and political crisis reflects the absolute failure, for generations, of capitalism as a system to take society forward. Not only this, it also shows that the present ideology of its representatives on a world scale, namely neo-liberalism, has actually made the situation far worse.
All these processes have led to a build up of huge tensions and pressures. Capitalism and imperialism have huge resources and tools of repression to encourage and force acceptance of their wishes. Despite this, the huge pressure for change from the working class and the poor peasantry has been reflected, even if in a distorted way, in many of the political developments that have shaken the region over the last few months. The election of Hamas belongs to this category.
It is true that political support for Hamas’ ideas has risen amongst some layers of the poorest and most downtrodden in the vacuum that exists in the West Bank and Gaza. However, rather than signifying overwhelming support for Hamas’ Islamist policies, the extent of the election victory mainly reflects the anger against Fatah. The relatively high turnout of 78 per cent showed that people perhaps felt that at last there was an opponent that could drive Fatah from power. One Palestinian woman, summed up the mood of many Palestinians, saying "For 10 years Fatah haven’t done anything for us. We have to try Hamas. We can’t say if they will be better but we have to try." (Guardian, London, 24 January 2006)

"Change and Reform"
Hamas orientated its entire campaign around this mood. Running under the name "Change and Reform", Hamas highlighted the rampant corruption of the PA and promised a clean-up. Its propaganda also emphasised the poorer background, simple lifestyle and sacrifice of many of its candidates, some of whom stood in the election from their prison cells.
Despite being mainly a protest vote, the political situation will be more complicated as a result and could initially act as a hurdle to the development of a class conscious and socialist, workers movement to overthrow capitalism and feudalism in the West Bank and Gaza, Israel and the Middle East.
Notwithstanding the granting of limited autonomy, for the last twelve years the working class and the poor of the West Bank and Gaza have suffered under the burden of increasing poverty and the collapse of what little remained of social services.
According to the Palestinian Red Crescent (Red Cross), nearly 3,800 Palestinians have been killed and over 27,000 injured during the second Intifada which began in 2000. But literally millions more are affected on a daily basis by checkpoints and punitive collective punishments which humiliate and enrage beyond belief.
The Israeli Defence Force (IDF) controls all exit and entry points (apart from one which has been closed) for Gaza and the West Bank while it runs hundreds of checkpoints between towns and villages inside Palestinian territory. Since 1993 it has barred Palestinians from working inside Israel, even though Israeli bosses exploited them as cheap labour. This has worsened the situation immeasurably inside Gaza and the West Bank. Gaza is enclosed by a security fence and at present a separation wall is being built around the West Bank.
The Israeli capitalist state collects VAT and customs duty on Palestinian goods and controls the water, power and petrol supply. Last November it threatened to cut off electricity to the 1.3 m strong population of Gaza (where hospitals have no emergency generators) as a collective punishment for rocket attacks on Israeli territory by armed Palestinian militias. And this for a territory that it has ostensibly withdrawn from!
The terrible living conditions in Gaza and the West Bank are undoubtedly caused by the military occupation and the economic stranglehold imposed by the Israeli state. But the PA, led by Fatah, proved incapable of providing any strategy to face this menace and in effect acted as the conduit for the policies of US imperialism and those of the Israeli ruling class, holding back any attempt by the masses to fight back. Moreover, Fatah leaders, many of them exiled returnees, grew fat on corruption, building themselves gleaming villas next to overcrowded refugee camps. This is where the majority of the population live in overcrowded hovels on sewage filled streets. It was under conditions like this that Hamas began to build its base, particularly in the more poverty stricken Gaza strip.

Mistakes of the "left"
One of the additional political factors which aided the growth of Hamas were the mistakes made by the leadership of the left organisations in the West Bank and Gaza such as the Peoples Party (Communist Party) the DFLP (Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine) and the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine). The latter two organisations described themselves as "marxist" at different times in their history and did have quite significant support in some areas of the Occupied Territories (Gaza strip and the West Bank) during the first Intifada. It is true that all of them did have differences with Fatah on strategy and tactics.
However, despite the individual bravery of many of their activists, unfortunately all of these organisations were light years away from genuine Marxism. Instead their leaderships basically tail-ended the nationalist approach of Fatah. They did this by supporting the idea that before any struggle for socialism could even be theoretically embarked upon, a democratic secular Palestinian state had to be achieved under capitalism. However, that is precisely what US imperialism cannot afford in the region because of the threat this would entail to its interest in maintaining a capitalist Israeli state as a key strategic ally.
Neither did these organisations put forward a programme and analysis which emphasised the unique role of the working class drawing behind it the poor peasantry as the only force on which a struggle to win genuine national liberation and transform the lives of the majority, could be built.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, many of the activists in these organisations became demoralised and dropped out of activity. These organisations have never really recovered. As a result despite the fact that both the DFLP (standing with the Peoples Party), and PFLP standing alone, put forward lists in the elections they only managed to get five seats between both of them.
As these organisations began to go into crisis, Hamas, otherwise known as the Islamic Resistance Movement (Harakat al-Muqawwama al-Islammiya) continued growing. Hamas developed out of the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist religious organisation formed in Gaza in 1946. Many Hamas leaders were originally involved in Mujama‘, a charity set up in 1978 which developed a network of clinics, kindergartens and educational institutions. It had its main support base in the Islamic University in Gaza. Mujama‘ quickly came into conflict with the more secular Fatah. In the 1980s Mujama‘ also carried out attacks on cinemas, bars and casinos. The former Israeli military governor of Gaza, Brig-Gen Yitzhak Sager, admitted that the Israeli state had indirectly funded Mujama‘. These tactics were used by the Israelis to undermine Fatah, which then had majority support in the Occupied Territories, and prevent opposition to it taking a "left" character.
The Israeli state had a similar approach to Hamas when it was formed in early 1988, allowing its charitable institutions to be registered and granting travel permits for its leadership into and out of the Territories to other Arab countries.
Hamas’ aims, expressed in its founding charter in 1988, are to create an Islamist state on the territory encompassed by Gaza, the West Bank and Israel. Such a state would be ruled under Shariah law. This would be an oppressive reactionary society which would be hostile to an independent movement of the working class in defence of its rights and socialist ideas. It would also mean the widespread oppression of women. It would represent a move backwards socially and politically.
The preamble to the Hamas Charter of 1988 states "Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before it." It also states that "The Islamic Resistance Movement believes that the land of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf consecrated for future Moslem generations until Judgement Day. It, or any part of it, should not be squandered or … given up."

Oslo boycotted
This is why Hamas opposed the Oslo "peace agreement" and also boycotted the first elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council (Parliament). Despite this, throughout the 1990s Hamas built its base, partially through funding social services which were not provided by the Fatah-led PA and also by having the most radical anti-imperialist and anti-Israeli rhetoric. However, the collapse of the Oslo "peace agreement", the development of the second Intifada, and the complete abasement of the Fatah leadership before the imperialist powers opened the way for a much bigger growth in Hamas’ support.
While Hamas has organised elements of mass protests during the second Intifada, these have always been strictly controlled from above and only used intermittently. Its military arm, the ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam brigades, have carried out armed attacks against the IDF and launched rocket attacks against Israel. One of its main tactics in the struggle against the Israeli occupation has been the use of suicide bombers against Israeli targets – many of them civilian. Hamas first used this tactic following the massacre of 29 Muslims in a mosque in Hebron in February 1994. Since then they have carried out 60 attacks which have killed 300 Israelis. Given the absence of an alternative organisation or method of struggle, as well as the desperation to end the horrific occupation, this tactic has achieved some support amongst the Palestinians.
The CWI understands the reasons which drive Palestinians to use these desperate measures. However we completely oppose this method of struggle because its results are counter-productive. Israeli Jewish workers and sections of the middle class are angry at the collapse in their living standards and the corruption of their politicians. They realise the so-called "peace process" is a diplomatic manoeuvre between the elites which has nothing to do with guaranteeing peace and security for the majority. However, these moods are pushed into the background when suicide bombings occur, and the majority of Israelis feel they have no option but to support the government’s oppressive measures as the only available measure to try to protect their security.
This gives the ruling class the social support it needs to step up oppressive measures against the Palestinians and divert attention away from the pressing social and economic problems inside Israel.
This does not mean the CWI has a pacifist approach. We believe in a mass, democratic struggle of the Palestinian working class and poor peasantry to end the occupation. Such a movement will have to be armed to defend itself against the attacks by the IDF and others but those bearing arms should be accountable to the working class as a whole.

Al Qa’eda?
The more reactionary sections of the media internationally have implied that Hamas and Al Qa’eda are largely the same because both are "terrorist" groups. It is undoubtedly the case that Hamas’s political ideology is reactionary, but direct comparisons with Al Qa’eda are incorrect. Al Qa’eda is a loose international network, made up of small groups of fighters, dedicated to terror attacks against "non-believers" the world over, and pledged to the recreation of the seventh century Islamic caliphate, an area covering much of Asia, North Africa and Southern Europe.
Hamas is an organisation which is nationally based (in Israel and Palestine). This makes it possible for it to provide a range of social services such as clinics and schools, whereas this is not the perception of Al Qa’eda’s role. Unlike Al Qa’eda, Hamas has organised elements of mass struggle. While internationally many people may not agree with Hamas suicide bombings and rocket attacks on Israel, many would point to the brutal measures carried out by the IDF which have preceded these attacks. The attacks on the World Trade Centre or the beheading of hostages in Iraq, are viewed differently by many activists who strongly oppose such tactics.
However, it was Hamas’ promise of an alternative corruption-free life that struck a chord amongst the Palestinians and saw its support rise massively on the ground over the last year. The extent of this support was not fully recognised by Israeli military intelligence, US imperialism and, crucially, the Fatah-led PA. Even before the death of Yasser Arafat in 2004, the PA leadership was in reality paralysed and unable to control events on the ground. In partial recognition of this, Arafat was forced to announce the holding of local elections. Hamas had long campaigned for this, eager to consolidate its growing base at local level.
Participation in local elections raised other questions for the Hamas leaders. Whatever they said publicly, Hamas’ military and political leaders knew that a campaign of suicide bombings or military attacks on its own would not defeat the Israeli ruling class. Moreover, the IDF’s assassination campaign had eliminated much of their leadership and a certain war-weariness amongst the Palestinian masses acted forced them to look at other alternatives. Undoubtedly the entrance of Hezbollah in Lebanon into Parliament had an effect.
The more moderate section of Hamas, led by Khalid Mashal (who is exiled in Syria) as well as the majority of Hamas prisoners, won the organisation over to the idea of participating in the political process including standing for national elections. This was not an easy decision to make. It meant agreeing to a ceasefire (tahdi’a) agreement which was signed in March 2005.
Partly because of the pressure that has been brought to bear on them, Hamas has begun to give mixed messages as far as its approach to Israel is concerned. The Hamas manifesto in these elections did not make any mention of the destruction of the state of Israel. One of its leaders, Muhammad Ghazal, commented in a Reuters interview in September 2005 that "The [Hamas] charter is not the Koran". By this he clearly meant that under certain conditions, sections of the Charter could be changed. He also said "When we talk about politics it means we have accepted the 1967 borders. We are ready to have those borders. We accepted to have our own state. Limited land swaps are a minor thing. The Palestinian people agreed to forget 78 per cent of our land". Implicit in this is a abandonment of the call for the destruction of the Israeli state. But on the other hand, Mashal, known in Hamas for his moderation, praised the recent comments of Ahmadinejad, the Iranian president, to wipe Israel off the face of the earth.
Abbas, the PA president took a big gamble in encouraging Hamas’s participation in politics. He hoped by doing this he would be able to force the organisation to disarm. This was the only option open to him – the repeated demands of US imperialism and the Israeli ruling class that he should forcibly disarm Hamas and the other militias were ludicrous. Such a course of action was untenable military, politically and socially. If Abbas had attempted to implement their wishes, he would have been removed from power and an open civil war would in all likelihood have followed.
In visits last year to the US, Abbas convinced the Bush administration that Hamas should be allowed to participate in elections and by the time the national elections were scheduled, Fatah would be able to secure a majority. As a senior adviser to Abbas said at the time, "This message will reverberate throughout the Middle East: in the first clear and clean electoral contest between pragmatic nationalism [Fatah] and extreme Islamism [Hamas], the nationalists will have won." ("Enter Hamas: The Challenges of political integration", International Crisis Group, 18 January 2006).
This perspective was incorrect to say the least. The local elections, held in four rounds, brought sweeping victories for Hamas last year. The historic bastion of Fatah support in Nablus on the West Bank, fell to Hamas as did many other urban areas. Hamas developed a disciplined campaigning technique for these elections – it produced green baseball caps and distributed stickers, and used teams of canvassers and polling station agents. In Nablus on polling day voters twice received mobile phone text messages asking if they had voted in accordance with God’s will.

Dry run
These methods were a dry run for the national elections held a few days ago. Fatah entered the campaign in disarray and ended it in chaos. The crisis in Fatah was reflected in the process of drawing up lists of candidates. The old guard in the leadership wanted to keep all the top slots for itself leading to a rebellion from below, lead in part by Mustafa Barghouti. He is imprisoned in an Israeli jail and was one of the activists who rose to prominence in the first Intifada. Barghouti is one of the most popular Fatah leaders. From his prison cell Barghouti organised a split from Fatah and put forward a separate list called "Al Mustaqabal" (The Future) until Abbas relented and made concessions. The extent of the weakness of the old leadership was demonstrated by the fact that Barghouti was then given the number one slot on the Fatah lists.
Nonetheless this did not solve the problem. There were numerous "unofficial" Fatah candidates, some of whom were given unofficial political and financial support by old guard Fatah leaders. This made the scale of the defeat for Fatah worse. Half the seats for the Legislative Council are elected on the basis of proportional representation for a party list and half in 16 multi-seat constituencies. In the constituency section, for example, in Jerusalem there were 6 seats to be won. However there were 19 "independent" Fatah candidates and five "official" ones – all competing against each other!
There was a partial recognition of the impending catastrophe that was about to befall US imperialism and Israeli capitalism as a result of this election. But the response acted to build support for Hamas rather than undermine it. Since the local elections, the IDF has arrested hundreds of Hamas activists, candidates and organisers. This made the Israeli military look like a wing of the election campaign of Fatah and in fact led to those arrested being viewed as martyrs.
US imperialism took a slightly more subtle, but in the end, just as fruitless approach. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) organised a $2 million programme of spending in the West Bank and Gaza to try to boost the image of the PA and therefore help Fatah in its election campaign. Thirty projects some of them involving the free distribution of food and water at Israeli checkpoints, and the funding of advertisements announcing events funded by the programme in the name of the PA, were organised. The consulting firm hired to devise the strategy for this campaign said the goal was to "help lay the foundation for successful moderate leadership in Gaza as well as the West Bank"! (Washington Post, US, 22 January 2006)
This, and the Fatah campaign, failed disastrously. However, even the Hamas leadership were surprised by the extent of their victory. While it may seem strange, the size of this landslide is not the result they hoped for. Before the elections, "Khalil Shahin, Al-Ayam newspaper correspondent, says that Hamas seems gripped by a mixture of euphoria about the possible outcome and fear that it [a victory] might be realised. It is afraid of its electoral strength and doesn’t want more than 40 per cent of the vote…[with this] it would be able to block the political process without the responsibility of government." ("Enter Hamas: The Challenges of political integration", International Crisis Group, 18 January 2006).

Fears confirmed
These fears were confirmed immediately after the elections. Hamas leaders spent all day calling on Fatah to join them in a unity government, when rumours of their victory began to circulate. The Fatah PA government and Prime Minister responded by resigning. Since then rumours have spread around the Palestinian areas that Hamas is negotiating with Salam Fayyad, (ex Fatah member and former Finance Minister of the PA who was previously an employee of the World Bank), to be the new Prime Minister.
A new and very unstable situation has opened up in Gaza and the West Bank. The Israeli government has said that there will be no negotiations with the PA because Hamas will be part of the government and the party has refused to renounce its call for the destruction of the Israeli state. Of course, the Israeli regime has not mentioned that it was prepared to have contacts with local councils run by Hamas and facilitate through prison officials, negotiations between Hamas prisoners with other Arab countries as well as their leadership. It has announced that it will not pass over VAT receipts or customs duties to the PA as has been the case previously.
The Bush administration has said that it will review all aid to the Palestinian Authority since Hamas is on its list of banned terrorist organisations. At the moment it donates $234 million a year. But its first act was to plead with Abbas to stay on as President. Undoubtedly, one calculation behind this request was to have a non-Hamas member who could act as an intermediary without it appearing as if they are negotiating with "terrorists".
The EU (as opposed to its member states) also donates $280 million a year to the PA. It is less likely they will cut back or halt funding. But the imperialist powers face a very difficult decision.
On 31 January, the PA will need $100 million, at least, to pay the wages of its 135 000 employees. Without these wages an explosion of mass protest could occur. At the moment there is no money and the PA is bankrupt. There will be huge pressure on imperialism to find some solution to this potential disaster – Either through channelling the money via Abbas, the president, or perhaps with some of the Arab regimes stepping in with emergency funding.
In Nablus demonstrations have taken place by Fatah members calling for the resignation of the entire leadership of the organisation. Senior members of Fatah militias have announced an "internal intifada" to drive out the old corrupt leadership.
As far as Hamas is concerned, it is very unlikely that it will renounce its call for the destruction of Israel over the next few weeks and months. This would cause huge divisions at the moment, especially within Hamas’s military wing. As far as disarming its militias, Khalid Mashal held a press conference in Damascus on Saturday 28 January explaining that Hamas was prepared to merge its militias and form a Palestinian army from all the security forces. This is an opening negotiating tactic and one that is likely to be bitterly opposed by US imperialism and the Israeli state. However, what Hamas may do is formally set up a separate political party from its armed militias in an attempt to overcome this problem. Hamas may be looking at the example of Sinn Fein and the IRA as an example to emulate. Hamas leaders in the run-up to the elections did make the point that in return for a withdrawal by Israel to the 1967 borders, they would be prepared to announce a 10 to 15 year ceasefire.
It is undoubtedly the case that whatever their public pronouncements before the elections, elements within the Bush administration were hoping that a more moderate wing within Hamas could be strengthened and absorbed into the political process. Condoleezza Rice, US Secretary of State, commented in September 2005, "There are periods of time of transition in which one has to give some space to the participants, in this case the Palestinians, to begin to come to a new national compact…For instance, in the Good Friday Agreement it was understood when Sinn Fein came into politics… eventually the IRA would disarm, and perhaps, hopefully, that process is underway." ("Enter Hamas: The Challenges of political integration", International Crisis Group, 18 January 2006)
Rice is correct to be so conditional! In Ireland the "peace process" has foundered. It is three years since the local power-sharing government collapsed. The level of violence which characterised the Troubles may have died down in terms of its intensity but the sectarian polarisation between Protestant and Catholic communities is as great if not greater, than before. None of the fundamental problems have been solved.
But in the Middle East the tension, huge social and economic problems, and the geo-strategic importance of the region mean that rather than a reduction in violence, a new period of instability and clashes could develop. Islamic Jihad and the Al-Aqsa brigades (formerly Fatah’s armed wing) have already said they will continue armed attacks against Israeli targets.
It still remains to be seen whether Hamas can successfully take control of the PA security forces. Many of them are Fatah members. Partly this depends on Hamas’ ability to keep on paying their wages. But there is no doubt that the possibility of episodes of violence, verging on open civil war is more likely. There have already been armed clashes between Hamas and Fatah supporters.
The Hamas victory will destabilise the capitalist and feudal elite across the region. Egypt already has seen an increased vote for the Muslim Brotherhood in the most recent elections. In Saudi Arabia more hardline Islamist candidates won ground in the limited elections that took place last year. There is already a growth in support for reactionary Islamist organisations, including Al Qa’eda amongst the population. Jordan already has a majority of Palestinians living there and the Muslim Brotherhood is active as an opposition group. In all of these countries, these forces will be strengthened and the ruling elite weakened by Hamas’s victory. The election results in Gaza and the West Bank will also increase fears that Iran, which has refused to bend to imperialism’s pressure to close down its civilian nuclear programme, is strengthening its influence in the region, because of its historic links with Hamas.

US campaign in tatters
US imperialism’s propaganda campaign for "democratisation" in the region is in tatters. Even during the Egyptian elections there were signs that the Bush administration was having second thoughts about how wise it was to push for democratic elections – especially since the results were not the ones wanted by US imperialism. It could be the case that US imperialism will attempt to come to agreements with leaders that are already in power, rather than pushing for "regime change" through the ballot box. For example, representatives of the Syrian regime have claimed that they are negotiating a deal with the US and France which might allow President Assad to stay in power as long as he incriminates some of his own senior officials in the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri.
Meetings have already been planned between US representatives and the Jordanian regime and Mubarak in Egypt for next week. The Quartet group (involving Russia, the EU, the UN and US) has sprung into life and called an emergency meeting which will take place in the next few days.
The political situation in Israel will also become more complicated for a time. Fears amongst Israeli Jews have been whipped up as a result of the Hamas victory. Soon after the election of Hamas, Israel’s Defence Minister, Mofaz, implied in a media interview, that Hamas leaders should not think they were exempt from assassination attempts by the IDF following their election victory.
It is more likely that the Israeli general election in March will be fought on security issues. Prior to the Palestinian election, there was a bigger chance that social, economic and working class issues could form part of the election debate as a result of the election of Amir Peretz (former head of the Histadruth and a working class Sephardic Jew) as leader of the Labour Party. Instead, it is possible that even Benjamin Netanyahu’s reactionary Likud party could regain some of the ground it has lost.
Hamas will now have to deliver the goods – and quickly - to the Palestinian people. While in power in local councils, although it cleaned up the worst examples of corruption, it also carried out cuts in spending and sold off local council land and property, ostensibly to clear debts which involved paying "non-Islamic" interest payments.
Experience will show the Palestinian masses that only a break with capitalism and feudalism can begin to offer a way out of the disaster they face. But disappointment with Hamas rule will not be, in and of itself, enough to ensure this conclusion is drawn. A clear socialist alternative as part of an independent working class movement will have to be constructed for that to happen. The CWI will, along with the most conscious activists, struggle to make that objective a reality.
This would require a struggle to end mass unemployment and poverty. But this would only be the beginning – a movement to end the political and economic oppression by Israeli, Palestinian and Arab capitalism needs to be built which can put in its place a democratically planned socialist economy to transform the living standards of the region. Such a struggle would also include the right of Palestinians to self-determination, including an independent state with full rights for all minorities. This would mean the fight for a socialist Palestine and a socialist Israel, as part of a voluntary socialist confederation of the Middle East.

The Saudi ship is quietly, firmly shifting course

2006-01-29T22:58:00.000-08:00

By Afshin Molavi
Commentary by
Monday, January 30, 2006

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad stole the headlines last month during the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) summit with his incendiary remarks calling for Israel to be "wiped off the map." As a result, an event that might have showcased the new king of Saudi Arabia - a moderate, pan-Islamic, reform-minded modernizer - on an international stage, deteriorated into a media circus that raised questions about Muslim radicalism and presented exactly the opposite image than that which King Abdullah sought to cultivate.

King Abdullah bin Abdel-Aziz al-Saud, the sixth head of the modern Saudi state, saw the Mecca summit as the first step in his ambitious plan to trigger a Muslim world renaissance to jolt the world's more than one billion Muslims away from what he described as "political, economic, and social underdevelopment that has evolved into a major crisis." In a stinging rebuke of Islamic extremists, he lashed out at Al-Qaeda, describing its followers in Islamically-loaded terminology as "corrupters of the earth" - a charge tantamount to blasphemy. He also called on fellow Muslim leaders to create a poverty fund and a natural disaster relief fund for the Islamic world. It was an impressive performance and was meant to be, as one Saudi analyst said, "King Abdullah's coming out party," a chance for him to shine on a world stage.

Instead, he was overshadowed by Ahmadinejad, whose comments reflected the worst of the Muslim world. But shadows are not new to Abdullah who, for nearly a quarter century, waited in the shadows as crown prince, though he served as de facto ruler for 10 of those years after a stroke incapacitated King Fahd. As nominal ruler, Abdullah retained considerable powers, but the shadow of Fahd, his sons and their princely allies constrained him from fully implementing his nationalist, integrative, reformist vision at home and his moderate, pan-Islamic foreign policy abroad. As a consequence, Abdullah, it seemed at times, served as first mate on a drifting ship, plugging holes and generally guiding it in the right direction, but unable to shift course dramatically.

The Saudi ship is quietly but firmly shifting course now and Abdullah is fully in control. This is good news for global stability, for oil markets, for the war on terror and the future of the Muslim world. In his first six months in power unencumbered by the shadow of Fahd, Abdullah has already taken several dramatic steps, including releasing liberal dissidents from jail, reaching out to the Shiite minority, promising greater rights for women, shining an internal light on princely corruption, and tolerating a degree of press freedom unknown in Saudi history. Meanwhile, Saudi civil society is bursting with new energy, structural economic reforms and high oil prices have paved the way for what is shaping up to be a sustained boom, and the domestic terror threat is waning.

Though opinion polls are not common in Saudi Arabia, anecdotal evidence suggests Abdullah is a popular figure at home. In my travels to four cities across the kingdom last month, I was struck by the diverse range of people who praised Abdullah, from marginalized Shiite young men in the Eastern Province to cosmopolitan Jeddah intellectuals wary of Al-Saud rule. Many, especially Shiites, spoke approvingly of Abdullah's integrative vision, others praised his personal piety or his vigorous support for Palestinian self-determination; but, mostly, ordinary Saudis expressed satisfaction at his clean hands. Tired of princely corruption and worried by high unemployment and under-employment, despite record oil prices, many Saudis have grown to resent the perks and privileges of the some 7,000 princes in the kingdom. "King Abdullah and his sons are clean," one young man told me, "and that is worth more than you can imagine."
http://www.dailystar.com.lb

The king's domestic popularity will allow him to tackle some tough problems, including the reform of an entrenched Wahhabi religious establishment that continues to purvey a largely intolerant brand of Islam. Unlike Fahd, whose personal religious credentials were shaky owing to his playboy past, Abdullah has the gravitas to face down the religious establishment as an equal: a pious man of faith interested in reform. He has already done so in the crucial battleground of education. While Saudi schools still have far too many radically anti-Western teachers sympathetic to Osama bin Laden, many students told me that the new, recently-trained teachers express more moderate and tolerant views.

Abdullah's religious credentials will also be useful as he seeks to fill the gaping leadership vacuum in the Muslim world, a world that has dramatically failed to live up to the enormous potential of its people and now faces a precarious moment of rising Shiite-Sunni tension related to events in Iraq. Abdullah's recent meeting with fiery Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr, his groundbreaking public meetings with Saudi Shiites, televised live, and his behind-the-scenes diplomacy with Iran on the Iraq issue reflect his desire to reduce Shiite-Sunni tensions.

At this perilous moment, Abdullah has the potential to be among the most important Muslim leaders of the 21st century and a positive force for the future of the Islamic world. Over the past three decades, Saudi Arabia's imprint has largely been negative, using its money and prestige to spread Wahhabism globally, fund (or turn a blind eye to the funding of) radical madrasas, cultivate a religious ethos of intolerance at home that poisoned young minds, and support retrograde regimes like the Taliban.

In one of the great "what might have been" questions of history, Saudi Arabia squandered an extraordinary opportunity to help build a modern, economically dynamic, socially tolerant Muslim world. Instead, it significantly contributed to "the crisis" that Abdullah describes today.

A new oil boom and a cautiously reform-minded king now have the opportunity to erase some of those wrongs. Abdullah seems to be on the right track. His success will not be defined by great speeches or chest-thumping tirades. It will be defined by quiet acts of diplomacy that prevent conflict, the creation of new institutions that bolster Muslim world economies (reorganization and modernization of the Islamic Development Bank should be a top priority), and the spreading of an Islam that tolerates diversity and welcomes change. Though the path remains long and the obstacles large, the first six months of his rule suggest that Abdullah and Saudi Arabia have taken the right initial steps.

Afshin Molavi, a fellow at the New America Foundation in Washington, lived and worked as a reporter in Saudi Arabia in the early 1990s. This commentary first appeared at bitterlemons-international.org, an online newsletter.

The legacy of King Fahd

2006-01-21T13:33:00.000-08:00

Robert Fisk

So the old man will be buried this afternoon on the edge of the Saudi capital, Riyadh, in a desert graveyard of no memorials.

The strict Wahhabi tradition - to which, of course, that far more famous Saudi, Osama bin Laden, belongs - demands no statues, no gravestones, no slabs. So Fahd will be laid in the desert sand, his head touching the earth, covered over and left for the after-life. Not a single stone will mark his place.

Would that some of our own great leaders would suffer such humility - if less ostentatiously so - on their deaths.

King Fahd of Saudi Arabia has died after 22 years on the throne. His successor,Crown Prince Abdullah, will formally take his place tomorrow.

But the old king really died in 1995, when an embolic stroke disabled him, paralysed his mind, befuddled his senses - the 84-year-old Keeper of the Two Holy Places would often ask servants to pour coffee for Muslim guests during Ramadan - when drinking and eating is forbidden in the hours of daylight.

In effect, his half-brother Crown Prince Abdullah has been "king" since then and, now aged 82, is still, as the cliche goes, "clinging to power". Another half-brother - and all these half-brothers reflect the Bedouin background of the Saudi monarchy - Prince Sultan Abdul Aziz, will be the new crown prince

And he is already 81.

Those who claim the Saudi royal family is led by sclerotic old men have a point - but perhaps they do not go far enough. Like the massive Muslim oil nation to the north, Iran, Saudi Arabia has become a necrocracy: government by, with and for the dead.

For years, we had been saying that Fahd would die - at his massive family palace in Andalusia (he knew, of course, that this was once part of a fine Arab empire) or on his gorgeous, preposterous, jet airliners, their interiors designed to look like Arab tents, or just in that hideously famous swimming pool. He suffered from pneumonia and a high fever, officials would insist. Anything else was "malicious speculation" - which meant that it was all true.

This was the man, however, who had funded the Arab legions against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 when, as we know, Bin Laden took the role of "prince" because Fahd's real princes, including 7,000 official and unofficial ones, preferred the bars of Monaco or the whores of Paris to drawing the sword for the religion in whose lands stood their greatest shrines, Mecca and Medina.

And it was this same Fahd who brought down upon the Arab Gulf - and eventually upon the Americans - the wrath of Bin Laden and his al-Qa'ida, by asking the US to send troops to protect the land of the Prophet after Saddam Hussein's 1990 invasion of Kuwait. And his fate might have been to have died in an assassination before; but it's difficult to murder an already dead man.

This was the king who had poured his vast coffers into Saddam Hussein's war chest against Iran, studiously saying nothing about the gassing of up to 60,000 Iranian soldiers and civilians during that conflict, in the hope that the Beast of Baghdad (our friend at the time, needless to say) would overthrow that far more terrible beast, the revolutionary Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

When Saddam arrived in Kuwait, Fahd wrote him a letter, reminding him of how much the Saudis had contributed to his brutal war against Iraq. "Oh Ruler of Iraq," Fahd wrote, "the Kingdom extended to your country $25,734,469,885. 80 cents." Analysing that sum, I once calculated the figure issued by Fahd courtiers was out by a dollar and a cent. By contrast, Fahd's bankers calculated they spent $27.5bn on paying for America's liberation of Kuwait - slightly more than they paid to Saddam.

It was Fahd and the Pakistanis who had, on America's behalf, helped to arm the militias of Afghanistan against the Soviet Union and - disgusted by the victors' feuding - supported Mullah Omar's Wahhabi army of self-righteous peasant clerics, the Taliban. Under Fahd, the kingdom poured millions into the madrassas in Pakistan which have made the news again following 7 July. The Taliban (like some of the London suicide bombers) were an authentic product of Wahhabism, the strict, pseudo-reformist Islamist state faith of Saudi Arabia founded by the 18th cleric Mohamed Ibn Abdul-Wahab.

Journalists like to claim that Wahhabism is "obscurantist" but it is not true.

Abdul-Wahab was not a great thinker or philosopher but, for his followers, he was a near-saint. Waging war on fellow Muslims who had erred was an obligatory part of his philosophy, whether they be the "deviant" Shia Muslims of Basra - whom he vainly attempted to convert to Sunni Islam (they chucked him out) - or Arabians who did not follow his own exclusive interpretation of Muslim unity.

But he also proscribed rebellion against rulers. His orthodoxy threatened the modem-day House of Saud because of its corruption, yet secured its future by forbidding revolution. The Saudi ruling family thus embraced the one faith which could protect and destroy it.

Which is why all the talk in modem Saudi Arabia of "cracking down on terror, protecting women's rights, lessening the power of the religious police, is so much hokum.

Saudi Arabia's role - under Fahd's nominal leadership - in the 11 September 2001 crimes against humanity has still not been fully explored. While senior members of the royal family, especially the then Crown Prince Abdullah, who was never as convinced of America's foreign policy wisdom in the Middle East as Fahd, expressed the obligatory shock and horror that was' expected of them, no attempt was made to examine the nature of Wahhabism and its inherent contempt for all representation of human activity or death.

The destruction of the two giant Buddhas of Bamian by the Taliban in 2000 - along with the vandalism in the Kabul museum, fit perfectly into the theocratic wisdom. So too, it might be argued did the Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre.

In 1820, the much-worshipped statues of Dhu Khalasa, dating from the 12th century, were destroyed by Wahhabis. Only weeks after the Lebanese Professor Kamal Salibi suggested in the late 1990s that once-Jewish villages in what is now Saudi Arabia might have constituted the location of the Bible, Fahd sent bulldozers to destroy the ancient buildings in these towns.

Saudi religious authorities have destroyed hundreds of historic structures in the name of religion in Mecca and Medina, and former UN officials have condemned the bulldozing of Ottoman buildings in Bosnia by a Saudi aid agency backed by the Fahd government which claimed they were "idolatrous".

So all the talk of "restive" princes, of potential rivalries between the half-brothers now that Fahd is dead has a kind of pseudo-importance to it.

Saudi Arabian society is not - and cannot be - a "modern" society in our sense of the word as long as Wahhabism holds its power. But it must be allowed to do so - to protect the king. And since it increasingly becomes a poor country, the authorities and the religious police grow stronger.

And as we depend ever more on the Saudis to pump oil, we are ever more silent about what is wrong in the kingdom. Our policy towards Saudi Arabia is now exactly what it was in Iran before the fall of the Shah in 1979.

When he was governor of Riyadh, Prince Sultan, according to that brilliant American journalist Seymour Hersh, was once heard to say on a US telephone intercept that King Fahd didn't know what was happening during an international flight. "He's a prisoner of the plane," he remarked. "Like all the Saudi royal family."

Crown Prince Abdullah now formally takes on a role that he has served de facto for nearly a decade.

Diplomats said they did not expect major changes in Saudi foreign or oil policy under Abdullah who talks quietly, with a stutter, but is described as imposing and statesmanlike.

His crackdown on al-Qa'ida suicide bombers in 2003 who aimed to topple the House of Saud was unprecedented.

Article copyright Arab American News.

Saudi Chains of Oppression

2006-01-11T18:10:00.000-08:00

Saudi Chains of Oppression

By Jamie Glazov
FrontPageMagazine.com | January 11, 2006

Frontpage Interview’s guest today is Dr. Ali H. Alyami, Executive Director of The Center for Democracy and Human Rights in Saudi Arabia in

Washington, DC.

FP: Dr. Ali H. Alyami, welcome to Frontpage Interview.

Alyami: Thanks for inviting me, Jamie

FP: Your Center is doing impressive work in informing the public and our leaders about the current situation in Saudi Arabia and in working toward a new democratic political structure for that country.

I would like to talk to you today about the Saudi tyranny and the steps that can be taken to democratize the nation in a real way. First, let’s talk a bit about your background. You were born and raised in Saudi Arabia. Tell us a bit about your youth and how it shaped your intellectual journey.

Alyami: I was born into a semi-nomadic environment. Life was tough, but rich in values. There were no schools to speak of at the time, so learning was very limited. There were no role models to emulate either.

FP: Ok, expand a bit on your experiences and observations growing up in Saudi Arabia – especially in terms of the place of women in the society.

Alyami: I grew up in the southern part of the country. Women were working alongside men. They did not wear the dark abayah, the black cloak. Women did not cover their faces and girls did not cover their hair before they get married. There were lively gender interactions, discussions, consultations, sharing of ideas and very relaxed social mingling.

This environment started to change when the Saudi-Wahhabi men strengthened their presence and implemented their austere religious and tyrannical political rules on the southern region. The exclusion of Saudi women from the decision-making process and participation in the building of their country’s institutions, especially the educational curriculum, is one of the reasons extremist ideologues teach school children hate of other people, their religions and democratic values.

FP: Tell us a bit about the Wahhabis and why they were able to gain power and why they are so influential today.

Alyami: Wahhabism is a revisionist religious movement predicated on the austere Hanifi brand of Islam. The movement was named after its religious extremist founder, Mohammed Ibn Abdul Wahhab who was infatuated with religious domination under the guise of purifying Muslims whom he believed to have had strayed too far from the straight path. Abdul Wahhab heard of a prominent chief of a small tribe in Nejd, Central Arabia, by the name of Mohammed Ibn Saud who was aspiring for an economic and political domination over the areas of Arabia where trade, agriculture, and water were thriving and in abundance in comparison with the arid and poor areas of his region.

The two men formed an alliance (in or around 1744) with the intent of conquering other tribes, confiscate their land, convert them to Wahhabism, and kill those who resisted. From what is known about the Saudi-Wahhabi religious, economic, and political movement, its executers left a trail of death, looting and destruction. After almost two hundred years of wars with other tribes, the Saudi-Wahhabi allies prevailed and declared their state in 1932 which they named after the Saudi clan, Saudi Arabia. The Saudi wing was given the authority over the economic, political and security operation and the Wahhabis were put in charge of the religious, social and educational institutions. This division of powers between two clans and their total control over every aspect of the Saudi people's lives are the biggest obstacle to political participation, empowerment of women and development of democratic and tolerant institutions.

FP: What is the impulse to marginalize and disempower women? What are its sources? And why do you think misogyny is so inter-related with tyranny in general?

Alyami: Without defending or justifying the Saudi system of the dehumanization and nationalization of women, subjugation of women existed through human history. Misogyny comes from “misein” a Greek term for hate of women “gyne.” Discriminations against and humiliation of women can be found in every major religious books and in every culture, but nothing is as severe, destructive and damaging as the Saudi-Wahhabi inhumane exclusion of women, especially at this stage of human history. The sources of the exclusion of Saudi women can be found in religion, tradition and man fear of women empowerment. Sadly, in the Saudi state, segregation of and discrimination against women are institutionalized and reinforced on daily basis.

Contrary to the Saudi ruling family's repugnant claims that the causes of marginalizing Saudi women is religious and tradition; it is more economic and political plot. It's divide, conquer, turn the population against each other and exonerate the system of its full responsibilities toward all of its citizens. The government's owned and operated political, educational, social, religious and economic institutions are designed to deny women the rights to be treated as full citizens.

FP: What kind of democratic reforms are badly needed in Saudi Arabia today?

Alyami: There needs to be transformation of the Saudi political, economic, religious, social, and educational institutions. Presently, all powers and pillars of oppression reside in the hands of the Saudi ruling family and its religious extremist supporters. Without public active political participation, the same extremists will keep doing what they have done for the last eighty years and the results will be devastating for the people of Saudi Arabia, the Middle East and the international community, especially the US.

FP: Would you say that the roots of the terror war reside in Saudi Arabia?

Alyami: Ideologically, I would say Saudi Arabia is the major source of terror incitements and probably financing. Even though, the Saudi government, ruling princes, have deleted some anti-Semitic and anti-Christian hate phrases from its school curriculum, the fact remains that hate for non-Muslims and Muslim minorities are very strong in Saudi schools, mosques, media and living rooms. Without drastic political, educational, economic transformation of all Saudi institutions and empowerment of women, Saudi Arabia will remain the hotbed for extremism, terrorism and incitements.

FP: Is Saudi reform today real or artificial? Is it designed for political participation or to strengthen the status quo?

Alyami: The Saudi reform is mostly done to appease the system’s critics, especially the US, whose intense pressure is necessary if any meaningful reforms in Saudi Arabia are to take place. The Saudi reforms hitherto have been artificial, meaningless, misleading and designed to strengthen the status quo and neutralize the Saudi reformers’ efforts to expose the tyrannical policies of the Saudi ruling princes. An example of the Saudi reform duplicity is the partial municipal elections, which ended in April 2004. Only half of the candidates were allowed to run for office. The other half is to be chosen by the government. The government scrutinized all candidates and anyone who was perceived to be a potential non-conformist was eliminated.

The voted-in candidates were elected by less than 10% of the population. This is because women were barred from voting and so was everyone below the age of 21, the arms and security forces. The 10% who were allowed to vote are mostly members of the society who have already bought into and support the system as is. The elected candidates were told to wait until the government decides what to do with them. They waited for eight months and were told that they can only be another government’s observers. They have no power to enact and laws or even ask for anything from the central or local government officials. They were assigned the tough job of sending their complaints to the proper authorities. In short, the government created another agency to strengthen its grip on every corner of the country.

In Washington and in European capitals, the elections in Saudi Arabia were a milestone of more good things to fellow. This optimism is based on wishful thinking and avoidance of calling the Saudi elections by their true name, deceptive, flawed and designed to paint a positive image of a system that is anti-democracy and among the most violators of basic human rights. All a person has to do is look at the Mijles al-Shurah, Consultative Council. It was established in the early 90s and still yet to be anything other than a rubber stamp. It has no power to do anything other than meeting and praising the king and his family.

FP: Paint us a portrait of the persecution and oppression women in Saudi Arabia suffer today.

Alyami: The best person to be asked would be a Saudi woman. However, most Saudi women are still considered property. They still have to get male approval to travel, to open a bank account, to visit neighbors and even to deliver their babies in hospitals. Only six percent of able Saudi women are working in segregated areas and are not allowed to work at night for fear of sexual encounters.

FP: If you were to give the Bush administration advice on policy toward Saudi Arabia what would you recommend?

Alyami: Contrary to President Bush's bashers, he of all American Presidents has been able to change the political landscape in the Arab and Muslim countries. There is no more evidence of this than in Saudi Arabia. Bush’s public pressure on the Saudi princes to share power with their oppressed citizens have empowered Saudi democratic men and women reformers to speak up and demand fundamental changes in their politically stagnant society. My recommendation would be to continue public demands and pressure on the Saudi ruling family to share power with educated, democratic and tolerant Saudi men and women or step aside and let the people rule themselves. There are alternatives to the present system that can be put in place. Millions of educated Saudi citizens are capable of doing superior a job than the geriatric and uneducated princes who are in charge now.

FP: Mr. Alyami, thank you for joining us today and keep up the great work.

Alyami: Thank you for having me and for your interest in the important educational work the Center for Democracy and Human rights in Saudi Arabia is doing.

Saudi Doctorate Encourages the Murder of Arab Intellectuals

2006-01-11T17:26:00.000-08:00

Saudi Doctorate Encourages the Murder of Arab Intellectuals: "January 12, 2006 No.1070

A three-volume treatise by Sa'id ibn Nasser Al-Ghamdi, titled Deviation from the Faith as Reflected in [Arab] Thought and Literature on Modernity, has recently gained publicity in the Arab world. The book, published in December 2003 inSaudi Arabia, is based on Al-Ghamdi's 2000 doctoral dissertation, submitted to the Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud Islamic University, for which he received his degree summa cum laude. In his treatise, Al-Ghamdi names more than 200 modern Arab intellectuals and authors whom he accuses of heresy - thus making it permissible to kill them.

Jordanian-American reformist intellectual and researcher Dr. Shaker Al-Nabulsi wrote an open letter to Saudi King 'Abdallah Ibn 'Abd Al-'Aziz, demanding to 'establish an investigation committee into this dangerous matter, so as to clear the name of the governmental Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud University of [the disgrace of] these terrorist fatwas that serve only [the interests of] the terrorists within Saudi Arabia and outside it.' [1]

In an article in the Qatari daily Al-Raya, Al-Nabulsi compared Sa'id Al-Ghamdi's book to another book, titled Modernity in the Balance of Islam, written by the Saudi fundamentalist preacher 'Awadh Al-Qarni in 1988. In that book too, over 200 Arab authors, poets, researchers, philosophers, academics, literary critics, and journalists were accused of heresy - thus making their killing licit.
Al-Ghamdi's book, says Al-Nabulsi, is even more dangerous than Al-Qarni's, because it was published at a time when terrorism was at its peak, and the entire world was following every act that justified terrorism or encouraged terrorists in any way. In addition, it is more dangerous because it had received academic, religious, and official approval, and ceased to be merely an expression of personal opinion when it received the approval of the Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud University in Riyadh. Al-Nabulsi asserts: "The university that granted a degree to a cultural butcher like Sa'id Al-Ghamdi has become a cultural slaughterhouse in which more than 200 modern Arab intellectuals have been slaughtered and skinned..." [2]

Al-Ghamdi's book was reviewed on the reformist website www.metransparent.com by Egyptian poet and literary critic 'Abdallah Al-Samti, who said: "The most dangerous thing in this book is its outright call to murder, and the fact that it legitimizes the killing of Arab intellectuals, since Sa'id Al-Ghamdi claims that 'the statements, actions, and beliefs of [these intellectuals] demand the ridda punishment [3] and legitimize their killing. However, in the current secular political climate that has been imported from the West, they have [been able to] spread the heresy and atheism that is in their decayed hearts...'"

In his dissertation, Al-Ghamdi explains that "since the arrows of doubt shot by the enemies of Islam have multiplied... and they have spread their intellectual and behavioral poisons among the Muslim youth in an attempt to drown them in deviancy, to bring them out from light into darkness, to replace their inner conviction and faith, and to cast them into the wasteland of doubts, skepticism, and vanities - [for these reasons] it is incumbent upon those who understand this to make clear to their [Islamic] nation and their community the danger inherent in this behavior...

"The most dangerous and vile thing that the enemies of Islam have done in order to achieve their deviant aims has been to use cultural means, which are outwardly manifest as literature, poetry, culture, and criticism, but which internally embody heresy, skepticism, and hypocrisy.

"The enemies of Islam have succeeded in sowing the seeds of their hatred in the land of the Muslims, and in growing the evil tree - the tree of accursed materialism. Muslims see and hear the people who openly call to heresy and to departure from the right path, and who openly spread intellectual and moral depravity, sometimes in the guise of 'modern literature' and sometimes under the slogan of 'human culture'..."

Al-Samti explains that Al-Ghamdi identifies "modernism" with "secularism," both of which are, in his opinion, "intellectual poisons" and "deviant beliefs." Al-Ghamdi believes that those who hold these beliefs intend to "spread different kinds of falsehood," and he claims that "what makes the situation worse is that these people, [whose thinking] is deformed, have great influence in the guidance and media apparatuses of many Muslim states...

"Al-Ghamdi believes that modernism is a foreign plant intended to complete the West's colonialist domination over the Muslim countries, which has taken place over the past few centuries. Its goal is to destroy, to ruin, to cause chaos in matters of faith and ethics, and to plant deviancy, atheism, and doubt. Modernism attempts to destroy Islam and to remove it from people's hearts...

"Al-Ghamdi does not leave a single detail of modern culture - large or small - uncriticized. His criticism... reaches various levels of revilement, racism and accusation of heresy.

"Those who got the largest dose [of criticism] are: [Egyptian author] Naguib Mahfouz, [Syrian author] Adonis, [Egyptian intellectual] Hassan Hanafi, [Egyptian author] Jaber Asfour, [Syrian poet] Nizar Qabbani, [Palestinian poet] Mahmoud Darwish, [Iraqi poet] Badr Shakir Al-Sayyab, [Egyptian poet] Amal Dankal, [Libyan poet] Muhammad Al-Fayturi, [Yemenite poet] 'Abd Al-'Aziz Al-Maqalih, [Saudi intellectual] 'Abdallah Al-Ghadhami, and [Moroccan author] Mohamed Choukri."

Other intellectuals mocked by Al-Ghamdi in his dissertation are: Algerian intellectual Mohammed Arkoun, Egyptian poet Salah 'Abd Al-Sabur, Palestinian poet Ahmad Dahbour, Palestinian poet Samih Al-Qasim, Syrian author Ghadah Al-Saman, Egyptian author Nawal Al-Sa'dawi, Lebanese author Hanan Al-Shaykh, Egyptian author Taha Hussein, Egyptian author Qassem Amin, Palestinian poet Mu'in Bsisu, Palestinian poet Tawfiq Ziad, Egyptian intellectual Nasr Abu Zayd, Palestinian author Ghassan Kanafani, Palestinian author Emil Habibi, Egyptian intellectual Rifa'a Al-Tahtawi, Egyptian intellectual Sa'id 'Ashmawi, Egyptian author Yusuf Idris, and Sudanese author Al-Tayyib Salih.

Al-Samti adds that "Al-Ghamdi doesn't make do with merely attacking [these] Arab authors and intellectuals and accusing them of heresy, but also goes into politics, economics, society, arts, and ethics.

"In one of his attacks upon the Arab rulers and regimes, in which he accuses them of apostasy because they are 'secular,' he says: 'The [Arab thinkers] have become numb... and they have begun to corrupt the land. In their perception and thought, faith and apostasy, Islam and ridda, have lost all meaning, and they have begun to scorn everything, under the protection of the secular rulers who share their [views]. These rulers filled the prisons with Muslim religious scholars and disseminators of Islam, who want the [divine] shari'a, rather than human desires and the filth of human ideas, to rule...'"

Al-Samti asserts that Al-Ghamdi's proposals for fighting the deviation from faith that exists in modern literature are similar to "the recommendations of the Inquisition." His suggestions are: "to reevaluate the position of experts in religious law who overlook the deviations [from faith] in literature; to promote interest in Islamic literature; to study and expose the secular and modern deviations [in modern literature]; to increase supervision over the media and literary clubs; and to request fatwas from prominent religious scholars, which deal with Islamic law as it pertains to issues of modern deviations from the faith." [4]
______________
[1] http://www.metransparent.com/texts/shaker_al_nabulsi_open_letter_to_king_abdullah_bin_abdulaziz.htm December 2, 2005.

[2] Al-Raya (Qatar), December 13, 2005. http://www.raya.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=108978&version=1&template_id=24&parent_id=23.

[3] In Muslim law, ridda, or apostasy from Islam, is punishable by death.

[4] http://www.metransparent.com/texts/abdullah_al_samti_saudi_book_vs_200_arab_intellectuals.htm November 28, 2005.

دور العربية في مسرحية خدام

2006-01-11T10:24:00.000-08:00

عن دور العربية في مسرحية خدام وآخر مراحل انهيار دولة المخابرات العربية

GMT 3:45:00 2006 الثلائاء 10 يناير
د. عبد الوهاب الافندي

عندما ألقي السير جيفري هاو نائب رئيس وزراء بريطانيا خطاب استقالته الشهير في البرلمان في اواخر عام 1990 ودق به آخر مسمار في نعش زعامة مارغريت ثاتشر لحزب المحافظين والحكومة، علق احد الصحافيين علي الحدث بقوله: لم اكن اعلم ان الخروف الميت يمكن ان يعض بمثل هذه الشراسة ! فقد كانت الصحافة الساخرة اطلقت علي هاو لقب الخروف الميت لانه بزعمهم يخلو من اي كاريزما سياسية، ويميل الي الموادعة والسلبية في حلبة الصراع السياسي المحتدم. ولكن كل من استمع لخطاب استقالة هاو الذي لم يستغرق سوي خمس عشرة دقيقة لم يبق لديه ادني شك في ان ثاتشر اصبحت هي الخروف الميت في تلك اللحظة.
هناك ما يدعو الي تشبيه مداخلة نائب الرئيس السوري المستقيل عبد الحليم خدام المطولة علي قناة العربية الاسبوع الماضي بتلك الواقعة، سوي ان لقب الخروف الميت غير مناسب لخدام، وقد يكون لقبه الانسب البوق المعطل ، او كلب الحراسة الذي فقد اسنانه . ولكن لقب الخروف الميت ينطبق بلا شك علي قناة العربية التي تبرعت باذاعة البيان السياسي لخدام. فالقناة كما يعرف القاصي والداني تنتمي الي تلك المنظومة الاعلامية العربية التي عناها شاعرنا بقوله:
قبيلته لا يغدرون بذمة
ولا يظلمون الناس حبة خردل
ولا يردون الماء الا عشية
اذا صدر الورّاد عن كل منهل
فلم يعرف عنها ولا عن مثيلاتها من الصحف والقنوات انها قادت معركة اعلامية ضد اي جهة او سلطة، الا اذا صدر التوجيه السياسي بذلك، وهذه نفس المنظومة الاعلامية التي تسعي لاقناعنا بأن حركة الاصلاح المعارضة في السعودية لا وجود لها الا حين ينشق عنها احد اعضائها، او تحاول ان توهمنا بأن مراسم دفن حاكم رحل منذ اكثر من عشر سنوات حدث تاريخي يستحق ان تهمل من اجله كل اخبار العالم الاخري لاسبوع. وهي نفس المنظومة التي كانت تجتهد في صناعة الوهم بأن شخصا لا يستطيع الاجابة علي سؤال: ماذا تناولت للفطور هذا الصباح؟ يصدر المراسيم الاشتراعية، ويناقش السياسة الدولية مع كبار زعماء العالم، ويقيل ويعين الوزراء!
ولو كنت قد استشرت في اختيار شعار لتلك القناة، لما وقع خياري علي شعار الأقرب الي الحقيقة الذي تردده القناة عن نفسها، وانما كنت اوصي بشعار الأقدر علي الابداع (فشعار الأقرب الي الخيال قد لا يؤدي الغرض) لأن ما تقدمه هذه القناة واخواتها هو ابداع بكل المقاييس، يخجل امامه كبار روائيينا مثل الطيب صالح ونجيب محفوظ وطيب الذكر عبد الرحمن منيف. المشاهدون والقراء يتعاملون مع هذه الاجهزة الاعلامية تعاملهم مع روايات وافلام الخيال العلمي، يتابعونها، اذا فعلوا، للمتعة والتسلية وليس لاستقاء المعلومات، الا ما يستخلص من صمتها ويقرأ من بين سطورها.
وعليه حين تقدر قناة مثل العربية ان تخصص ساعتين ونصف الساعة، في فترة الذروة، وليومين متتاليين، لاعلان سياسي حزبي لمسؤول معارض لدولة عربية، فان هذا لا يمكن ان يعتبر قرارا تحريريا بني علي القيمة الخيرية والاعلامية لهذه المداخلة، فلا يوجد اعلامي يحترم نفسه يعطي المحاور خمسة واربعين دقيقة للاجابة علي سؤال واحد! القرار بفتح محطة اخبارية بلا حدود لمعارض لنظام عربي لم يتخذه بالقطع المراسل المعني، ولا رئيس تحرير قسم الاخبار، ولا كبير المراسلين، ولا رئيس تحرير القناة الموادع المسالم. القرار لم يتخذه كذلك مدير القناة ولا حتي رئيس مجلس ادارتها. الذي اتخذه هو بلا شك صاحب السمو الملكي اياه، وهو نفس الشخص الذي يملك ان يأمر محطات هز البطن والارداف بأن تنقطع عن كل شيء سوي تلاوة آيات الذكر الحكيم لايام متتالية، فتسمع وتطيع.
والسؤال هو: ما هي الحكمة الملكية السامية في مثل هذا القرار المخالف للمألوف؟ والاجابة بالطبع ان الحدث المعني لم يكن حدثا اعلاميا كما يتبادر الي الذهن، بل هو طقس ديني يقصد به التعبد في المحراب اياه، والتقرب والزلفي الي من بيدهم النفع والضر في دين البعض. وهو يذكر بقرار اتخذ قبل عقد من الزمان في عاصمة عربية اخري باحتضان صهري صدام حسين الفارين من بغداد في وقت كانت الولايات المتحدة تبحث فيه عن وسيلة لتقويض نظام صدام حسين من الداخل، وقد قوبل ذلك الحدث بكثير من التهليل الاعلامي المنظم، واعتبر فتحا مبينا.
ولا شك ان المرء يحتاج لان يكون علي قدر كبير من السذاجة لكي يعتقد ان صهري صدام اللذين يفتقدان لكل مؤهل سوي القرب والحظوة عند الرئيس السابق، يصلحان لبناء قاعدة سياسية ترمي لايجاد بديل عن نظامه. فكيف يتخيل شخص يفهم الابجديات في ديناميات العمل السياسي ان جلاوزة وفتوات نجحوا في الصعود الي هرم السلطة عبر المخاتلة والقمع والمحسوبية يمكن استخدامهم كمصدر الهام شعبي للثورة علي السلطة، او حتي كمخلب قط لانقلاب داخلي، علما بان المعنيين لا يملكان اي سند شعبي او تنظيمي داخل النظام الا ما حصلا عليه من ولي نعمتهما صاحب السلطة الحقيقية؟ وتعتبر درجة الوهم اسوأ بكثير في حالة عبد الحليم خدام. صهرا صدام كانا علي الاقل ينتميان الي الحلقة الاسرية والامنية والتنظيمية الداخلية للنظام، مما يعطيهما قيمة مخابراتية في الكشف عن الاسرار. الامر يختلف بالنسبة لخدام الذي لم ينتم يوما الي الحلقة الداخلية للنظام العلوي المهيمن في دمشق، ولا لمؤسساته الامنية المتحكمة. خدام كان كاسمه، خادما مطيعا وبيروقراطيا فاعلا حقق في المجال الذي اوكل اليه، كما افتخر بذلك، قدرا لا بأس به من النجاح، ولكن هذا باعترافه لم يقربه من الموقع الحقيقي لاتخاذ القرار في النظام.
افتخار خدام بنجاحه في السياسة الخارجية السورية، مثل افتخار صهر صدام حسين من قبل بالنجاح في مجال التصنيع العسكري ليس له اي قيمة سياسية، ولا يمكن ان يصلح كقاعدة لبناء رصيد سياسي مستقل. فالافتخار بالاخلاص والنجاح في خدمة نظام قمعي قهر الناس واستعبدهم يحسب علي من ادي هذه الخدمة لا له. والأمر اشبه بأن يفتخر برزان التكريتي بأنه حقق خدمات امنية جلي لنظام صدام في قهر معارضيه، ويتوهم بأن مثل هذا الفخر يمكن ان يعطيه شعبية عند الناس كمعارض لصدام!
ولكن واقعة انشقاق خدام وترويج المروجين لها لا تخلو من دلالات عميقة ومهمة تكشف المراحل النهائية لتفسخ وتداعي دولة المخابرات العربية. انشقاق خدام، وقبله انشقاق صهري صدام واخرين، يكشف اولا عن عزلة نظام الدولة التي اطلقنا عليها في تقرير التنمية الانسانية العربية العام الماضي دولة الثقب الاسود . فالرفض الشامل الذي تواجهه هذه الدولة لا يقتصر فيما يبدو علي عامة الشعب وضحاياها الكثر، بل يعتمل حتي داخل الحلقات المقربة. فالوزراء وكبار المسؤولين وافراد الاسرة الحاكمة واولياء العهد وغيرهم من المقربين من الدكتاتور يتربصون به الدوائر علي ما يبدو، وينتظرون اول فرصة للوثوب عليه (او للانتحار قرفا ويأسا).
دولة المخابرات العربية تعيش ايضا علي ما يبدو عزلة متزايدة عن العالم حولها صنعتها بنفسها. فالحاكم المحاصر في قصره يبدو اسيرا اكثر من ضحاياه لاجهزة مخابراته. هذه الاجهزة بامكانها ان تحرك الحاكم مثل الاراجوز عبر التقارير التي تنسجها، وتفرض عليه القرارات والخيارات. فما كشف عنه خدام مثلا عن تصديق قصص تشبه الاساطير توردها المخابرات للرئيس يعتبر مذهلا بكل المقاييس، ولكنه يكشف عن ديناميات الانهيار الداخلي لدولة المخابرات. فالدكتاتور يضع نفسه تماما تحت رحمة اجهزته المخابراتية، وهذه الاجهزة بدورها تطور اجندتها الخاصة لحماية نفسها، وتصفية الحسابات مع المنافسين والخصوم، وتبيع مخدومها الروايات والاساطير.
وكما كشف خدام ايضا، فان احد اكثر الاوهام القاتلة التصاقا بدولة الثقب الاسود هو تصورها ان العالم خارجها هو مسودة طبق الاصل منها. ومن هذا القبيل توهم القيادة السورية بامكانية عقد صفقات سرية مع واشنطن لحماية نفسها من اخطائها وسقطاتها، وقراءتها الغاية في الغباء لديناميات صنع القرار في امريكا. ويعتبر هذا الخطأ مركبا لأن سياسة الولايات المتحدة هي كتاب مفتوح لمن يقرأ. المؤامرات الامريكية لا تحاك في الظلام، وانما تناقش علنا في مراكز الابحاث واجهزة الاعلام والكونغرس واماكن اخري. هكذا كان الامر في قرار غزو العراق، وكذلك الامر في السياسة تجاه السعودية ونشر الديمقراطية وغيرها. ولا يحتاج الامر الي عبقرية اجهزة المخابرات للكشف عما هو مكشوف اصلا.
الانهيار المدهش لدولة المخابرات العربية ظهر كذلك في تصدع واجهتها الاعلامية، وهو تصدع برز بصورة اوضح مع صدور القرار باسكات العربية واخواتها عن متابعة اخبار واقوال خدام كما اسكت الصباح شهرزاد عن الكلام المباح، فكان الانصياع والانهيار الكامل للمصداقية، وانكشاف دور هذه الاجهزة الاعلامية كأبواق دعاية وادوات مطيعة في يد السلطان، يطلقها مثل كلاب الصيد فتنهش من شاء، ويعقلها فتجلس سامعة مطيعة.
ومثلما تحولت اجهزة المخابرات من رصيد الي نقمة علي اصحابها، حيث تتحمل المسؤولية كاملة في الانهيار القادم لنظام الاسد، فان ابواق الدعاية الاعلامية تصبح اداة لفضح العورات التي استحدثت لسترها. فهي تفضح غباء سادتها وسذاجتهم السياسية المضحكة، مثلما تعري الاعلام المأجور من ورقة التوت التي لم تكن تستر الا ما تستره ملابس الراقصة المحترفة.
وكلما شاهدنا مسرحية جديدة في هذه المهزلة المستمرة، كلما تأكد اكثر ان هذا العرض المخزي يقترب من نهايته المحتدمة، فبين الاساطير التي ينسجها الاعلام وتلك التي تبدعها اجهزة المخابرات، يترنح النظام المخابراتي العربي نحو هاوية محتومة وهو يتخيل انه يطير بأجنحة من صنع خياله، وقريبا سنسمع لسقوطه دويا تسعد له آذان الشعوب المغلوبة علي امرها.

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